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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a case study of the strategies used by political parties to maintain one-party 
control at the state level. The New Hampshire House of Representatives, an unusually large 
chamber with 400 members, is studied. The Republican Party was able to maintain control of the 
House for almost 80 years, even when two-party competition arose in the state in the 1990s and 
Democrats were winning seats at the top of the ticket. To explain how they were able to maintain 
control, this thesis examines the use of redistricting, floterial districts, and ballot design to 
highlight the political strategies used by the party. An analysis of both the intended and 
unanticipated consequences of institutional design as well as the interplay and sequencing of the 
strategies explain how Republicans manipulated electoral institutions and translated votes into 
seats in order to protect a party’s majority in the legislature. 
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Introduction 
 
In 1984 Representative Evelyn King ran for reelection for the New Hampshire House of 
Representatives, but lost by 791 votes (N.H. Dept. of State 1985, 416). She was a Democratic 
incumbent representing Manchester Wards 8 and 9, along with five other Democrats and one 
Republican representative (N.H. Dept. of State 1983, 268). As a result of the House redrawing 
the district maps for the 1984 election, her district no longer existed. The legislators drew Wards 
8 and 9 as their own individual districts with three representatives each. In addition, a new type 
of district, called a floterial district, was used to cover Wards 7, 8, and 9. Representative King 
decided to run for representative of the floterial district and lost to the Republican candidate.  
The Republican Party had a majority in the New Hampshire House for about 60 years 
leading up to the 1984 election, and it was unlikely that the Democrats would be able to gain a 
majority. The 1984 election was a presidential election year and a landslide for Republicans in 
the state. In addition to 1984 being a wave election, the institutions and electoral systems and 
political makeup of the state at this time made it difficult for a Democrat to win office. The 
Republicans recently redistricted the state and included floterial districts for the first time. The 
ballot at the time included a straight-ticket option, and was in the party column form with the 
Republican Party listed first. Although New Hampshire was a decidedly Republican state in 
1984, the state would soon experience a political shift and the institutions and electoral systems 
would become strategies used by the Republican Party to maintain their majority in the House. 
By 2012 the once guaranteed Republican state shifted to a “purple state.” Beginning in 
the 1990s, the Democrats started to win seats at the top of the ticket, and in 2006 the Democrats 
gained a majority in the House for the first time in 80 years. While in the majority, the 
Democrats changed the design of the ballot so that it no longer had a straight-ticket option or the 
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Republican Party listed first. After this change, the Republicans took back the majority in 2010 
and redistricted the House districts. Manchester Wards 7, 8, and 9 were drawn as their own 
districts and as part of floterial districts. Manchester Ward 7 is now in a floterial district with 
Wards 4, 5, and 6. Manchester Wards 8 and 9 are in a floterial district with Litchfield, a 
decidedly Republican town. In the 2012 election, the state’s political makeup, district map, and 
ballot are significantly different than in 1984.  
Although the political environment for Democrats in New Hampshire in 2012 was better 
than 1984, Representative King would not have been guaranteed a win. If Representative King 
ran in the 2012 election in the floterial district made up of Manchester Wards 4, 5, 6, and 7, she 
would have likely won the election because two out of the three representatives who won were 
Democrats. If Representative King ran in the floterial district made up of Manchester Wards 8 
and 9 and Litchfield, she would have likely lost. The two representatives that won that floterial 
district were both Republicans (“State Representative-2012 General Election”). Despite the fact 
that the Democrats won a majority in the House after the 2012 election, some of the strategies 
the Republicans had implemented in the 2012 redistricting bill to maintain their majority in the 
House were successful, such as the floterial district combining Manchester Wards 8 and 9 with 
Litchfield. Even though the Democrats had attempted to eliminate the strategies the Republican 
Party was using to maintain party control in the House, such as ballot design, the Republicans 
still managed to translate some votes into seats for their party in a Democratic wave election. 
The political environment for a Democratic candidate running for the New Hampshire 
House of Representatives changed from 1984 to 2012, because of the rise of two-party 
competition in the state and the increased use of strategies by the Republican Party to maintain 
their majority in the House. New Hampshire Republicans were able to maintain a majority in the 
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House for about 80 years, but in the past four legislative sessions the Democrats have held the 
majority for three. As noted above, New Hampshire Democratic candidates started winning seats 
at the top of the ticket in the 1990s. The Republicans, however, were able to maintain party 
control in the House. This thesis will explain what strategies allowed the Republicans to 
maintain party control, including redistricting, the use of floterial districts and at-large districts, 
and ballot design, while there was a rise of two-party competition in the state. The following 
chapters will analyze each strategy individually, but will also point to how that strategy 
individually could not guarantee a Republican majority. Thus, this thesis seeks to highlight how 
sequencing of multiple strategies allows a political party to maintain control of a state legislature 
while there is two-party competition in the state. The New Hampshire House provides an 
example of how politicians use multiple strategies to translate votes into seats.  
The structure of my thesis consists of a chapter outlining the relevant literature on the 
strategies used to maintain party control, three chapters dedicated to analyzing the strategies in 
relation to the New Hampshire House and a final chapter explaining the sequencing of the 
strategies. Chapter one serves the purpose of further explaining my research question and 
outlining the relevant literature on the strategies. I begin the chapter with an explanation of the 
research question and the chosen case study. Then I explain that the framework of this thesis will 
be guided by the work of Eric Schickler and Paul Pierson. While Schickler focuses on the 
motivation of political actors, Pierson suggests a focus beyond the actors. Pierson’s focus is on 
sequencing and unanticipated consequences of institutional design, and thus ties together the 
chapters on each individual strategy. In this chapter I also introduce the fact that there was a shift 
in political alignment in New Hampshire in the 1990s, resulting in the rise of two-party 
competition in the state. The following chapters explain how the Republican Party was able to 
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maintain control of the House as there was a rise in two-party competition. Lastly, this chapter 
outlines the relevant literature on the strategies and institutions that will be discussed in relation 
to my case study in the following chapters. 
The second chapter looks at the strategies Republicans used when redistricting the state. I 
begin the chapter in 1964 and end with the 2012 redistricting plan. A key transition in 
redistricting in New Hampshire began with the 1964 United States Supreme Court ruling in 
Reynolds v. Sims. As a result of the principle that came out of the ruling, “one-person, one-vote,” 
the state legislature changed their redistricting process. The legislature was now required to 
redistrict every 10 years after the federal census to account for the changes in the state population. 
I then trace through redistricting in the state, including the years 1982, 1992, 2002, 2004, and 
2012. The redistricting bills in these years highlight the introduction of new mechanisms and 
gerrymandering techniques used by the Republican representatives. Additionally, the bills 
explain changes to the redistricting process as a result of election results, the rise of two-party 
competition, and Court rulings. Lastly, I explain how often these bills produced unanticipated 
consequences.  
Floterial districts are introduced as a mechanism for redistricting in the second chapter, 
and then further explained and analyzed in the third chapter. A floterial district is a district that 
“floats” over multiple existing single-member or multi-member districts that individually do not 
have a large enough population to receive an additional representative. This chapter will explain 
how this district was introduced to the New Hampshire redistricting process and how over time it 
became a mechanism for gerrymandering. A floterial district allows the party in control of the 
legislature to strategically group voters to help translate votes into seats. This chapter is closely 
connected with the previous chapter, because it discusses how politicians strategically group 
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voters to translate votes into seats. Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter traces the 
implementation of this mechanism and how floterial districts became a strategy for Republicans 
to maintain control of the House in later redistricting bills.  
The fourth chapter differs from the previous two chapters by shifting from a discussion of 
how politicians strategically group voters to how they cue voters in the voting booth through 
ballot design. In this chapter I discuss the implementation and changes to the features of the 
ballot that helped translate votes into seats for the Republican Party. From 1897 to 2007 the New 
Hampshire ballot included a straight-ticket option. This chapter explains how this voting method 
benefitted the Republican Party, and why the party fought to keep this voting method on the 
ballot. While straight-ticket voting was still on the ballot, the ballot format alternated between 
party columns and office blocs. Until after a New Hampshire Court Case ruling, the Republican 
Party strategically designed the ballot so that their candidates would be listed first in both 
formats. As a result of their candidates appearing first on the ballot, their party was subject to the 
primacy effect. In this chapter I discuss how ballot design was another strategy used by the 
Republican Party to translate votes into seats, and how the Democratic Party was able to 
successfully eliminate some of these strategies.  
In each of the chapters discussing the strategies used by politicians to translate votes into 
seats I tell a story of sequencing. For example, in the second chapter I explain how the 
Republicans increased their use of redistricting as a strategy in response to the rise of two-party 
competition. In the third chapter, I explain how after their introduction, floterial districts later 
became a method to assist the legislature in gerrymandering. I explain, in the fourth chapter, how 
the legislature designed the ballot to include straight-ticket voting and other features that assisted 
the Republican Party in maintaining control of the House.  
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The concluding chapter of this thesis will explain how the strategies analyzed in this 
thesis are not separate tools used by politicians, but rather are used collectively. For example, 
since the legislature is able to redistrict only once every 10 years, the legislature has found other 
strategies to use to help translate votes into seats for their party in the elections that happen 
during the 10 years. Thus, the strategies analyzed in this thesis are used collectively to help the 
legislature achieve their goal of maintaining one-party control. The explanation of the 
sequencing of these strategies relates back to Pierson’s argument introduced in the first chapter 
as part of the framework for my thesis. Additionally, the sequencing of the strategies helps 
answer the question of how the Republican Party was able to maintain control of the New 
Hampshire House while Democrats were winning seats at the top of the ticket. In general, this 
thesis will explain how a political party can maintain one-party control of a state legislature in a 
state that has two-party competition.
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Chapter One: Framing the Question 
 
Erik Engstrom writes in “Stacking the States, Stacking the House,” “[B]ecause electoral 
institutions can determine the political balance of power within a legislature, prudent politicians 
actively try to shape the rules that turn votes into seats” (2006, 419). In other words, politicians 
manipulate institutions to influence the partisan composition of their legislature at the state and 
federal level. This thesis will focus on the strategies of politicians at the state level, specifically 
by state legislatures, to maintain one-party control. The institutions that will be examined include 
redistricting, the selective use of floterial districts and at-large districts as alternative to single-
member districts, and ballot design. While scholarly literature discusses the political effects of all 
of these institutions individually, it fails to recognize the relationship among them. This thesis 
will analyze the interplay among institutions that have been designed and used to translate votes 
into seats as politicians try to maintain one-party control at the state level, as well as the interplay 
among these institutions in relation to the rise of two-party competition. 
This thesis will analyze the strategies used by politicians to translate votes into seats 
through a case study of the New Hampshire House of Representatives. The analysis of legislative 
history and testimony on bills will explain the motivations and goals of the politicians designing 
the institutions. The years of institutional implementation will be examined individually, as well 
as in context of the events leading up to the implementation and in relation to preexisting 
institutions. In addition, an explanation of the interplay of the political strategies will highlight 
how the Republican Party was able to maintain one-party control in the state legislature as there 
was an increase in two-party competition in New Hampshire. 
This state legislature was chosen because of its significantly large lower house, which 
provides the majority party with more opportunities to manipulate the translation of votes into 
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seats. The New Hampshire House of Representatives currently has 400 members, and is the 
largest representative body in the United States (Dublin 2007, 119). The first legislative body in 
New Hampshire was set up in 1776, and then was named the “General Court” in 1784 (Dublin 
2007, 119; Anderson 1981, 65, 101). At first, the size of the legislature varied election to election, 
as the number of House members increased relative to the state population. Since the legislature 
felt it was important to keep the constituents close to their representatives, they would increase 
the number of representatives as the state population increased. By 1942 voters elected 443 
representatives to the House (Anderson 1981, 216). The fluctuations in the size of the House 
came to an end when the 1943 constitutional convention amended the state constitution to limit 
the House membership to between 375 and 400 members. Since 1966, the New Hampshire 
House has been districted to have exactly 400 members (Dublin 2007, 123). With a 400-member 
House, New Hampshire has “more democratic representation than any other legislative body” 
(Anderson 1981, 355). Currently, each New Hampshire House member represents about 3,295 
constituents. If the United States Congress were to have the same proportion of representation, 
there would need to be about 94,565 members. Having such a large representative body has 
allowed the New Hampshire House to have the “unique feature of…most of its voters know[ing] 
their legislator personally or live within a mile with easy access to their lawmaker” (Anderson 
1981, 355). Additionally, the large representative body both assists and inhibits politicians from 
strategically translating votes into seats in the state, which will be discussed in the following 
chapters. 
For years, New Hampshire was known as a decidedly Republican state, because the state 
typically voted for the Republican presidential candidate. From 1860 to present-day, six 
Democratic candidates have won in the state, including: Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Roosevelt, 
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Lyndon Johnson, Bill Clinton, John Kerry and Barack Obama. As the state has voted for the 
Democratic presidential candidates five out of the last six elections, the state has turned “purple.” 
Although New Hampshire is surrounded by all “blue” states, which are states that have 
habitually voted for Democratic presidents, New Hampshire is now known as a swing state, 
meaning that it could vote either for a Republican or Democratic candidate.  
New Hampshire has also shifted its political alignment in the state elections from 
Republicans to Democrats at the top of ticket. Recently the state has consistently elected 
Democratic governors. New Hampshire typically had Republican governors, and since 1857 the 
Democrats held the governor’s office for only 21 out of 125 years (N.H. Dept. of State 2009, 90-
91). Since 1996, on the other hand, Democrats have won eight out of nine gubernatorial elections. 
With the recent 2012 election, New Hampshire has elected another Democratic governor for a 
two-year term. Despite the state electing Democrats at the top of the ticket, the state is still 
considered a swing state because it has been a battleground state for both political parties in the 
presidential elections.  
Even with a shift in political alignment in the state, the Republican Party has maintained 
a majority in the lower house of the state legislature. Since 1857, the Republican Party has 
maintained control of the New Hampshire House of Representatives, with the exception of 1871, 
1874, 1922, 2006, 2008, and 2012 (Dublin 2007, 121-3). The fact that the Republican Party was 
able to maintain control in the House while Democrats simultaneously won seats at the top of the 
ticket is significant. This thesis will explain how the Republican Party successfully used 
strategies to maintain party control in the House while Democrats won other offices in the state. 
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State Legislatures Translating Votes into Seats 
State legislatures have the ability to manipulate electoral systems to affect the translation 
of votes into seats, such as through the process of redistricting the state, using floterial districts or 
at-large districts, and implementing straight-ticket voting. Taagepera and Shugart argue that 
“The methods by which votes are translated into seats are often simply divided into two 
categories: those which apply to single-member districts and those which apply to multimember 
districts” (1989, 20). While at-large districts are a form of multi-member districts, floterial 
districts are slightly more complicated because they create a district that “floats” over single-
member and multi-member districts. Politicians can strategically use a combination of these 
districts to group voters and control what candidates will end up in office, and, as a result, the 
partisan composition of the legislature.  
Tufte suggests, “Arrangements for translating votes into legislative seats almost always 
work to benefit the party winning the largest share of the votes” (1973, 540). Therefore, the party 
in control will use strategies, such as gerrymandering, to ensure that they will win more votes 
and thus more seats in the legislature. Tufte argues that the translation of votes to seats is 
affected by the existing composition of the legislature and the party advantage (1973, 542). In 
other words, the partisan bias of the translation of votes into seats is dependent upon which party 
has majority in the state legislature and how many votes a party needs in order to win a majority. 
Since “electoral rules can make or break a party” (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 2), political 
parties seek to manipulate the electoral system and institutions, to control the translation of votes 
into seats.  
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Cox discusses electoral systems in relation to voting and defines electoral systems as “a 
set of laws and party rules that regulate electoral competition between and within parties” (1997, 
38). Electoral laws in the system can determine how votes will translate into seats. Cox writes,  
If political actors care mostly about winning seats in the current election, then the 
influence of electoral institutions on their goals is direct. If, in addition, actors’ 
expectations about each other’s vote shares are precise and consensual, then a 
well-structured coordination game emerges in which the prospects for successful 
coordination are good. (1997, 8) 
 
Cox’s idea is that the short-term goals of politicians are accessible when there is a general 
consensus among the actors, such as when there is a majority in the state legislature. In addition, 
Cox suggests that actors are able to win seats through the manipulation of the electoral systems, 
such as through ballot design. Thus, party competition and consensus among actors of the same 
party allows for strategic actions that will translate votes into seats. Successful manipulation of 
electoral laws allows a political party to maintain a majority, which is important because then 
that political party can decide the policy agendas. It also allows the majority party to prevent the 
repealing of their strategic laws by the minority party. The manipulation of electoral laws and the 
strategic arrangement of voters will be discussed in the following chapters as strategies used by 
the Republican Party to translate votes into seats and maintain one-party control of the New 
Hampshire House.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework used to analyze the strategies of institutional design will be 
guided by the work of Paul Pierson and Eric Schickler. Pierson suggests a move away from 
institutional choice to institutional development by providing an explanation of sequencing 
leading up to and the unanticipated consequences of institutional change (2004, 104). Schickler, 
on the other hand, focuses on the interplay of competing coalitions in institutional change, 
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described as disjointed pluralism. Pierson suggests that Schickler’s “disjointed pluralism” draws 
“heavily” on actor-centered functionalism, because he focuses on the goals and motivations of 
each actor in institutional change (Pierson 2004, 109). In contrast to Schickler, Pierson’s 
discussion of institutional development critiques “actor-centered functionalism,” which is when 
actors, such as politicians, design an institution to benefit their interests (Pierson 2004, 105).  
Schickler further examines how the interplay of coalitions often is so competitive that 
institutional change is a “battleground” rather than a stable process of change and “coherent 
solutions” (2001, 18). He suggests that the actual institutional change is dependent upon the 
importance of the change to the coalition presenting it. For example, Schickler writes, “Rohde 
argues that party government depends on the degree of majority party unity on the agenda items 
confronting Congress, and on the level of polarization between the majority and minority parties” 
(2001, 10). Schickler uses Rohde’s argument to suggest that if there is strong polarization in the 
legislature, and the institutional change is not as important to the majority party as other policy 
issues, it will likely not occur. However, in the case of redistricting, which is an institution that 
results in the translation of votes into seats, there is often great unity among the majority party 
when presenting their plan. Lastly, Schickler suggests that “reelection interests” and “members’ 
party-based interests” motivate institutional design (2001, 5). These interests and actor 
motivations will be highlighted throughout this thesis in the discussion of the design of 
institutions used in the translation of votes into seats.  
Pierson, on the other hand, suggests that to fully understand institutional development 
there should be an understanding beyond just the motivations of the actors. To support this claim, 
Pierson lays out the limitations of only understanding institutional design in relation to the actors, 
including:  
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1. Institutions have multiple effects 
2. Institutional designers may not act instrumentally 
3. Institutional designers may have short time horizons 
4. Institutional effects may be unanticipated 
5. Institutional continuity and environmental change 
6. The problem of actor discontinuity  
(2004, 108-122) 
 
The first limitation—“institutions have multiple effects”—looks at Schickler’s idea of disjointed 
pluralism, which is the idea that there are competing coalitions with different expectations of the 
institutional change. For example, in a state legislature there will be competing interests between 
the majority and minority party or the majority party and incumbents, in the process of proposing 
institutional change. The second limitation discusses how actors may propose an institutional 
change because they “believe it to be appropriate,” and as Pierson suggests, when an institutional 
change occurs may affect the type of change that is proposed (Pierson 2004, 110). Pierson argues 
that the unanticipated effects of institutional change are the most significant limitations, because 
actors cannot anticipate all the consequences of institutional change. By focusing on the 
motivations of actors, these effects are overlooked. Therefore, Pierson suggests that “the 
significance of unintended consequences needs to be incorporated into the ways we think about 
institutional origins and change, even if we cannot develop theories that can identify the kinds of 
mistakes that are likely to occur” (2004, 117-118). Another limitation is that over time the 
political environment is likely to change, which will alter the functioning of institutions, such as 
the shift in political alignment in New Hampshire. Lastly, Pierson argues that an actor may 
inherit an institution that they did not design and will have to deal with the implications of this 
institution (2004, 119-120). These limitations challenge the assumption that institutional effects 
will always align with the desires of the designers. As a result, this thesis will analyze institutions 
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not just in relation to the motivations of the actors and the moment of implementation, but also 
over the period of time of institutional development.  
With these limitations in mind, Pierson argues that a study of political institutions needs 
to be observed over time, in relation to the motivations of the actors and with respect to already 
existing political institutions. Pierson discusses the idea of path dependency, which looks at the 
sequencing of events. Pierson writes that it is important to “extend beyond the focus on the 
‘moves’ of the ‘actors’ in the legislatures to a broader discussion of the temporal orders in which 
historical alternatives present themselves, and the ways in which this forecloses certain 
possibilities while enhancing the prospects of others” (2004, 64). In other words, Pierson 
suggests that to fully understand the institutional change one must look at the development of the 
institution over a significant period of time.  
In order to understand how politicians are able to maintain control at the state level, 
especially in cases of two-party competition, the following chapters will trace through strategies 
politicians use in institutional design. Each chapter will individually analyze the institutions and 
describe the strategies the Republican Party implemented to maintain a majority, which draws on 
the work of Schickler. Through legislative history, bill attempts, testimony, court cases and 
constitutional amendments, the goals and motivations of the political parties will be analyzed. 
However as Pierson suggests, the chapters will also analyze beyond the “‘moves’ of the ‘actors’” 
by looking at the unanticipated consequences of the institutions. Furthermore, Pierson’s work 
will guide the conclusion of this thesis, which will explain the sequencing and combination of all 
of the strategies used by politicians in their effort to maintain one-party control in the state 
legislature.  
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Before analyzing each strategy in relation to the case study, the institutions need to be 
explained in relation to the current literature. The remaining part of this chapter will summarize 
the relevant literature on redistricting, floterial districts and at-large districts, and ballot design. 
As mentioned earlier, the literature fails to explain the interplay between the institutions, and 
thus this thesis will serve that purpose. 
 
Redistricting 
The New Hampshire state legislature uses redistricting as a strategy to maintain one-party 
control through the translation of votes into seats. This strategy will help explain the relationship 
between the party in control of redistricting, incumbents, and voters as the Republican Party 
maintains control in the New Hampshire House of Representatives. Redistricting is the process 
of redrawing district maps to evenly distribute the population across districts. McDonald defines 
redistricting as “conducted by the states through a patchwork of state laws and constitutional 
provisions, overlaid with federal guidelines that apply to drawing all electoral districts” (2004, 
375). Much of the literature discusses court cases related to redistricting and the effects of 
redistricting on partisan bias and incumbency advantage. 
 Most of the federal guidelines for redistricting have come from court-ordered mandates, 
especially as a result of the rulings from Baker v. Carr (1962), which declared legislative 
apportionment questions “justiciable,” and Reynolds v. Sims (1964), which called for equal 
representation and the “one person, one vote principle.” Prior to the court-ordered mandates, 
political parties mainly used redistricting as a mechanism to gain party control, and incumbents 
used it as a way of securing their seats. This manipulation of district lines is known as 
gerrymandering. Erikson describes the “optimum gerrymander for a party” as “the spreading of 
the opposition party supporters as thinly as possible across many districts where they cannot 
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obtain a majority” (1972, 1237). Gerrymandering received its name after Massachusetts 
Governor Elbridge Gerry drew a “salamander-shaped” district in 1812 (Taagepera and Shugart 
1989, 16). Even after the court-ordered mandates, political parties have continued to 
gerrymander in an attempt to affect the translation of votes into seats, but now have to observe 
the equal population mandates in the process of redistricting.  
Tufte writes that, “control of districting by one political party can mean […] the 
difference between majority and minority status in a state legislature—often remarkably 
independent of voters’ preferences” (1973, 553). However, among the literature there is not a 
general consensus on whether partisan redistricting and gerrymandering has any effect on party 
control and incumbency advantage. Nevertheless, most of the literature does agree that if there is 
an effect it is present at the state level compared to the federal level. McDonald states, “The 
more districts in a legislative body, the greater the ability to group voters strategically. Thus, 
partisan gerrymandering can be more potent in state legislative than in congressional districting” 
(2004, 374). Therefore, examining redistricting of the New Hampshire House will present a 
greater explanation of redistricting as an institution and its involvement in maintaining one-party 
control at the state level.  
 
The Trade-off between Parties and Incumbents 
When a state’s legislature redistricts, such as New Hampshire’s, there is often a trade-off 
between the goals of the party in the majority and the goals of the incumbents. This means that it 
is difficult for the party in majority to gain seats while simultaneously securing all of the 
incumbents’ seats. The literature that accepts the opinion that redistricting has an effect on 
partisan advantage concludes that a partisan bias will be observed in the direction of the party 
controlling the process (Campagna and Grofman 1990; McDonald 2004; Gelman and King 
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1994). However, “the redistricting goals of a political party and its incumbents can be at odds” 
(McDonald 2004, 374). Cain, for example, maintains that in a partisan gerrymander the 
noncontrolling party, the minority party, will be adversely affected compared to the party 
controlling the redistricting. In addition, Cain finds that incumbents in the noncontrolling party 
will be better off than the party as a whole. Nevertheless, incumbents in the minority are not 
necessarily safe because the partisan plan may either parcel the incumbents’ district or attempt to 
displace minority party incumbents. In other words, the redistricting plan may alter the 
incumbent’s district to make it more difficult for them to win, by either intentionally adding 
voters of the opposing party or by adding so many new voters to the district that the incumbent’s 
name recognition is reduced. Moreover, a district may be drawn that pits the incumbent of the 
minority party against an incumbent of the majority party, so as to try to displace the minority 
party incumbent and secure a seat for the majority party (Cain 1985).  
On the other hand, in a bipartisan gerrymander Cain argues that neither party gains an 
advantage, rather the outcome is incumbent protection (Cain 1985, 321). Incumbents in the 
majority party, however, are not necessarily safe. In fact, “incumbents are often forced to give up 
votes (hence electoral safety) in order to increase the number of legislative seats their party is 
likely to capture” (Gelman and King 1994, 541). Therefore, in the process of redistricting, 
partisan bias usually takes precedence over protecting incumbents. It is clear that redistricting is 
a mechanism used by parties to manipulate votes and consequently manipulate the composition 
of a legislative body.  
 
Checks on the State Legislature 
There are several checks on the state legislature and party that is in control of the 
redistricting process, including the threat of court action and voters who can choose to not reelect 
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their representative if they are unhappy with their actions. In many states, including New 
Hampshire, if the state legislature cannot pass a redistricting plan then the court will be 
responsible for redistricting. With the potential for court action, McDonald suggests that a 
compromise between the parties on the redistricting plan is likely to occur, in order to avoid the 
plan being sent to the court. Court action, however, may also deter the state legislature from 
making a compromise. Courts may either create their own plan, or choose a plan proposed by a 
political party or an outside group. If the party of the judges involved in the court action is 
known, members of the state legislature may avoid making a bipartisan compromise because 
they know that their party will be benefitted by the decisions made by the court (McDonald 2004, 
380). In addition to the threat of court action either preventing or encouraging a compromise 
among the state legislature, there is also the check of the voters influencing the redistricting plans. 
Since the legislative branch is an elected branch, constituents closely watch the actions of their 
representatives. If the voters are unhappy with the redistricting plan proposed by their legislators, 
they can decide to not reelect the representative. Because representatives are trying to manipulate 
the outcomes of votes in districts, representatives take into consideration how constituents will 
vote.  
 
Redistricting in New Hampshire 
In order to keep representation between districts equal, New Hampshire is required, as 
are all other states are, to redistrict every ten years after the federal census is issued. In New 
Hampshire, the state legislature is responsible for redrawing the districts, as it states in the New 
Hampshire constitution:  
There shall be in the legislature of this state a House of Representatives, 
biennially elected and founded on principles of equality, and representation 
therein shall be as equal as circumstances will admit. The whole number of 
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representatives to be chosen from the towns, wards, places, and representative 
districts thereof established hereunder, shall be not less than three hundred 
seventy-five or more than four hundred. As soon as possible after the convening 
of the next regular session of the legislature, and at the session in 1971, and every 
ten years thereafter, the legislature shall make an apportionment of representatives 
according to the last general census of the inhabitants of the state taken by 
authority of the United States or of this state. In making such apportionment, no 
town, ward or place shall be divided nor the boundaries thereof altered. (N.H. 
Const. Pt. II, Art. 9) 
 
As a result of amendments to the constitution, the New Hampshire House is responsible for 
redistricting after the census comes out, to account for changes in the population. This task, 
however, is not simple because the legislature must limit the number of representatives to 400 
and make certain that there is the smallest possible deviation between the districts.
1
  
There have been several amendments to the New Hampshire constitution over the years 
dealing with equal representation, House and Senate districts, and the redistricting process in 
general. When the constitution was first written, a town was granted one representative for every 
150 persons (N.H. Const. Pt. II, Art. 10). However, in 1877, the constitution was amended to 
increase the number of people to 600, as the population of New Hampshire increased. In addition, 
in 1877 the formula for figuring out the number of representatives changed from being based on 
the number of taxpayers to population (Anderson 1981, 154). Leading up to the 1877 amendment, 
small towns continuously elected representatives, even without having the required number of 
people to be granted a representative. For example, 26 unqualified towns had their own 
representatives in 1874 (Anderson 1981, 155). Even after the 1877 amendment, unqualified 
towns continued to elect representatives and thus drastically increased the size of the House, to at 
one point as many as 443 members. This constant fluctuation in the size of the House led to the 
                                                          
1
 The deviation measures the extent to which a district population differs from the ideal population. The ideal 
population in New Hampshire is measured by dividing the state population by 400—the number of representatives 
in the House. The range of deviation, also referred to as the statewide deviation, is calculated by adding the largest 
positive deviation to the largest negative population in the state (Representative Peter Burling 2002). 
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1942 amendment limiting the number of members in the House to between 375 and 400. In 1942, 
the constitution was also amended to delete the population requirement of 600 people for one 
representative. Therefore between 1942 and 1964, there was no population requirement for 
receiving representation. The redistricting process during this time, however, was not open to the 
range of manipulation seen in later redistricting years, because it followed the tradition of town 
lines making up the districts. Additionally, towns with smaller populations were often delegated 
part-time representation. During this time, it is clear that geography took precedence over equal 
representation. Article 11 currently requires that the 400 members of the House be evenly 
distributed across the state in accordance with the latest census (N.H. Const. Pt. II, Art. 11).  
The majority of the amendments to the constitution about districting dealt with issues of 
representation for small towns. New Hampshire has many towns with the populations not 
exceeding double digits, especially in Coos County. For example, Dixville, known as the first-in-
the-nation to vote in the Presidential primary, has a population of twelve people according to the 
2010 Census (N.H. Office of Energy and Planning 2010). Over the years, the constitution has 
called for different methods of representation for small towns. With the creation of the 
constitution, small towns could be grouped together to meet the 150-person requirement for one 
representative. Then with the 1877 amendment, small towns could together form a district to 
meet the 600-person requirement. In 1889, an amendment to Article 11 stated “that towns of less 
than 600 should be represented a proportional amount of time” (N.H. Const. Pt. II, Art. 11). Then 
in 1942, an amendment called for small towns to be represented at least once every ten years 
(N.H. Const. Pt. II, Art. 11). Therefore, the House of Representatives gave small towns part-time 
representation by deciding which years a town could elect a representative. However, in 1964 
part-time representation was ended with an amendment to Article 9 “providing for equal 
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representation” and an amendment to Article 11 permitting “small towns to be districted for one 
or more representatives” (N.H. Const. Pt. II, Art. 9, 11). Both of the 1964 amendments were a 
result of the Supreme Court decisions in Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims (1964).  
 
Supreme Court Rulings Related to Redistricting 
Prior to the 1962 and 1964 Supreme Court rulings for Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, 
reapportionment and redistricting was long “overdue in some states” (Dixon 1964, 210). The 
Baker decision began the series of five “Reapportionment Decisions” (Dixon 1964, 211). In 
1946, prior to Baker, the Supreme Court heard Colegrove v. Green, which was about the 
constitutionality of the legislative districts drawn by the Illinois legislature. The Supreme Court 
ruled in Colegrove that the question about legislative apportionment “was a nonjusticiable 
‘political question’, inappropriate for the judiciary to address at all” (Brest and Levinson 1992, 
1073). However, in 1962 the court agreed to hear a case about “malapportionment” in the 
Tennessee legislature, titled Baker v. Carr. Malapportionment is when districts in the same state 
do not have an equal ratio of the number of representatives per the number of voters (Taagepera 
and Shugart 1989, 14). This inequality could come about because voters could move between 
districts, but in this case the malapportionment was a result of the plan drawn by the state 
legislature. The Supreme Court decision found that the Tennessee legislature districting plan did 
violate the Equal Protection Clause, but that the Court did not have the right to overrule it. 
Rather, the Supreme Court made the significant decision that questions about “the fairness of 
drawing state legislative districts were ‘justiciable’” (Brest et al. 2006, 1155).  
Out of the five redistricting cases that followed Baker, the most well-known and 
influential ruling came from Reynolds v. Sims in 1964. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice 
Warren wrote,  
Foster 22 
 
State legislatures are, historically, the fountainhead of representative government 
in this country. … But representative government is in essence self-government 
through the medium of elected representatives of the people, and each and every 
citizen has an inalienable right to full and effective participation in the processes 
of his State’s legislative bodies. … Full and effective participation by all citizens 
in state government requires, therefore, that each citizen have an equally effective 
voice in the election of members of his state legislature. (Brest and Levinson 1992, 
1079-80) 
 
From Reynolds emerged the “one-person, one-vote” standard that each voter’s vote is equal to 
that of the other voters in the state. Prior to Baker and Reynolds many states had highly 
malapportioned districts. During the nineteenth century, redistricting was not regulated. For 
example, “some states frequently redrew the maps, often as a direct result of change in partisan 
control of state legislatures” (Carson, Engstrom, and Roberts 2006, 283). On the other hand, 
some states would wait years before deciding to redistrict. As a result, the districts would 
become highly malapportioned.  
New Hampshire was among the states that were highly malapportioned prior to the 
Supreme Court Case decisions, because of the tradition that town lines make up the districts and 
the use of part-time representation. In 1955, before Baker and Reynolds, the state was highly 
malapportioned with only 37.4 percent of the population electing the majority of seats (Hamilton 
1964, 9). In addition, New Hampshire had the “highest value of votes in the smallest districts 
prior to 1900,” meaning that voters were well represented across the state, including in the 
smaller districts (Hacker 1963, 23). But in subsequent years leading up to Baker, the votes of the 
New Hampshire citizens who lived in urban areas became unfairly disproportionate, and more 
heavily weighted, than those citizens who lived in the smaller towns (Hacker 1963, 23). Some 
have argued that New Hampshire, along with Wisconsin, was the only state that “approximated 
the one-person, one-vote standard in both chambers” prior to the Supreme Court decisions 
(Ansolabehere, Gerber, and Snyder 2002, 767). Evidently this is not the case, considering that 
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leading up to 1964 the New Hampshire legislature designated part-time representation to the 
smaller towns. As a result, the people who lived in the smaller towns were not as well 
represented by House representatives as the voters who lived in the larger towns and received 
full-time representation. 
After the 1964 Reynolds ruling, New Hampshire passed a redistricting plan for the House 
of Representatives. At this time, the House avoided dividing or merging towns, and as a result 
used part-time representation, which caused malapportionment. 
Before the Reynolds ruling, in New Hampshire geography took precedence over creating 
districts that were equal in population. However, after the Reynolds decision, the state legislature 
redistricted the House and ended part-time representation. While the district lines were no longer 
limited to town lines, the constitution required for towns combined into a district to be 
contiguous. The Reynolds ruling addresses the fact that malapportionment was present in many 
states as a result of history, economics, group interests and geography taking priority over equal 
representation. In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Warren wrote,  
But neither history alone, nor economic or other sorts of [377 U.S. 533, 
580] group interests, are permissible factors in attempting to justify disparities 
from population-based representation. Citizens, not history or economic interests, 
cast votes. Considerations of area alone provide an insufficient justification for 
deviations from the equal-population principle. Again, people, not land or trees or 
pastures, vote. Modern developments and improvements in transportation and 
communications make rather hollow, in the mid-1960's, most claims that 
deviations from population-based representation can validly be based solely on 
geographical considerations. Arguments for allowing such deviations in order to 
insure effective representation for sparsely settled areas and to prevent legislative 
districts from becoming so large that the availability of access of citizens to their 
representatives is impaired are today, for the most part, unconvincing. (Reynolds 
1964, 31) 
 
Therefore, while the Reynolds decision is ambiguous about the constitutionality of the geography 
of redistricting, it does make it clear that equal representation takes precedence over tradition. It 
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is significant that the Court briefly notes geography, because it had not done so in the past. As a 
result of the “one-person, one-vote” standard coming out of the Reynolds decision, New 
Hampshire amended its constitution in 1964 to state that apportionment shall be “founded on 
principles of equality, and representation therein shall be as equal as circumstances will admit” 
(N.H. Const. Pt. II, Art. 9). 
 
Redistricting Commissions 
Instead of having their state legislature redistrict, some states create a commission to 
draw the map. About 21 states currently use a commission for state legislative redistricting 
(“Redistricting Commissions: Legislative Plans” 2008). The appointment process and the role of 
the commissions vary from state to state. For example, several states have a commission as a 
backup plan if the legislative process “breaks down, [such] as under divided government” 
(McDonald 2004, 382). In these states, the commission is used as an extra step before the 
redistricting process would be passed off to the courts. The other common form of commissions 
has sole redistricting authority. Another way the commissions differ is in the number of members 
and who the members are. For example, some commissions are either appointed by or composed 
of members of the state legislature and “statewide party officials,” but this does not avoid the 
partisan bias problems that occur when a state legislature redistricts (McDonald 2004, 382).  
In other states the commission may be made up of an equal number of partisan members, 
and will likely bring about a bipartisan plan. Some states that have an equal number of partisan 
members require that the commission’s plan be approved by a two-thirds vote in the state 
legislature and then by the governor (McDonald 2004, 383). Lastly, many states have created 
guidelines and limitations for redistricting commissions to try to avoid partisan politics. These 
states avoid partisan redistricting plans and gerrymandering by setting strict guidelines, which 
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are not found in states that have their legislatures redistrict. Although New Hampshire’s 
constitution states that the state legislature is responsible for redistricting, there have been several 
attempts to pass legislation creating a redistricting commission. Thus far, these attempts have 
been unsuccessful. 
 
Conclusion 
Whether a state legislature or a partisan redistricting commission is responsible for 
redistricting, literature shows that the results of partisan redistricting have only a short-term 
effect. Gelman and King come to the conclusion that over the long-term, the effects of partisan 
redistricting are minimized. Gelman and King observe partisan bias, which they define as “the 
degree to which an electoral system unfairly favors one political party in the translation of 
statewide (or nationwide) votes into the partisan division of the legislature” (1994, 543). They 
conclude that redistricting plans create “fairer electoral systems than if there had been no 
redistricting,” but originally do produce a slight bias in the direction of the party controlling the 
process (Gelman and King 1994, 553). Similarly, Basehart and Comer argue that partisan 
redistricting can have an effect, but that when “parties succeed in producing redistricting gains, 
the gains are not permanent but dissipate generally after two or three elections” (1991, 75). 
Therefore, over time the partisan bias of redistricting is minimized. Another reason the effects of 
redistricting could be minimized would be because of “large state or national shifts in voting 
patterns” (Gelman and King 1994, 543). As will be shown in this thesis, the New Hampshire 
House Republicans were able to gain seats in the election following the passing of their 
redistricting plans; however, as there was a rise in two-party competition and wave elections, the 
effects of redistricting were minimized.   
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Floterial Districts and At-Large Districts 
In addition to redistricting in general, state legislatures use mechanisms to redistrict in 
order to control the translation of votes into seats. These mechanisms include single-member, 
multi-member, floterial, and at-large districts. New Hampshire’s state legislature uses a 
combination of these types of districts to redistrict. A single-member district is a district that has 
one representative, while a multi-member district and at-large district allows voters to elect 
multiple representatives. A floterial district is a district drawn over multiple existing districts 
which independently would not be entitled to another representative, but together can receive an 
additional representative. For example in the 2012 redistricting plan, Manchester Wards 8 and 9 
were combined into a floterial district with Litchfield. Individually, Manchester Ward 8, 
Manchester Ward 9, and Litchfield are multimember districts that individually each have two 
representatives. The floterial district allows the voters in the two Manchester Wards and 
Litchfield to elect two additional representatives. The literature on all of these types of districts 
questions the consequences of using one type of district over the other. In addition, two main 
concerns present in the literature are about the effect of these districts on partisan representation 
and if the districts align with the “one-person, one vote” standard.  
 
Floterial Districts 
Floterial districts are a redistricting mechanism that is not as easily understood and not as 
widely used compared to single-member, multi-member, and at-large districts. While Hamilton 
states that the Reynolds decision “casually, endorsed both multi-member districts and floterials,” 
he also notes that the “application of the equal representation doctrine to floterial districts is a 
conundrum” (1967, 332). While floterial districts have the potential to allow for gerrymandering, 
they often confuse the redistricting process by making it difficult to maintain equal 
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representation, as required by the Reynolds decision. Some of the literature even questions 
whether the equal representation requirement is upheld when floterial districts are used, because 
representatives of floterial districts have more constituents than those representing a single-
member district.  
In addition, computing the deviation in representation between floterial districts and the 
other districts is complicated. Moncrief describes how multi-member districts are considered to 
have equal representation to single-member districts because a simple ratio of representatives to 
population can be used. For example, if a single-member district has 1,000 constituents and a 
three-member district has 3,000 constituents, then these two districts are considered to have 
equal representation (Moncrief 1989, 254). However, a simple ratio of representatives to 
population cannot be used for floterial districts. The Reynolds decision addresses the process of 
computing deviation by stating, “Weighting the votes of citizens differently, by any method or 
means, merely because of where they happen to reside, hardly seems justifiable” (Moncrief 1989, 
257).  
In recent state court cases on floterial districts, including the New Hampshire case Boyer 
v. Gardner (1982), states have used and accepted the aggregate method to compute deviation 
(Moncrief 1989, 258). The aggregate method uses a ratio of the representatives to total 
population in the floterial district (Moncrief 1989, 257). The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
reversed its decision on using the aggregate method for floterial districts in Representative Peter 
Burling v. Gene Chandler (2002). The Court stated that the aggregate method is an appropriate 
means of calculation deviation for only multi-member districts, but not floterial districts because 
“it masks substantial deviation from the one person/one vote principle” (Representative Peter 
Burling 2002, 9). Despite the deviation problems that may arise with floterial districts, Moncrief 
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does not suggest that states should avoid using floterial districts. Rather he suggests, “floterial 
districts may provide a reasonable solution to the problem of accommodating the requirements of 
both the federal and state constitutions” (Moncrief 1989, 261).  
In recent years, the New Hampshire state legislature has added floterial districts to their 
redistricting process. After a constitutional amendment in 2006, floterial districts were added to 
Article 9 of the state constitution. In 2002, prior to the constitutional amendment, the New 
Hampshire state legislature used floterial districts in their redistricting plan. Shortly thereafter, 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court heard a case questioning if the new plan using floterial 
districts violated the “one-person, one-vote” standard. The New Hampshire Supreme Court 
argued that floterial districts did in fact lead to “voting right inequities” (Representative Peter 
Burling 2002, 6). The Court calculated the range of deviation between districts and found that 
the floterial districts created an unacceptably high deviation. Therefore, the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court proposed a new redistricting map without the use of floterial districts. The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court concluded that using the floterial districts in the redistricting plan 
caused an unacceptably large deviation between districts and thus were an “unsound redistricting 
device” (Representative Peter Burling 2002, 12). The New Hampshire Court’s ruling aligns with 
that of the literature on floterial districts, which is that floterial districts are confusing and 
complicated. This thesis will look at this institution and how it is used in the translation of votes 
into seats as the Republican Party in New Hampshire attempts to maintain party control. 
 
At-large Districts 
At-large districts, similar to floterial districts, group voters together in a way that will 
influence the outcome of the election and the party composition of the legislature. An at-large 
district allocates several representatives to a town. Since several representatives are apportioned 
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per at-large district, the literature discusses multi-member and at-large districts interchangeably. 
The literature on multi-member districts, and Courts hearing cases about multi-member districts, 
question whether they allow for equal representation and if they have any influence on partisan 
control. In Reynolds the Supreme Court did not directly give an opinion on whether multi-
member districts are constitutional. Hamilton, however, argues that the Supreme Court ruling for 
Reynolds does suggest that there are legitimate reasons for using multi-member districts. These 
include “[preserving] the integrity of political subdivisions, [utilizing] natural or historical 
boundaries, and [achieving] ‘some flexibility’” (Hamilton 1967, 334). In addition, the Reynolds 
decision states that equal representation does not necessarily require the use of only single-
member districts, but this is rather ambiguous. In Fortson v. Dorsey (1965), the petitioners 
claimed that voters in multi-member districts did not have the same capability of electing their 
representatives as the voters in single-member districts (Grofman 1981, 877). The Supreme 
Court further clarified their view of multi-member districts in this case, by stating that multi-
member districts are acceptable as long as the “‘overriding requirement’ is ‘substantial equality 
of population’” (Hamilton 1967, 334). Therefore, multi-member districts are considered to be 
constitutional by the Supreme Court and thus do not violate the “one-person, one-vote” standard. 
New Hampshire uses a combination of multi-member districts and single-member districts, 
which according to the Supreme Court is an acceptable method of redistricting to achieve equal 
representation.  
The other literature on multi-member and at-large districts questions whether these 
districts encourage partisan results, considering that multi-member districts “were created or 
maintained for the purpose of illegal discrimination against racial or linguistic minorities” 
(Niemi, Hill, and Grofman 1985, 441). In addition, historically at-large districts were drawn to 
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prevent the election of Republicans and African Americans in the South (Bushman and Stanley 
1971). Grofman acknowledges, as other scholars have, that although at-large districts are not 
always adopted with the goal to weaken the minority votes, there have been “instances where 
cities have changed to at-large systems as tactics to dilute Black political influence” (Grofman 
1990, 882). Bushman and Stanley highlight how in the mid-1960s when the Republican Party 
and African Americans gained political power in the south, at-large districts “diminished their 
potential for electing Senators from their racial or political group” (1971, 665). While at-large 
districts are not used to strategically group based on race, they have been used to group voters 
based on political party.  
Niemi, Hill, and Grofman question how often minority party candidates can be elected in 
multi-member districts. Interestingly they find that New Hampshire in 1980, along with several 
other states, had more minority party representation in multi-member districts than in single-
member districts (1985, 448). However, Niemi, Hill, and Grofman fail to recognize that the 
majority of House representatives in New Hampshire are elected from and represent multi-
member districts. Therefore, there is a greater chance of minority party candidates winning in 
multi-member districts than single-member districts. Additionally, in 1980 only a total of 160 
members of the minority party were elected from the multi-member and single-member districts 
out of the total 400 members.  
In another test, Niemi, Hill, and Grofman compare the percentage of minority party 
representation in the chamber that uses only single-member districts to the chamber that uses 
single-member and multi-member districts in 1966, 1972, and 1980. Their results show that in 
New Hampshire the minority party was able to receive more representation in the chamber that 
only uses single-member districts, which is the State Senate (Niemi, Hill, and Grofman 1985, 
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450). They, however, do not accurately depict the fact that the State Senate in New Hampshire is 
significantly smaller than the House of Representatives, and consequently there are fewer 
districts drawn for the State Senate. As McDonald argues, it is easier to gerrymander and 
strategically group voters when there are more legislative districts (2004, 374), such as in the 
New Hampshire House of Representatives. Thus, their tests do not consider New Hampshire’s 
unique state legislature, with the State Senate having only 24 members compared to the 400-
member House of Representatives. In general, Niemi, Hill, and Grofman conclude that multi-
member districts do not over represent or under represent the minority party (1985, 453), but 
recognize that there are outliers in their tests. New Hampshire could be considered an outlier, 
and as a result their conclusions may not apply to New Hampshire multi-member districts. 
Therefore, the following chapters will explain instances of the Republicans in the New 
Hampshire House translating votes into seats by creating districts that underrepresent the 
minority party.  
An example of an at-large seat in New Hampshire is the town of Salem. The New 
Hampshire state legislature has consistently districted the town as an at-large district with nine 
representatives. The New Hampshire constitution allows towns, such as Salem, to decide to 
divide their town into two or more representative districts (N.H. Const. Pt. II, Art. 11-a). For 
example, Nashua is divided into nine wards, with each ward having three representatives. Salem, 
however, has chosen not to divide their town into wards because of political reasons. Salem is 
largely a Republican town, and if the town were to redistrict into wards, Democratic voters may 
be districted into the same ward. This would potentially allow for Democratic candidates to win. 
Without wards, every Salem voter will vote for nine representatives. Since the voters in Salem 
generally align with the Republican Party, it is most likely that the Republican candidates will 
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receive the majority of votes. As Durfee discusses, at-large seats typically have more candidates 
on the ballot, which makes it “impossible for the electorate to acquaint itself with the 
qualification and records of so many men” (1945, 1101). Therefore, voters will likely vote a 
straight party ticket, resulting in one party receiving the majority of the seats. While this 
institution is not unique to New Hampshire, at-large districts have assisted the state legislature in 
grouping voters so that the translation of votes into seats leads to one-party control. 
 
Conclusion 
Floterial districts are similar to at-large districts because they allow politicians to 
strategically group voters. These districts, as the literature suggests, help politicians gerrymander 
and can potentially assist legislatures in creating plans that follow both federal and state 
constitutional requirements. This thesis will explain how floterial districts are specifically used 
by New Hampshire politicians. Additionally, this thesis will explain how the use of floterials 
changed because of court rulings and their effect on assisting the Republican Party in 
maintaining control in the House. 
 
Ballot Design 
In addition to the manipulation of the electoral systems through redistricting, floterial 
districts, and at-large districts, Taagepera and Shugart argue that the manipulation of ballots can 
also affect the electoral system in the translation of votes into seats (1989, 19). Politicians create 
electoral laws manipulating “how citizens vote and how these votes are counted; what the district 
structure of the polity will be; and how counted votes are translated into seats” (Cox 1997, 38). 
Therefore, the redistricting of voters takes into consideration which political party a citizen will 
cast their vote for, but it does not influence how a constituent will vote. Thus, when designing 
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the ballot a politician will consider: if the constituent is voting for the candidate or the party, how 
many votes a constituent will cast, and what “seat-relevant votes” the constituent may be casting 
(Cox 1997, 40-41). Politicians will often provide the voter with cues to influence the voter’s 
decisions, such as party labels. Therefore, ballot design, such as straight-ticket voting, is a 
strategy used by politicians to affect the electoral system in the translation of votes into seats.  
 
History of the Australian Ballot 
In the early 1890’s most states adopted the Australian ballot, and since then states have 
made alterations to the format of their ballots (Rusk 1970, 1220). Prior to the Australian ballot, 
each party was responsible for preparing their own ballot, referred to as a party strip ticket. The 
tickets had only the candidates of their party and were specifically made to be distinguished from 
the other party’s tickets. A voter was only able to pick one ticket and publicly place it in the 
voting box, thus making voting during this time not private. With the implementation of the 
Australian ballot came the secret ballot. Since the state government was now responsible for 
preparing the ballot, they made every ballot identical and included all of the candidates from 
both parties. Each state was then able to individually format their ballots, but the general layout 
was of the Australian ballot form. In general, states either adopted the “Massachusetts office bloc” 
or the “Indiana party column.” Massachusetts’ ballot was divided into blocs based on office, 
which was seen as a nonpartisan method. The Indiana ballot was formatted into columns based 
on political parties, which was essentially a combination of the party strip tickets used prior to 
the Australian ballot (Rusk 1970, 1221). An important difference between the party strip tickets 
and the Australian ballots was that the Australian ballots made it easier to vote split ticket, 
meaning voters could vote for candidates of different political parties (Rusk 1970, 1222). 
However, the Indiana ballot version of the Australian ballot was so similar to the party strip 
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tickets that originally voters did not take advantage of the split ticket opportunity because of 
habitual voting. Jerrold Rusk concludes in his study of the Australian ballot that “ticket-splitting 
is significantly higher under the less partisan arrangement of the office bloc form than under the 
party column type” (1970, 1231).  
A 1964 New York Times article claims that ticket splitting has grown so much over the 
years that 20 states, including New Hampshire, decided to implement straight-ticket voting 
(Loftus 1964). New Hampshire did not originally use the party columns version or straight-ticket 
version of the Australian ballot. Thus, there were more split ticket votes in the second election 
after the implementation of the Australian ballot than before (Rusk 1970, 1231). Rusk argues that 
straight-ticket voting is similar to the party column format, in that it encourages voters to vote 
along party lines. In addition, he concludes that the straight-ticket and emblem version used on 
the party column ballots decreases split ticket voting even more (Rusk 1970, 1235). New 
Hampshire used a straight-ticket ballot with an emblem for many years, until this type of ballot 
was repealed in 2007. Since state legislatures have the ability to alter the format of their election 
ballots, decreasing split ticket voting is a method used to maintain party control from the top of 
the ticket to the bottom.  
 
Straight-Ticket Voting 
While other states have straight-ticket voting, New Hampshire’s straight-ticket ballot, 
which was eliminated in 2007, differed from the other states (Niemi and Herrnson 2003, 321). 
There is no official name for the type of ballot New Hampshire uses, but Niemi and Herrnson 
refer to it as the “straight ticket with exception” (2003, 321). The instructions on the New 
Hampshire ballot read:  
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Make a cross (X) in the square opposite the political party of your choice if you 
wish to vote for all candidates running in that party. [I]f you vote a straight ticket, 
but wish to vote for one or more individual candidates, you may do so, and your 
vote for an individual candidate will override the straight party vote for that office. 
(Niemi and Herrnson 2003, 321-2)  
 
Niemi and Herrnson described the instructions as, “while logically correct, the instruction is 
devilishly complicated” (2003, 322). Where these directions and process become confusing is 
with the multi-member districts in the lower house of the state legislature. “If one voted, say, a 
straight Democratic ticket but then chose one Republican in a three-person district for state 
representative, it would not be clear which two of the three Democratic candidates one wished to 
vote for” (Niemi and Herrnson 2003, 322). In addition, straight-ticket voting allows for the lower 
offices, such as County Treasurer, County Attorney, Sherriff and County Commissioner, who are 
all elected in New Hampshire, to receive more votes than they would without straight-ticket 
voting. This is because by checking the straight-ticket box, these lower offices receive a vote 
even if the voter may not intend to elect this candidate. In addition, these lower offices, including 
the House of Representatives, will often receive a vote during Presidential election years when 
there is the “coattails effect.” The “coattails effect” is the idea that in presidential election years 
non-consistent voters will vote for not only the presidential candidate, but also for the lower 
office candidates of the same party. Thus, straight-ticket voting helps ensure that lower offices 
will receive votes.  
Using straight-ticket voting ballots can help guarantee that voters will elect more 
representatives from the same party. There is extensive literature on how voters use “shortcuts” 
to inform their votes, such as party cues (Bartels 1996; Kam 2005). For example, Popkin refers 
to these short cuts as “low-information rationality, or gut reasoning” (Kam 2005, 164; Bartels 
1996, 197). Kam argues that voters may vote for a particular party because that party’s policies 
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“resonate” with that voter’s values (Kam 2005, 165); however, this does not necessarily mean 
that the candidate in that party has the same values as the voter. Kam’s results find that “The less 
politically aware can arrive at convergence between party identification and issue opinions by 
toeing the party line—if they know what the party line is” (Kam 2005, 177). Yet, voters will still 
choose to vote for the candidate in the party they most align with because they see it as an 
informed decision. On the other hand, Bartels finds that although uninformed voters use cues, 
such as political parties, to assist their votes, this does not necessarily mean that their vote is 
fully informed (Bartels 1996). While voters may vote along party lines, such as checking the 
straight-ticket box, their vote is not necessarily fully informed and thus points to how straight-
ticket options can be used to manipulate votes. Therefore, while Kam and Bartels find reasons 
for why not all voters will blindly vote along party lines, enough uninformed voters will choose 
to use party cues to make their decision. Straight-ticket voting encourages voters to use party 
cues, because the ballot includes a box that makes it simple for voters to vote along party lines.  
 
Ballot Structure 
In addition to party cues, the ordering of the party columns or candidate’s names on the 
ballots can also serve as voting cues. Studies have shown that “primacy effects” occur with 
voters and the structure of a ballot. A “primacy effect” is when there is a bias “towards selecting 
the first object considered in a set” (Miller and Krosnick 1998, 293). Thus, when a candidate’s 
name is listed first, possibly because of alphabetical order, they are more likely to be selected by 
an uninformed voter. In their study, Miller and Krosnick found that in cases when the voter is 
less knowledgeable about politics and when it is not a highly publicized race, that the order of 
candidates’ names on the ballot may influence the voter (Miller and Krosnick 1998). In cases of 
a ballot that uses the party column format, there is primacy effects for the candidates of the party 
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listed first. Since studies have shown that there are “primacy effects” in relation to ballot 
structure, it is significant who designs the ballot and how it is designed. 
 
Conclusion 
The literature on ballots suggests that the structure of the ballot can significantly 
influence how a voter will cast their vote, especially uninformed voters. In New Hampshire, the 
Republican Party strategically designed the ballot to include the straight-ticket option as well as 
mechanisms that would guarantee that Republican candidates would be listed first. This thesis 
will explain how ballot design is used as another strategy for politicians to translate votes into 
seats.  
 
Conclusion 
Politicians collectively use institutions like redistricting, floterial districts, at-large 
districts, and ballot design in the translation of votes into seats. This thesis will analyze these 
institutions individually and consider the interplay among them. In addition, this thesis will 
explain how the translation of votes into seats allows for one-party control in a state legislature in 
a state that is shifting “colors.” Paul Pierson and Eric Schickler provide the framework for the 
analysis of these institutions. Schickler argues that, “For each change, the key questions are who 
sought the change, what interest or interests were pursued through the change, how was the 
change adopted, and what its implications were for congressional operations and outcomes” 
(Schickler 2001, 19). These questions will help frame the analysis of each institution through 
legislative history, bills and testimony. In addition, the outcomes of the institutions designed and 
their influence on later institutional development will be questioned and examined. As Pierson 
suggests, one must looked beyond the “‘moves’ of the actors’,” and therefore this thesis will 
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explain how the sequencing of all of the political manipulations of the institutions has allowed 
the Republican Party in New Hampshire to maintain control of the House of Representatives for 
so long.  
The next chapter will analyze redistricting as a strategy used by the Republicans in the 
New Hampshire state legislature. The analysis will discuss redistricting in New Hampshire prior 
to and after, the Supreme Court rulings in Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims. These years have 
been specifically chosen to show how the state altered its redistricting process after the “one-
person, one-vote” standard. The other years analyzed will be 1982, 1992, 2002, 2004, and 2012, 
because significant legislation was passed in all of these years. Tracing through the history of 
redistricting in New Hampshire will help uncover how this institution was manipulated by the 
state legislature in the translation of votes into seats. 
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Chapter Two: Redistricting 
 
New Hampshire representatives use strategies when redistricting to turn votes into seats. 
This chapter will highlight these strategies, especially as they become more apparent with the 
rise of two-party competition. Analysis of legislation and testimony of representatives will 
provide an explanation of the increase in manipulation of redistricting over the years. The 
following discussed bills highlight significant years for change and the political strategies used in 
the New Hampshire House. This chapter focuses on redistricting of the New Hampshire House, 
because in comparison to the State Senate there are more districts to draw, which allows for 
more gerrymandering. Additionally, the House has had a more consistent Republican majority 
compared to the Senate. Compared to the House, the majority has fluctuated between parties 
more in the Senate, as shown in Figure 2.1. Although the Senate has never stopped or amended 
any House district map proposals, testimony by Senate members on the House plans provides 
insight into the process. The history of the House legislation will seek to answer which political 
party was responsible for the change in redistricting and what the goals and results were of 
achieving the change (Schickler 2001, 19). The specific years chosen, including 1960, 1965, 
1982, 1992, 2002, 2004 and 2012, will outline the changes in redistricting and explain an 
increase in political strategies as the Republican Party felt it was more difficult to maintain 
control of the House as the state began to turn “purple.” Furthermore, this chapter will explain 
how previous years of change influenced the institutional design later, and how there were 
unanticipated consequences. 
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The following legislation was chosen to provide a better understanding of redistricting as 
an institution and how it is involved in the translation of votes into seats.
 2
 A turning point for the 
institution in New Hampshire occurred after the 1964 Supreme Court decision in Reynolds v. 
Sims, which required equal representation for voters across a state. A comparison of the 1961 
plan to the 1965 plan, created in response to Reynolds, highlights the transformation of the 
institution in New Hampshire. In 1982, floterial districts were used for the first time, and are an 
example of how mechanisms are used to assist political parties in redistricting. In later legislation 
floterial districts were used by the Republican Party to gerrymander. As the New Hampshire 
Democrats became more competitive in state elections through the 1990s, the Republican Party 
began to propose more partisan plans in an effort to secure their majority in the House. In 1992 
and 2002, the Republican Party attempted to displace minority party incumbents by either 
altering their district or placing them in a district with a Republican incumbent. However, in 
2002 the gerrymandering efforts were stopped by the Democratic governor’s veto, and as a result 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Representative Burling v. Gene Chandler, Speaker of the 
House (2002) was responsible for drawing the map. Lastly, the 2012 district map was the most 
partisan bill, which is made evident by the Democratic governor’s failed veto and the successful 
push by the Republican Party to quickly override the Democratic governor’s veto.  
As the Democratic Party recognized that redistricting legislation was becoming more 
partisan over the years, they tried to counteract the partisan efforts of the majority party. 
Therefore, the Democratic Party started proposing redistricting commissions as they gained 
strength as a party in the 1990s. These bills were proposed by only Democratic House members 
and only in the years that they were in the minority. This chapter will analyze legislation of 
                                                          
2
 The New Hampshire constitution requires redistricting plans to be completed prior to the candidate filing period in 
June. So, all of the redistricting bills discussed in this chapter were in effect for the general election that same year. 
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redistricting maps and redistricting commissions to explain when and why certain redistricting 
mechanisms were implemented, how the rise of two-party competition affected the Republican 
Party’s strategy, the involvement of the Courts in the process, the clear partisan divide between 
plans, and how in some years there were instances of unanticipated consequences.  
 
Constraints on Redistricting in New Hampshire 
New Hampshire’s state legislature is responsible for drawing the district maps every ten 
years; however, there are constraints on the process. These constraints, including federal, 
statutory, and state constitutional requirements, shape the redistricting process in the state. The 
state legislature has found that some of these constraints assist gerrymandering, while others 
inhibit it. The most difficult requirement for the legislature is to balance the federal requirements 
and the state constitution.  
The New Hampshire state constitution gives the state legislature the power to redistrict 
the state. In Article 9, it states that the legislature may not divide towns, wards, or unincorporated 
places when drawing the map (N.H. Const. Pt. II, Art. 9). If towns are contiguous, the 
constitution allows the legislature to combine them into a multi-member district (N.H. Const. Pt. 
II, Art. 11). The legislature, however, will not cross county lines when drawing the districts, 
which is only a statutory requirement. In New Hampshire the County Convention members are 
the state representatives, pursuant to RSA 24:1 (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §24:1). The responsibilities 
of the County Convention are to “raise county taxes, make appropriations, and authorize the 
purchase or sale of county real estate” (Richard E. Boyer 1982, 5). Although it has been 
suggested that changing this statutory requirement would make the redistricting process easier, 
there have been no efforts to change this. Additionally, it has been suggested that this structural 
requirement allows for more gerrymandering. Therefore, the state representatives are constrained 
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by state requirements to not divide towns, wards, or unincorporated places and not crossing 
county lines. Additionally, the state representatives have to keep in mind the federal 
requirements to keep a low statewide deviation and abide by the “one-person, one-vote” 
principle. 
In respect to statewide deviation, New Hampshire representatives have looked to the 
federal government for this requirement. The United States Supreme Court rulings have 
concluded that the state legislature is responsible for providing a justification for higher 
deviations (N.H. House. Special Committee on Reapportionment 1982a). The first time the 
Supreme Court indicated the proper amount of deviation for redistricting was in 1973 in Mahan 
v. Howell, in which the Court heard a case about the Virginia state legislature plan. While the 
maximum deviation was 16.4 percent, the Court upheld the Virginia plan because the state drew 
the legislative districts based on existing city and county political boundaries. In Reynolds the 
Court ruled that,  
So long as the divergences from a strict population standard are based on 
legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy, 
some deviations from the equal-population principle are constitutionally 
permissible with respect to the apportionment of seats in either or both of the two 
houses of a bicameral state legislature. (Epstein 2013, 760) 
 
Therefore, since Virginia’s district maps respect city and county lines, the Court ruled that this is 
a rational state policy. Even though the Court approved Virginia’s plan, they did suggest that the 
deviation “may well approach tolerable limits” (Mahan 1973, 6). 
In addition to the Mahan ruling, New Hampshire has looked to two other Supreme Court 
cases for guidance. The Court also heard Gaffney v. Cummings in the same year as Mahan, and 
ruled that “there will be deviations that are sufficiently large to establish the prima facie case of 
violation, but which will be sustained by the courts if shown to be justifiable by the states” (N.H. 
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House. Special Committee on Reapportionment 1982a). In White v. Regester, the Court 
cautioned that “very likely, larger differences between districts would not be tolerable without 
justification” (N.H. House. Special Committee on Reapportionment 1982a). The New Hampshire 
House, in 1982, used these three Supreme Court decisions as a guide to their statewide deviation 
requirements. The legislature agreed that their deviation should not exceed 16.4 percent, and if it 
was high then they should have a justification for why this was the case.  
After the New Hampshire 1982 redistricting plan, the Supreme Court issued their ruling 
for Brown v. Thomson (1983), which further defined the deviation requirements for legislative 
districts. The Supreme Court reviewed a Wyoming House of Representatives district, and in the 
decision clarified that previous Court rulings have “established, as a general matter, that an 
apportionment plan with a maximum population deviation under 10% falls within this category 
of minor deviations” (Brown et al. 1983, 9). In later redistricting plans, the New Hampshire state 
legislature has been advised to keep their statewide deviation under ten percent. However, the 
House has drawn several plans that exceeded ten percent, including the previous 1982 plan, and 
the 1992 and 2002 maps. In 1992, a representative stated “Ideally the courts say that you [should] 
be no more than 10%. We historically have been higher and will be high again this year” (N.H. 
House. Constitutional and Statutory Revision 1992, 2). Part of the reason the redistricting plan 
was sent to the Court in 2002 was because of its high statewide deviation, and as a result the 
House took care to keep the deviation below ten percent in the 2012 plan.  
Another constraint on redistricting in New Hampshire is that the state is subject to 
preclearance under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (U.S. Dept. of Justice. “Section 5 of the 
Voting Rights Act”). The Voting Rights Act was enacted in 1965 to “eliminate discriminatory 
election practices” (U.S. Dept. of Justice. “The Voting Rights Act of 1965”). Section 2, including 
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the amendments, prohibits voting practices and procedures “that discriminate on the basis of race, 
color or membership in a language minority group” (U.S. Dept. of Justice. “The Voting Rights 
Act of 1965”). Section 5 of the act requires covered jurisdictions to receive preclearance from the 
United States District Court or the Attorney General before making any change with respect to 
voting, including redistricting. A “covered jurisdiction” is a state, or part of a state, that has a 
“‘test or device’ restricting the opportunity to register or vote,” less than 50 percent of people of 
voting age registered to vote, or less than 50 percent of registered voters voted in the most recent 
presidential election (U.S. Dept. of Justice “Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act.”). In 1970, ten 
New Hampshire towns, including Rindge, Millsfield, Pinkhams Grant, Stewartstown, Stratford, 
Benton, Antrim, Boscawen, Newington, and Unity, became “covered jurisdictions” under the act.  
New Hampshire’s ten towns became covered jurisdictions in 1970 because at the time the 
federal government was concerned about voter suppression, and the state had a literacy test and 
less than 50 percent of the registered voters voted in the 1968 presidential election in the towns 
(Haddin 2012). A literacy test was implemented in the state in 1902, when many other states 
were also implementing similar tests because of the high level of illiterate citizens (Tucker 2009, 
7). By 1970, several cities and towns in the state were no longer using the literacy test, but it had 
not been repealed from the state laws. In fact, in the Nashua Telegraph in 1962, an article stated, 
In all of the hullabaloo about the use by some Southern states of literacy tests to 
bar Negroes from voting, it has been generally forgotten that a lot of Northern 
states, too, have such tests, although they seldom are used. We would say that few 
New Hampshire residents know that New Hampshire has some form of a literacy 
test to determine the qualification of a voter in this state. (“N.H. Vote Test”)  
 
The newspaper article further suggests that the literacy test was rarely used in the state, but had 
not been repealed or amended. The law was not repealed until 1976, after the ten towns became 
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covered jurisdictions, when the State Senate put forth a bill to repeal the literacy test. Senator 
Monier urged the passage of the law and said,  
We have it still on the books that we do have literacy tests and obviously 
everyone is well aware that the Supreme Court has overruled this […] I might add 
that there is a House Concurrent Resolution coming forth also that would ask the 
Secretary of State to notify the town clerks. There seem to be some persons in the 
state that are charged with the responsibility of voting that haven’t recognized yet 
that we don’t have literacy tests. This removes from the books an archaic statute 
which is already outdated. (N.H. General Court 1976, 112)  
 
The Senate bill and House concurrent resolution both passed, and the use of literacy tests in the 
state ended. However, since 1970 the ten towns in New Hampshire have continued to be covered 
jurisdictions, and thus any change to New Hampshire electoral laws has to receive preclearance 
by either the United States Department of Justice or the United States Attorney General. 
The Voting Rights Act has a bailout provision, which allows a covered jurisdiction to 
terminate their coverage under the act. In order to end its coverage, the jurisdiction must have 
eliminated the voting procedures that originally qualified them to be covered under the act. 
Additionally, there are several requirements the jurisdiction must prove they have met or not 
infringed over the past ten years, including that they have not had a literacy test or device, all of 
the changes have been reviewed, none of the changes have been objected to by the District Court 
or Attorney General, none of the changes have been subject to a lawsuit, and the changes have 
not violated the Constitution, federal, state, or local laws with respect to voting discrimination 
(U.S. Dept. of Justice. “Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act”). After the 2012 redistricting plan 
was cleared, the state of New Hampshire filed for a “bailout,” which means that the state would 
be exempt from the preclearance process in the future. In the petitioner briefs in New Hampshire 
v. Eric Holder, the state of New Hampshire argues that the ten towns have met all of the bailout 
requirements for the past ten years (Complaint, The State of New Hampshire v. Eric Holder 
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2012). On March 1, the United States District Court approved New Hampshire’s bailout 
(Wickham 2013).  
These constraints shape the redistricting process in New Hampshire and should be kept in 
mind for the bills discussed in this chapter. The limitations on the redistricting process in the 
state began after a Supreme Court ruling in 1964. Starting with the 1965 redistricting plan the 
state legislature has had to be cognizant of state and federal requirements. The difficult balance 
between the state constitution and the federal requirements were apparent in the 2012 
redistricting plan, especially after a 2006 state constitutional amendment. The changes to the 
state and federal laws on redistricting, in addition to the politics of the state, shaped the way the 
Republican Party used redistricting as a strategy over the years.  
 
1961 and 1965 Redistricting Plans: Influence of “one-person, one-vote” standard  
The Supreme Court rulings in Baker v. Carr (1962) and Reynolds v. Sims (1964) mark a 
significant change in the redistricting of state legislative districts across the country, including in 
New Hampshire. Prior to 1964, the year that the state amended the state constitution to require 
equal representation, the legislative districts in New Hampshire were highly malapportioned. A 
significant factor adding to the malapportionment was the use of part-time representation, which 
was added as an amendment to the state constitution in 1942. The amendment required that small 
towns received representation at least once every ten years. The statute in 1961, the last year 
part-time representation was used, stated  
The following named towns, according to the census of 1960, having less than the 
number of inhabitants necessary to entitle such towns to one representative and 
having a right under the constitution to elect a representative such proportional 
part of the time. (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §275) 
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 For example, in 1961 the state legislature decided that the town of Madbury was allowed to elect 
and send a representative to the state house in 1962, 1968 and 1970, while the town of 
Bridgewater could send a representative only in 1964 (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §275). The state 
legislature determined which years the small towns could send a representative based on the 
practice that the smallest towns could elect and send a representative once during the decade, 
while the larger towns could elect and send a representative four out of the five legislative 
sessions in the decade. While at this time the House did look to the census to determine the 
required number of people per town to receive representation, this did not guarantee equal 
representation across the state. Thus, it has been suggested that during this time representation in 
the House was based on a “one-town, one-vote” standard, not the “one-person, one-vote” 
standard (Representative Peter Burling 2002, 4). 
The use of part-time representation illustrates how the state legislature used geography as 
the basis for districting. The single changing factor for redistricting was the required population 
size for representation, based on the results of the census. At this time, the district lines were the 
town lines, and redistricting was simply the process of deciding how many representatives each 
town could have and which towns would receive part-time representation. In 1964, the decision 
in Reynolds resulted in the “one-person, one-vote” principle, suggesting that equal representation 
had to take precedence over geography. This provided a shift in the redistricting process in the 
state, from traditional geography based maps to prioritizing equal representation.  
 
1965 Redistricting Plan 
After the Supreme Court ruling came out with the “one-person, one-vote” standard, the 
New Hampshire House of Representatives passed a redistricting plan in 1965, House Bill (HB) 
712. This bill repealed the part-time representation of small towns and combined those small 
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towns to form districts. HB 712 was a significant change from the traditional process of basing 
the map on geography, to now combining and dividing towns into wards to create equal 
representation across the state. Now that the state legislature had the power to draw district lines, 
they had the opportunity to gerrymander, especially in later redistricting legislation. When HB 
712 was brought to the House floor, there were no partisan floor debates (Gardner 1993, 169) 
and the bill was passed. HB 712 was then sent to the State Senate and passed. Republican 
Senator English presented the legislation to the Senate floor and said, “The House has done a 
heroic job in bringing about this re-apportionment” (N.H. General Court 1965a, 940). 
Democratic Senator Martel suggested that the Senate should not change any redistricting efforts 
by the House, because “The House does as it concerns itself—that is their business” (N.H. 
General Court 1965a, 940). Although there are no roll call votes for the House or Senate, or 
testimony from the House, the Senate testimony points to there not being a partisan divide on 
redistricting at this time. Rather, it seems that the main goal of the General Court was to create a 
plan that would abide with the recent Supreme Court rulings.  
Without roll call votes or recorded House testimony, conclusions about the institution 
during this time can be drawn from the existing political composition of the state government 
during the drafting of the legislation and the results of the election after the passing of the bill. 
When HB 712 was proposed, the state government was divided politically, with a Democratic 
governor and the Republican Party having a majority in both legislative chambers. In the 1966 
election, directly following the passing of the redistricting plan, the Republican Party gained 30 
seats in the House (Dublin 2007, 123), while a Democratic governor and United States senator 
were elected (N.H. Dept. of State 1967, 438). The fact that the Republican Party gained seats in 
the House of Representatives and Democrats won at the top of the ticket, suggests that 
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gerrymandering could have occurred. While a main goal of the legislature was to draw a 
constitutional district map, because the 1961 plan did not satisfying the “one-person, one-vote” 
standard, it is quite possible that the House of Representatives saw this mandatory redistricting 
as an opportunity to gerrymander.  
In more recent legislation that displays clear gerrymandering efforts, there is often 
pushback from the minority party, but this did not happen in 1965. There might not have been 
much pushback from the Democratic Party because they may have seen HB 712 as mandatory 
legislation, and were concerned that it would have reflected poorly on the party to oppose the bill. 
The Democratic governor may have also decided to sign the bill for the same reasons, fearing 
that vetoing the legislation would have hurt his reelection. On the other hand, it is possible that 
the Democratic Party recognized that as the minority party, with only 183 Democratic members 
compared to 215 Republican members (Dublin 2007, 123), they had little influence on the 
legislative agenda. For example, it would not have been possible for the Democratic Party to 
convince enough Republican members to vote against the bill. Additionally, the Democratic 
Party may have known that with or without gerrymandering the political makeup of the state at 
the time was such that the Democratic Party would, no matter what, stay in the minority.  
Without any obvious pushback from the Democratic representatives and Democratic 
governor against the redistricting bill, there is no apparent answer as to whether the purpose of 
the bill was only to create a district map with equal representation or if the bill had partisan 
motives. New Hampshire Secretary of State William Gardner suggested that “there was little 
controversy” and “no partisan floor debates” during the drafting and voting of the 1965 plan 
(Gardner 1993, 169). However, the fact that the Republican Party gained 30 seats in the House, 
while a Democratic governor and United States senator were both elected, cannot be ignored. 
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Conclusion 
The Reynolds decision changed the redistricting process in New Hampshire. Prior to the 
Supreme Court ruling the state was not as cognizant of the “one-person, one-vote” principle that 
emerged from Reynolds. For example, the state had previously used part-time representation, 
which certainly did not allow for equal representation. After the Reynolds ruling the state 
changed its method of redistricting to make certain there was equal representation for the voters. 
Additionally, having the ability to draw district lines opened up the opportunity to gerrymander 
in later years. As a result, redistricting has become more complex over the years, as the goals and 
motivations of the political parties have deviated, and new mechanisms for redistricting have 
been introduced.  
 
1982 Redistricting Plan: The Introduction of Floterial Districts 
In contrast to HB 712 in 1965, the political parties were more divided on the 1982 
redistricting plan. The majority and minority parties came out of the committee both agreeing 
that HB 2 “Ought to Pass with Amendment,” but the parties proposed different amendments. The 
minority party, the Democrats, claimed that their amendment changed the map so that it kept the 
traditional, “small district representative government” (N.H. General Court 1982, 54). They also 
argued that their plan lowered the statewide deviation to 13.13 percent, while the majority party 
plan had a deviation of 13.74 percent. The majority party, on the other hand, argued that their 
map put aside the desires of the incumbents and the political leaders in order to create the fairest 
plan and one that complied with the “one-person, one-vote” standard (N.H. General Court 1982, 
54). The majority party amendment was adopted, and the bill was passed by the House.  
In the Senate, the bill was discussed as a partisan bill and sloppy legislation, but 
nevertheless the bill passed in the Senate. While the Senate Reapportionment Committee 
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unanimously recommended that the bill “Ought to Pass,” several senators testified on the Senate 
floor in opposition to the bill. Democratic Senator Preston read a letter from the speaker of the 
House stating, “The Majority Report deserves our united Republican support. Throughout both 
the regular and special session, the overwhelmingly consistent support to the Majority 
Committee position has been the key factor in the Republican leadership role in state government” 
(N.H. General Court 1982a, 178-9). Senator Preston, although not openly testifying in favor or in 
opposition to the bill, argued that the redistricting plan is already “predetermined” by the people 
in the leadership. In other words, Senator Preston was suggesting that the Republican Party 
clearly controlled the redistricting plan, as evident from the letter and the bill that was passed 
through the House. Several other senators argued that the number of representatives in their 
districts was unfairly decreased and so they would vote in opposition to the bill. Although the 
Democrats found HB 2 to be Republican controlled and several Republican senators threatened 
to vote in opposition, the bill still passed the Senate fourteen to nine.  
 
Floterial Districts 
HB 2 is a significant piece of legislation in the history of redistricting in New Hampshire, 
because it was the first plan to use floterial districts. A floterial district is a district drawn over 
multiple preexisting districts, in order to provide an additional representative to the towns that 
alone do not meet the population requirement to receive another representative. An example of a 
floterial district in HB 2 consisted of the towns of Wear, New Boston, Francestown, and 
Bennington. The town of Wear had a population of 3,232 and was given one representative, 
while the New Boston, Francestown, and Bennington district had a population of 3,648 and was 
also allotted one representative. In the 1982 plan the ideal population to receive one 
representative was 2,300 people, and so these districts individually were just under the 
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population requirement to receive two representatives.
3
 The floterial district drawn over these 
two districts was drawn to help correct the “fractional underrepresentation” for the two districts 
individually (Richard E. Boyer 1982, 2). How floterial districts are used and their impact on the 
redistricting process will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  
Both the minority and majority parties in 1982 agreed that floterials were necessary to 
help decrease the state deviation in HB 2. However, the use of floterial districts in HB 2 did turn 
off some representatives. For example, Democratic Representative Hendrick went on record in 
opposition to the bill because he opposed a floterial that combined Litchfield and Merrimack. 
While Representative Hendrick argued that the floterial district did not accurately comply with 
the “one-person, one-vote” principle, there were obvious underlying partisan concerns in his 
opposition (N.H. General Court 1982, 66). Prior to the 1982 changes, Litchfield and Merrimack 
were combined as one district and apportioned five representatives. Representative Hendrick was 
the only Democratic representative in the district (N.H. Dept. of State 1981, 335). HB 2 
apportioned one representative to Litchfield, six representatives to Merrimack, and one 
representative to the floterial district. In the 1982 election, Representative Hendrick was 
reelected in the Litchfield district, but the other six representatives in Merrimack and the floterial 
district were all Republicans (N.H. Dept. of State 1983, 265-266). Therefore, the floterial district 
helped the Republican Party gain a seat.  
Floterial districts were introduced in 1982 as a way of lowering the statewide deviation. 
Since the legislators were having a difficult time allocating representatives to the smaller cities 
without creating high levels of statewide deviation, the speaker of the House introduced floterial 
districts as a solution to lower the deviation. Drawing the lines for the small towns most likely 
                                                          
3
 The ideal population is the population requirement for a town to receive one representative. The ideal population is 
figured out by dividing the state population by 400, which is the number of House Representatives. 
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became an issue in 1982 because of a significant increase in the state population. Compared to 
previous census years, the 1980 federal census showed the largest percentage increase in 
population in 30 years, of 24.8 percentage points. Additionally, there was a significant increase 
in population in the rural areas in the state, of 36.9 percentage points in ten years (U.S. Census 
Bureau 1981). This percentage increase helps explain why floterial districts may have been 
implemented because as Moncrief quotes,  
in theory, they [floterial districts] are a way of achieving greater arithmetic 
equality in situations where there are political subdivisions of varying sizes whose 
populations do not neatly accord with the representation ratio, while at the same 
time preserving the integrity of the boundaries of traditional political subdivisions 
(Duncombe and Stewart 1985; Dixon 1968, 461). (Moncrief 1989, 253) 
 
In other words, Moncrief suggests that floterials are used by representatives because they believe 
floterials will help fix the deviation problem between the various sized districts in the state. In 
practice, floterial districts should help equalize the deviation between rural areas, where the 
population is more spread out, compared to concentrated, urban areas. Thus, the New Hampshire 
state legislature pursued floterial districts as a way of creating equal representation across the 
state.  
Floterial districts are not unique to New Hampshire, and in fact the speaker of the House 
learned about this type of district from Virginia. Other states that have experimented with 
floterial districts include Oregon, Mississippi, New Jersey, Georgia, and Wyoming (Moncrief 
1989, 252-3). Floterial districts were also used by the Tennessee legislature and were addressed 
in Baker v. Carr. The concurring and dissenting opinions in Baker both suggest that floterial 
districts often confuse the calculation of the state deviation. In fact in Boyer v. Gardner (1982), a 
New Hampshire District Court case, the question of how to properly calculate floterial districts 
in the state deviation was addressed, and will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Partisan Divide 
Considering that the 1982 redistricting plan displayed a greater partisan divide than the 
previous two plans, in 1965 and 1972, the Democratic Party was “severely critical” of their 
Democratic governor when he did not veto the bill (Gardner 1993, 170). Governor Gallen signed 
the House redistricting plan after making “an agreement with the speaker to further review 
certain districts” (Gardner 1993, 170). The speaker of the House claimed to review the bill, but 
no changes were made. In contrast, the governor vetoed the Senate redistricting bill, most likely 
because he knew that the Senate, with ten Democrats and fourteen Republicans, would be unable 
to receive the necessary two-thirds vote to override his veto and be forced to renegotiate a new 
plan. As a result of the governor not vetoing the House bill, the Democratic House members did 
not support the governor in his reelection, and consequently he was defeated in the 1982 election. 
In an effort to make up for not vetoing the House bill, Governor Gallen vetoed all of the House’s 
city district plans. The Republican Party did not have a two-thirds majority in the House, and as 
a result was unable to override the governor’s vetoes. When a Republican governor took office 
the next year, the Republicans were able to pass their city districting plans. 
After the city districts plans were approved by the new governor, the full 1982 
redistricting plan finally went into effect for the 1984 election. The Republican Party gained 58 
seats in the House after the 1984 election, which points to potential gerrymandering in HB 2. 
However, the increase in the Republican majority cannot be attributed strictly to gerrymandering. 
As the secretary of state, William Gardner, notes, “the population changes” in the state, “the 
national trend with President Reagan’s popularity,” and “coattails from the New Hampshire 
straight-ticket ballot” could have all equally influenced the outcome of the 1984 election 
(Gardner 1993, 171). Even if the increase in Republican House members cannot be attributed to 
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HB 2, the 1982 bill is significant because it is the first redistricting plan to include the use of 
floterial districts, which later become an important strategy used by the Republican Party to 
maintain their majority. 
 
Conclusion 
The 1982 redistricting plan points to the start of partisan division on the redistricting 
process in the state, although this division becomes much more apparent in later legislation. As 
the election results presented in Figure 2.1 and Figures 2.3 through 2.8 suggest, the Democratic 
Party was not as competitive in the state during the passing of HB 2 compared to the 1990s. 
Even so, HB 2 starts the political party division on House redistricting plans. The use of floterials 
in HB 2 introduces this mechanism to the redistricting process, and with the rise of two-party 
competition and increased use of the district, they become a significant source of debate between 
the political parties.  
 
The Rise of Two-Party Competition 
In the 1990s, New Hampshire experienced a shift in its political party alignment. 
Historically, New Hampshire was considered a Republican state. Leading up to the 2000 
presidential election, several events influenced the political shift in the state from being 
considered a decidedly Republican state to a swing state. A New York Times article in September 
2000, stated that  
New Hampshire could fall either way […] Historically, the state has been a good 
bet for Republican presidential candidates, until Mr. Clinton was victorious here 
twice. The governor, Jeanne Shaheen, is a Democrat in her second term, and 
made Mr. Gore’s short list of possible running mates. Still, 37 percent of 
registered voters are Republicans, compared with 27 percent who are Democrats. 
(Flaherty 2000)  
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In the press coverage leading up to the 2000 election, several other articles referred to New 
Hampshire as a swing state. While New Hampshire was traditionally only in the spotlight for 
presidential primaries, the attention continued to be on the state through the general election in 
2000. Another New York Times article stated that the reason New Hampshire did not receive 
much attention in past general elections was because,  
There was no suspense about the results. The Republican candidate carried the 
state in every election but one from 1948 until 1988, winning by 29 percentage 
points in 1980, 38 points in 1984 and 26 points in 1988 […] Since then, however, 
population shifts have helped make New Hampshire one of the nation’s 
presidential battlegrounds. (Cohen 2012)  
 
Both of the presidential candidates in 2000 campaigned in the state up until the day of the 
general election, hoping to win the state that had appeared to change from a guaranteed 
Republican win. The state began its shift as it voted for the Democratic candidate, President Bill 
Clinton, in the previous two presidential elections in 1992 and 1996. Additionally, Democratic 
Governor Jeanne Shaheen was elected in 1996 as President Clinton won New Hampshire for his 
second term. Governor Shaheen was then reelected in 1998, and was running for her third term 
in the 2000 election.  
The 2000 election results provide further evidence that New Hampshire transitioned from 
a strong Republican state to a swing state. In 2000 Governor Shaheen was reelected, while 
Republican President George W. Bush received only 7,211 more votes than Vice President Al 
Gore. President Bush won by significantly fewer votes than previous Republican presidential 
candidates had in New Hampshire (N.H. Dept. of State 2001, 350). In the following three 
presidential elections, New Hampshire went “blue” in all of them, which further clarifies the 
political party shift in the state. With Democrats winning at the top of the ticket, the Democratic 
Party displayed their growing strength as a party in the state.  
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The comparison between the increase in registered independent voters, top of the ticket 
election results, and the New Hampshire House partisan composition provides an additional 
explanation of the political shift in the state in the 1990s. Figure 2.2 presents the breakdown of 
registered Republicans, Democrats, and Independents in New Hampshire from 1984 to 2012.
4 
This graph shows that starting in the late 1990s registered Independent voters began to 
outnumber registered Republicans and Democrats. Previously, registered Republican voters 
greatly outnumbered registered Democratic and Independent voters. Although New Hampshire 
has always had a large number of registered Independent voters, these voters typically voted for 
the Republican candidates. Additionally, despite the large number of registered Independent 
voters, no third party candidate has ever gained enough mobilization to win a top of the ticket 
seat in the state, further clarifying that these voters were not in fact truly Independents.  
Although there was an increase in the number of registered Independent voters, who had 
habitually leaned Republican, the rise of the Democratic Party competitiveness in the state 
occurred simultaneously. Figure 2.3 shows how Democratic presidential candidates began 
receiving more votes starting in 1992, when President Bill Clinton won New Hampshire. After 
1992, Democrats won the presidential elections in 1996, 2004, 2008 and 2012. Although the 
Republican presidential candidate, President George W. Bush, won in 2000, he only won by a 
slim margin. The Democratic Party continued to show its strength through the gubernatorial 
races, as the Democrats held the office consistently from 1996 through 2002, and 2004 through 
2012, shown in Figure 2.4. The United States Senate election results, in Figure 2.5, illustrate how 
the Republican Party began to win by fewer seats in the 1990s, with the Democratic Party finally 
winning the Senate seat in 2008 for the first time since 1972. Accordingly Figures 2.3, 2.4, and 
                                                          
4
 Figure 2.2 provides the breakdown of the political parties of registered voters only back to 1984, because the state 
did not report these figures before this year.  
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2.8 show how the Democratic Party gained more votes in these offices over the years, illustrating 
the increase in Democratic Party strength in the state and thus the growing competitiveness 
between the two political parties. 
The Democratic Party, however, did not display as much competitiveness in the offices 
that were subject to redistricting, such as in the United States Congress and New Hampshire 
House of Representatives elections, until much later. Figures 2.6 and 2.7 are of the two 
Congressional Districts in the state, and illustrate how the Republican Party consistently won 
these seats until 2006, when the Democrats began winning the office. Figure 2.8 shows the 
partisan composition of the New Hampshire House of Representatives, and how the Republican 
Party maintained control even as the Democratic Party began to display strength as a party. The 
Republican Party was able to maintain control of the House of Representatives through strategies, 
such as redistricting, discussed in this chapter, and floterial districts and ballot design, discussed 
in the next two chapters. In 2006, despite the Republican Party’s strategic gerrymandering, the 
Democratic Party gained a majority for the first time since 1922 (Dublin 2007, 122). With the 
Democratic Party winning control of the House of Representative and offices at the top of the 
ticket in 2006, it became evident that there was officially a two-party competition in the state.  
The shift in political alignment in New Hampshire in the 1990s can be partially attributed 
to the state’s changing demographics. In a 2008 study of voter registration patterns in the state, 
Johnson, Scala, and Smith concluded that the state has one of the most mobile voting populations 
in the country. The two factors that contributed most to the shaping of the electorate were 
migration and life-cycle changes. Considering that less than 45 percent of New Hampshire 
citizens are born in the state, migration contributes to a significant portion of the state population. 
Those who migrate to the state are generally from the Boston metropolitan area, and settle in the 
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southern region of the state. Additionally, Johnson, Scala, and Smith discuss how death rates thin 
the voter pool, but citizens turning 18 replace the deceased. Thus, in the 2008 election young 
voters and migrants made up about one-third of the potential new voters. Johnson, Scala, and 
Smith concluded that these new voters typically identify with the Democratic Party, and 
therefore these new voters had potential to influence election results. The young voters that do 
register to vote, however, generally register as Independents, which could possibly explain the 
increase in registered Independents in the 1990s as shown in Figure 2.2 (Johnson, Scala, and 
Smith 2008). 
Although the 1990s can be pointed to as “New Hampshire’s shift from a reliably 
Republican state to a Democratic-tilting bellwether,” this shift occurred slowly over time and by 
county (Scala 2011, 1). A study by Dante Scala concludes that there was “slow-motion 
realignment” in the counties in New Hampshire, because of significant population growth in the 
state and because of the “changes in the national Republican Party itself” (Scala 2011). For 
example, in the 1960s the Republican Party dominated five counties in the state, and after a 
significant population growth in the 1970s and 1980s the Republicans could count on only two 
counties in 1980. As some counties shifted away from Republican to Democratic tilting, other 
counties remained Republican. Overall, New Hampshire became less of a decidedly Republican 
state over the years.  
Beginning with President Clinton winning the state in 1992, Democrats displayed their 
growing strength as a party in the state throughout the 1990s.
5
 In the 2000s, Democrats 
                                                          
5
 It has been suggested that Ross Perot, the Independent candidate for president in 1992, cost President George H. 
Bush the presidency. President Clinton won New Hampshire and the Electoral College in 1992. A study of the 1992 
election and the effect of Perot on the election found that nationally Perot voters “were more likely to be Bush voters 
than was the rest of the voting population” (Alvarez 1995, 737). The study was based on national election results. 
While nationally Clinton received 46 percent, Bush received 34 percent and Perot received 20 percent of the votes, 
in New Hampshire Clinton received 39.23 percent, Bush 38 percent, and Perot 22.77 percent of the votes. Thus, the 
difference between Clinton and Bush in New Hampshire, compared to the country, was much closer. As a result of 
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continued to win seats at the top of the ticket and took control of the House in 2006, even as 
Republicans attempted to maintain control of their majority. Changing demographics in the state 
influenced the change in voter registration and election results in the 1990s. Between 1998 and 
2008, Johnson, Scala, and Smith concluded that there was a 30 percent increase in Democratic 
Party voter registration, while Republican voter registrations remained rather constant. 
Additionally, they compared the voter registration in the counties in 1998 to 2008. The graph, 
Figure 2.9, illustrates that the number of registered Democratic voters increased in every county 
between 1998 and 2008. Therefore, migration to the state, young voters, and a “slow-motion 
realignment” of counties in the state influenced the rise of two-party competition in the state 
(Johnson, Scala, and Smith 2008). As a result of Democrats winning seats at the top of the ticket, 
the Republicans began to feel that their majority in the House was being threatened, and started 
implementing strategies to help maintain their party control.  
 
1992 & 2002 Redistricting Plans: Responding to the Rise of Democratic Party Competition 
In 1992 and 2002 the partisan divide on redistricting continued, but it became even more 
divided over the ten years. The 1992 and 2002 bills came at the start of the increase in 
Democratic Party strength and in the midst of the rise of two-party competition in the state, as 
discussed earlier. From committee minutes, testimony and roll call votes, it is evident that both 
of these bills were Republican proposals. Since the Republicans recognized the rising 
competition from the minority party, they used techniques to manipulate the redistricting process 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the difference in the breakdown of the votes nationally compared to New Hampshire, the conclusions of the study 
may not be directly applied to the state. So although the study concluded that 50.5 percent of the Perot votes would 
have voted for Clinton, while 49.5 percent of the Perot votes would have voted for Bush, this distribution of Perot 
votes cannot be applied to New Hampshire. In New Hampshire, Bush would have needed to received 52.7 percent of 
Perot votes to win by one vote over Clinton (N.H. Dept. of State 1993, 356). It is quite possible that Bush could have 
received this many Perot votes. Even though it is possible that the presence of Perot on the ballot assisted Clinton in 
his win in New Hampshire, it is significant that voters chose not to overwhelmingly vote for a Republican candidate, 
as they had traditionally. In addition to the President’s race, Democrats started winning the governor’s office in the 
1990s in the state. Thus, the 1992 election can still be seen as part of the shift of political alignment in the state.  
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to secure their majority in the House. These techniques included the use of floterial districts and 
attempts to displace minority party incumbents.  
 
1992 Redistricting Plan 
The 1992 redistricting bill, HB 591, was sponsored by a Republican House representative 
and Republican state senator. The Republican control over this bill continued as House floor 
amendments proposed by Republican representatives were mostly adopted, while on the other 
hand amendments proposed by Democratic representatives failed to be adopted (N.H. General 
Court 1992). In the 1992 House Redistricting Committee, there was a partisan debate over the 
map. Democratic Representative Chambers argued against the plan. She felt that this bill moved 
toward larger districts “and [was] leaning on floterial districts to try to equalize the representative 
districts,” which she believed was unacceptable because the New Hampshire legislature prides 
“itself on being close to the people” (N.H. House. Constitutional and Statutory Revisions 1992, 
2). Taagepera and Shugart suggest that using a variety of small and large districts is a tactic to try 
to gain more seats. They write, “In the regions where your party is strong try to have as small 
districts as the law allows […] In regions where your party is weaker and could fail to earn one 
seat out of three, try to have larger districts” (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 16-17). Therefore, 
Representative Chambers pointed to the large districts as a gerrymandering tactic by the 
Republican Party in an effort to translate votes into Republican seats. In contrast to 
Representative Chambers, Republican Representative Shackett testified that he felt the 
“overriding philosophy to be one-person, one-vote” and that there was no partisan attachment to 
the bill (N.H. House. Constitutional and Statutory Revisions 1992, 6).  
Furthermore, Representative Chambers argued that there were better plans with lower 
deviation proposed than the high deviation of 14.37 percent in HB 591. In fact, HB 591 
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increased the statewide deviation from 13.74 percent in the 1982 plan. Republican 
Representative Cowehoven, the chairman of the committee, mentioned that the high deviation 
was a concern, especially since the courts advised that the deviation should not exceed ten 
percent. However, even with a Republican representative expressing this concern, the bill was 
still passed with no amendments to decrease the deviation. With the Republican Party controlling 
the legislative and executive branch, the bill was able to be passed even with the high deviation 
and clear partisan motives.  
The 1992 election was the first time that registered Democratic voters outnumbered 
Independent voters, as seen in Figure 2.2. This only lasted for two elections, and since 1998 the 
Independent voter registration has outnumbered registered Democrats and Republicans. The 
House partisan composition shifted in 1992, with the Republicans losing 11 seats even though 
they were responsible for the 1992 redistricting plan. This seat loss was minor, because the 
Republican Party still had a strong majority in the House. In addition, in the next election the 
party managed to win back those seats plus some. However, looking at the partisan composition 
of the House in Figure 2.8 it appears that the Republican Party lost seats in the 1992 and 1996 
presidential elections years. This could likely be the result of more Democrats coming out to vote 
for these elections, considering that President Clinton won both times in New Hampshire. 
HB 591 provides an example of how partisan redistricting cannot guarantee complete 
control over the translation of votes into seats. In 1992 there was a presidential election and a big 
win for Democrats in the state, which is even evident in the 11 seat loss in the House for the 
Republicans. As mentioned in the first chapter, redistricting is not immune to national trends or 
wave elections. Nevertheless, the redistricting plan must have had some influence on the 
outcome of the partisan composition of the House because the Republican Party maintained 
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control of the House all through the two presidential elections, in which the state went “blue,” 
and through the Democratic Party winning the governor’s seat 1996 through 2000. 
 
2002 Redistricting Plan 
Similar to the 1992 plan, the Republicans and Democrats had opposing views of the 2002 
plan. For example, Republican Representative Bragdon for the committee majority states that 
“The average deviation, per district is well under the goal of 10%” (N.H. General Court 2002, 
292). On the other hand, Democratic Representative Clemons argued for the minority party that 
there were several cases of unacceptable deviation. For example, she claimed that the “districts 
in this plan range in population from a high of 86,605 to a low of 2,946” and that “only 15 
members will be elected from districts that fall within the constitutionally acceptable range of 
3,089” (N.H. General Court 2002, 292). In addition, Representative Clemons further explained 
that this plan was unacceptable because this was the first time in history that “this Legislature 
had the technical capacity and expertise to draw 400 single-member districts” (N.H. General 
Court 2002, 292). Representative Clemons suggested that the Republican Party chose not to 
draw 400-single member districts because this would not allow for the gerrymandering that the 
Republican Party accomplished in this plan. 
 
Displacement of Incumbents 
Another similarity between the 1992 and 2002 redistricting plan is the technique of 
pitting incumbents against each other in order to displace the minority party legislators and 
further gain majority party seats. As Cain discusses, in an effort to secure their seats the majority 
party will often pit incumbents from the minority party against majority party members, or 
change a minority party incumbent’s districts to make it more difficult for reelection (1985). The 
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fact that the 1992 plan would force two incumbents to run against each other was briefly 
mentioned in committee. Prior to 1992, Hinsdale and Winchester together made up a district in 
Cheshire County, with three apportioned representatives. When HB 591 was drafted, the three 
elected representatives from this district were all Democrats from Winchester. The 1992 map, 
however, changed Cheshire County so that Winchester and Hinsdale were individual districts, 
each with one representative. In addition, Winchester and Hinsdale were combined with 
Chesterfield to create a floterial district, with one representative. This new plan meant that only 
two of the three incumbents could be elected in the Winchester district or the floterial district. 
The outcome of the 1992 election was that one of the incumbents was reelected in the 
Winchester district, while the other two incumbents ran in the floterial district and both lost to a 
Republican candidate (N.H. Dept. of State 1991, 256; N.H. Dept. of State 1993, 400). 
HB 591 displaced two Democratic incumbents by altering their districts, so as to make it 
more difficult for the representatives to be reelected. Republican representatives may have 
chosen to combine Winchester with Chesterfield and Hinsdale because they were considered 
more Republican towns. In fact, Chesterfield and Hinsdale both had more registered Republican 
voters than Winchester in 1990 (N.H. Dept. of State 1991, 287). This suggests that a Republican 
would be more likely to win in the floterial district and the Hinsdale district. Consequently, in the 
1992 election the Republican Party gained a seat in Cheshire County as a product of 
gerrymandering.  
Similar to the 1992 redistricting plan, the designers of the 2002 plan, HB 420, used the 
method of intentionally displacing the minority incumbents. For example, HB 420 changed the 
district of the House Democratic Minority Leader, by placing her hometown in two overlapping 
floterial districts. As a result, her constituents were now split into two districts and combined 
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with new voters. Thus, this plan made it so the House Democratic Minority Leader had less 
name recognition in either district. In northern New Hampshire, two towns were combined to 
form a two-representative district, despite the fact that the towns alone had the population 
requirement to have their own representatives. As a result, a Democratic incumbent would be 
forced to run against a Republican incumbent (N.H. General Court 2002, 870-871). These cases 
of incumbents pitted against each other in the 2002 plan are examples of strategies used by 
political parties to gain seats in their legislative body. The Democratic governor at the time, 
Governor Jean Shaheen, vetoed HB 420 because of these instances of incumbents pitted against 
each other, the misuse of floterial districts and the large range of deviation.  
 
Involvement of the Courts in the 2002 Redistricting Plan 
Since the governor’s veto of HB 420 was unable to be overturned by the required two-
thirds vote in the House, the New Hampshire state legislature failed to pass a redistricting plan in 
2002. Consequently, the role of drawing the district lines was passed on to the New Hampshire 
Supreme Court. In Burling, petitioners filed for “original jurisdiction requesting the Court to 
declare the existing representative districts unconstitutional and to impose a deadline for the 
legislature to enact a valid reapportionment plan for the house” (Representative Peter Burling 
2002, 2). After accepting jurisdiction, the Court decided that because the General Court had 
already recessed and the candidate filing period was soon, it would have to be responsible for 
drawing the map. The Court’s plan apportioned 400 representatives over 88 districts and did not 
use any floterial districts. The range of deviation in the Court’s plan was 9.26 percent, which was 
significantly lower than the deviation in HB 420 and below the ten percent requirement set by 
the United States Supreme Court. Part of the reason the deviation was lower was because the 
Court attempted to use single-member districts over multi-member districts whenever possible. 
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When multi-member districts were used, the Court assigned “as few representatives as possible 
because of its concern that large multi-member districts may tend to dilute the voting strength of 
racial or political elements of the voting population” (Representative Peter Burling 2002, 12). 
Unlike the state legislature bill, the Court “did not consider the impact upon either political 
parties or incumbency” (Representative Peter Burling 2002, 13), and therefore the Court felt it 
had produced the fairest plan. Burling will be discussed in the next chapter, because the Court 
made important rulings on floterial districts in this case.  
HB 420 stands apart from previous redistricting plans, because it was the first time that a 
governor had vetoed a House redistricting plan. Governor Shaheen’s veto in 2002 can be 
attributed to the increase in the Democratic Party strength and party competition in the state. 
Despite the fact that there was a Democratic governor for the 1965 and 1982 redistricting plan, 
the 2002 Democratic governor was the first to resist the House Republican redistricting efforts. 
As discussed earlier, the 1965 plan was not seen as partisan, while in contrast the 1982 plan was. 
The governor did not veto the 1982 plan because he made an agreement with the speaker of the 
House to review the bill. However, signing the bill turned out to be a politically fatal decision, 
because the governor lost the support of his party and was not reelected. In contrast, Governor 
Shaheen vetoed HB 420, citing the reason as the use of Republican strategies in the plan. After a 
decade of the Democratic Party displaying their strength as a party, the Republican Party began 
to use more gerrymandering techniques in HB 420, including the increased use of floterial 
districts, the displacement of incumbents, and accepting a higher statewide deviation than 
previous legislation.  
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2004 Redistricting Plan: Replacing the Court Plan 
The House, however, was not satisfied with the Court’s 2002 plan because they believed 
that it did not create enough districts. In 2004, the House of Representatives replaced the Court’s 
plan with a bill that increased the number of House districts from 88 to 103. The majority report 
from the House committee stated that “more districts and smaller districts [...] provide better 
access to the representatives by the citizens” (N.H. General Court 2004, 292). When the House 
plan was proposed on the Senate floor, several senators were concerned about the timing of the 
redistricting plan. Some senators questioned whether the House districts could be redrawn more 
than once during the decade. In addition, senators were concerned with how this piece of 
legislation altered the range of deviation. Democratic Senator D’Allessandro stated,  
The court made its finding based on the lowest possible deviation. The lowest 
possible deviation meant that people were being represented in the best fashion 
because of the lowest possible deviation. The deviations created by this bill are 
greater in almost every context. (N.H. General Court 2004a, 521)  
 
As senators had suggested in previous legislation, such as with the 1965 plan, Senator Kenney 
advised the Senate not to alter the bill. He said, “there was kind of a gentlemen, ladies agreement 
that we wouldn’t really tamper with redistricting in the way that they felt it should be put in place, 
out of respect to that body” (N.H. General Court 2004a, 519). Despite the concerns of some of 
the senators, the Senate heeded to Senator Kenney’s testimony and passed the bill without any 
amendments. 
The 2004 redistricting plan was well-timed, partisan legislation, meant to further 
maintain Republican control in the House. As evident from the Democrats winning seats at the 
top of the ticket in the 1990s, there was obvious two-party competition in the state. When the 
Republican House members in 2002 proposed a visibly gerrymandered plan, their attempt was 
stopped by the Democratic governor. This was the first time a House plan had been vetoed by a 
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governor and further emphasized the rise of Democratic Party competitiveness in the state. The 
2002 election was a landslide for the Republican Party across the country, and this held true for 
the New Hampshire state elections. With a newly elected Republican governor and an increase in 
majority in the House, the Republican Party saw this as an opportunity to pass legislation that 
would benefit their party. Although New Hampshire had previously passed mid-decade plans, 
the past legislation only altered ward lines. This mid-decade overhaul redistricting plan redrew 
the whole map. The purpose of the bill was to increase the number of districts from the Court’s 
plan, which as McDonald argues, makes it easier to strategically group voters and thus control 
the translation of votes into seats (2004).  
The Republican Party lost seats in the House between 2002 and 2004, even after the 
Republican House members intentionally drew a map that would benefit their party. As Gelman 
and King observe in their study, there is generally an increase in legislative seats in the direction 
of the party in control of drawing the map in the election year following the passing of 
redistricting legislation (Gelman and King 1994). Following the 1965, 1972, and 1982 plans, the 
Republican Party gained seats in the House of Representatives, despite the fact that the 1965 and 
1972 plans have been said to not be partisan. After the 1992 plan, the Republican Party lost a few 
seats, but was still able to maintain control. Individually, redistricting as an institution can only 
affect the translation of votes into seats to a certain extent. It is not immune to trends in national 
politics, wave elections or the influence of other institutions. Therefore, although the Republican 
Party lost seats after the 2004 plan, it was not because their gerrymandering efforts necessarily 
failed. The 2002 House Republican majority was a result of a national GOP landslide, while the 
2004 election was a good year for Democrats in New Hampshire. In 2006 the Democratic Party, 
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for the first time in almost 80 years gained a majority in the House, which was only two years 
after a Republican redistricting plan had been implemented.  
 
2008 Court Case: Mid-Decade Redistricting  
In 2008, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire ruled in Town of Canaan v. Secretary of 
State on the constitutionality of mid-decade redistricting. Prior to the 2006 election, the 
Republican majority in the House proposed a constitutional amendment that would require towns 
with the ideal population to receive their own representative. Additionally, the amendment would 
make the use of floterial districts constitutional. The 2006 amendment will be discussed in 
further detail in the next chapter on floterial districts. After the passing of the 2006 amendment, 
several legislators felt that the House districts should be redrawn. They argued that the current 
House districts were unconstitutional, especially because they did not meet the 2006 amendment, 
which required every town that met the ideal population to have their own representative. This 
would have been the second time the House was redistricting in the decade, and the Court ruled 
that the legislature is able to redistrict only once during the decade. 
In 2002, the House and Senate redistricting plans were both vetoed by the governor and 
sent to the Court’s for review. Similar to the House, the Senate redrew the district map to replace 
the Court plan in 2004. The Court reviewed the Senate’s replacement of the Court’s 2002 plan in 
Below II, and upheld the 2004 Senate plan. The Court ruled that “once the legislature has 
fulfilled its constitutional obligation to reapportion based upon the decennial census figures, it 
has no constitutional authority to make another apportionment until after the next federal census” 
(Town of Canaan 2008, 2). The Court used Below II as precedent for their ruling in the Town of 
Canaan. 
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The Town of Canaan ruling is significant because it prohibited the current and future 
representatives from redistricting more than once during the decade. Having the ability to 
redistrict more than once would have provided another strategy for maintaining party control. In 
fact, allowing the legislature to redistrict more than once would have potentially led to the 
legislature redistricting whenever there was new party majority in the House. This Court ruling is 
a result of the 2002 governor’s veto, the 2002 Court redistricting plan, the 2004 House plan, and 
the 2006 amendment. Additionally, this Court ruling has restricted future legislatures from 
passing mid-decade redistricting plans.  
 
Conclusion  
A common theme for the 1992, 2002 and 2004 redistricting plans was that they presented 
unanticipated consequences. The Republican Party was responsible for creating the district maps, 
and intended the districts to assist their party in maintaining a majority. After the passing of the 
1992 plan the Republicans lost seats in the House. On the other hand, the 2002 redistricting bill 
was never passed and the Court’s had to step in. Even though the Republicans did not approve of 
the Court plan, they gained seats in the House in the next election. In 2004, the Republican Party 
put forth a plan to replace the Court plan, but then lost their majority in the House two elections 
later. Even though the redistricting plans were guided by Republican motives, the plans did not 
always produce the effects the party expected. These unanticipated consequences can be 
attributed to the fact that Republican Party strategies for redistricting are not immune to changes 
in national and state politics.  
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Redistricting Commissions: Response to Republican Controlled Redistricting Plans 
Democratic House members began proposing legislation to create nonpartisan 
redistricting commissions as a way of taking the redistricting process out of the legislature. As a 
result of their growing strength as a party through the 1990s, but their constant minority in the 
House, the Democrats partially contributed their minority to Republican gerrymandering. New 
Hampshire was not the first state to have proposals to take the redistricting process out of the 
state legislature. In fact, 21 states currently use commissions that are either primarily responsible 
for the process, advise the legislature on how to draw the plan, or are implemented only if the 
legislature fails to pass a plan (“Redistricting Commissions: Legislative Plans”). The 
appointment process varies between states, with some states requiring that the members are not 
public employees or elected officials, and in contrast other states require the members to be 
elected officials. The states that do not allow appointments of elected officials are attempting to 
“insulate the process” of drawing the districts from politics (McDonald 2004; Cullen and Davis 
2012). The Democratic representatives proposing legislation in New Hampshire looked to the 
redistricting commissions in other states as examples.  
Democrats were responsible for proposing the creation of nonpartisan commissions in 
New Hampshire. Their proposals would intentionally distribute the appointment process across 
representatives of both political parties and would require that the appointed members were not 
elected officials or party leaders. This appointment process resembles Alaska’s, which authorizes 
the governor to appoint two members, and the president of the Senate, the speaker of the House, 
and the chief justice of the Supreme Court to all appoint one member. In some of the other states 
the House majority and minority leaders were responsible for appointing the members 
(“Redistricting Commissions: Legislative Plans”).  
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Democratic representatives only proposed commissions when the party felt threatened by 
Republican gerrymandering and after learning about them from other states. Two of New 
Hampshire’s neighboring states, Vermont and Maine, both use advisory commissions. Vermont 
was one of the first states to implement commissions, and did so in 1965 after the Reynolds 
decision (V.T. Stat. Ann. §1904). On the other hand Maine waited until 1993 (M.E. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §1206). Maine’s state legislature is similar to New Hampshire’s, because it is a citizens’ 
legislature. In addition, Vermont and Maine both require that the members of the panel are not 
members of the legislature, therefore attempting to avoid politics from controlling the process. 
With examples of commissions from neighboring states, it is likely that the Democratic 
representatives used them as guidance for drafting legislation. Although Vermont has had 
commissions since 1965, New Hampshire did not start proposing them until much later. The 
Democrats began proposing commissions when they believed Republican gerrymandering was 
one of the strategies restricting their party from gaining seats in the House, especially because 
their party was winning offices that were not subject to redistricting. Therefore, Democratic 
representatives began to propose commissions as a way to counteract the actions of the majority 
party. With the Republican Party having the majority in the House, these proposals were never 
passed. Strategically the Republican Party would not want to hand over the redistricting process 
to a nonpartisan commission, because this would not allow the representatives to use the strategy 
to control the translation of votes into seats. 
 
1998 Redistricting Commission Proposal: The First Attempt 
The first redistricting commission was proposed in 1998. In comparison to the following 
proposals, this bill was not as specific as to who would be responsible for appointing the 
members. Democratic Representative Cushing, a sponsor of the bill, argued that the minority 
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party and incumbents felt that the majority party’s goal was only to secure their party’s majority 
and that a commission would provide a fairer plan than any legislator (N.H. House. Election Law 
1998a). The majority report suggested that the bill was “inexpedient to legislate” (ITL), as it did 
with all of the later proposals.
6
 The majority wrote, “The commission would be an unnecessary 
bureaucratic layer which might inhibit the legislature in the execution of its charge to redistrict 
decennially” (N.H. House. Election Law 1998). This bill was proposed one session before the 
House of Representatives would be responsible for redistricting the state again. Therefore, the 
Democratic Party recognized their growing strength as a party and did not want the 
gerrymandering efforts of the Republican Party to reverse their progress.  
 
 Redistricting Commission Proposals in the 2000s 
After the Republican Party tried to pass the highly partisan redistricting plan in 2002, the 
Democratic Party presented the House with several different redistricting commission proposals. 
Immediately following the 2002 redistricting plan that was sent to the Court, Democratic 
Representative Weed and Representative Burling proposed HB 202. Compared to the previous 
proposal, this bill laid out more specifically who would make up the independent commission 
and who was responsible for the appointments. The members were to be New Hampshire 
citizens, with two members appointed by the governor, and one member appointed by the chief 
justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, speaker of the House, minority leader in the 
House, president of the Senate, and minority leader of the Senate. Representative Burling 
                                                          
6
 According to the “New Hampshire General Court Legislative Handbook,” any proposed bill will be sent to the 
appropriate committee. The committee will then give their recommendation of “Ought to Pass,” “Ought to Pass with 
Amendment,” “Re-refer to Committee,” “Retain in Committee,” “Inexpedient to Legislate,” and “Refer to Interim 
Study.” A bill cannot be “killed in committee” in New Hampshire. After the committee gives their recommendation, 
the bill is put into the House or Senate calendar and voted on by the appropriate chamber. If the chamber adopts the 
committee’s recommendation of Inexpedient to Legislate, the bill will then be essentially “killed.” Thus, although 
the bill proposing a redistricting commission in 1998 was given the recommendation of Inexpedient to Legislate, the 
bill still had to be brought to the House floor to be voted on by the entire chamber. (“New Hampshire General Court 
Legislative Handbook”) 
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testified about the importance of the legislation by stating that “the property of redistricting is 
that of the citizens of New Hampshire [and] that it belongs to neither the Democratic or 
Republican Party” (N.H. House. Election Law 2003). The majority report, recommended that 
HB 202 was ITL and argued that the present legislature should not control the redistricting 
process of future state legislatures by not allowing them this right. The minority report, in 
contrast, believed that this bill would “remove the rancorous partisanship evident following the 
last decennial census,” and would create a plan that is not drawn for any particular party or 
incumbent (N.H. House. Election Law 2003). 
After HB 202 failed, Representative Weed and Representative Burling proposed another 
bill to take redistricting out of the state legislature. HB 1269 created an advisory commission, 
appointed by the House majority leader and House minority leader, which would be responsible 
for drawing the map and presenting it to the House. The House would have the ability to adopt 
the plan, alter the plan and then adopt it, or ask them to reconsider the plan. The majority report 
claimed that the citizen members were not knowledgeable enough to be given the responsibility 
to redistrict the state. The majority report recognized that HB 1269 was proposed in response to 
the highly partisan redistricting plan of 2002, but argued that the committee had learned from its 
previous mistakes and that it was a lesson for all future legislatures to learn from (N.H. House. 
Election Law 2004). However, the minority report again claimed that an advisory commission 
would take the partisanship out of the redistricting process (N.H. House. Election Law 2004a).  
In 2004, the Republican House members passed a mid-decade plan to replace the court-
drafted plan, and in response Democratic House members again proposed a commission. The 
2005 bill, HB 49, would give the responsibility to the House and Senate to appoint independent 
citizens. Similar to the arguments on the previous bills, the majority report argued that 
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redistricting should stay the responsibility of the legislature, while the minority report argued that 
a commission would create a fairer plan (N.H. House. Election Law 2005, 2005a). 
Representative Vaillancourt, a Republican, argued that since New Hampshire has a 400 member 
legislative body there was no need for a commission. He argued that 400 members going back to 
their constituents for advice on the redistricting process would be more valuable than creating a 
smaller group of people responsible for the process (N.H. House. Election Law 2005b). 
Although the Democrats proposed this bill in response to the 2004 redistricting plan, the next 
election was a good year for the Democratic Party. The Democrats gained enough seats to have a 
majority in the House in 2006 and as a result the proposals for commissions temporarily stopped.  
 
2011 Redistricting Commission Proposal 
Although there had been a break from the proposals, during the years that the Democratic 
Party had control of the House from 2006 through 2009, the proposals started up again in 2011. 
The Republican Party gained enough seats in the 2010 election to take back control of the House. 
In 2011, HB 224 proposed the creation of a redistricting commission that resembled the previous 
bills. The members would be citizens appointed in the same manner as HB 202 from 2002. The 
majority and minority report arguments also resembled the arguments from the previous 
legislation. However, this time the majority argued that while other states have similar 
commissions there is no proof that it actually takes the partisanship out of the process. 
Additionally, there was concern that there was no proof that the governor would not pick people 
from his own party and he had the ability to appoint two members to the commission, while the 
other representatives could only appoint one. Thus, there was concern that a partisan commission 
would be formed. Since the governor was a Democrat, the Republicans were concerned that a 
Democratic-leaning commission would be created, and that the commission would create a map 
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that benefited the Democratic Party. HB 224 was not passed, similar to all the other proposals to 
create a commission (N.H. House. Special Committee on Redistricting 2011). 
 
Timing of Redistricting Commission Proposals 
All of the redistricting proposals were sponsored by Democratic representatives, but none 
of the proposals came at the time when the party had a majority. While the Republican Party 
strategically passed a mid-decade redistricting plan in 2004, when they had a majority in the 
House and held the governor’s office, the Democratic Party on the other hand did not take 
advantage of having a Democratic governor and the majority in both chambers. It is possible that 
the Democratic Party had other policies higher up on their agenda than creating a redistricting 
commission. For example, as will be discussed in the fourth chapter, when Democrats had their 
majority they were able to eliminate some of the other Republican Party strategies. Another 
possibility for why they did not propose redistricting commissions may have been because they 
may have hoped that they would continue to hold the majority in 2010, and then have the 
opportunity to redistrict for the first time in New Hampshire history. However, the Democratic 
Party lost their majority in 2010 as the rise of the Tea Party created a national GOP landslide. 
Consequently, the Democratic Party lost their opportunity to pass a redistricting commission, 
considering that the Republican Party had consistently opposed the creation of such a 
commission in the past. It is possible that after a year of debates with the Republican Party over 
the 2012 map and with the Democrats winning back the House for the 2013 session, that creating 
a commission will be a top priority for the party.  
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2012 Redistricting Plan  
In response to two sessions of Democratic control in the House, Republicans took 
advantage of the redistricting process in 2012 by trying to guarantee that the Democrats would 
not be able to gain the majority again. The political party composition of the House during the 
drafting of this bill was 288 Republican members and 102 Democratic members (“State 
Representative-2012 General Election”). The Democratic Party had control of the House for two 
sessions prior to the significant Republican Party majority in 2010. The rise of the Tea Party 
helped right wing Conservatives gain seats across the country in 2010, including in New 
Hampshire. This Republican Party majority is significant because this was the first time a 
political party had a veto proof majority during a redistricting year, which meant that even if the 
Democratic governor chose to veto the bill the Republicans would be able to easily receive the 
two-thirds needed to override the veto.  
This redistricting bill was different than previous legislation because of the recent 2006 
amendment and because the legislature did not want to fail to pass legislation and have the Court 
take over, like what happened in 2002. In 2002, the Court took over the redistricting process and 
created a map that did not use floterial districts. The Court ruled that floterial districts are an 
“unsound redistricting device” (Representative Peter Burling 2002, 12). As a result, the 
Republicans proposed a constitutional amendment that would make floterial districts 
constitutional. The constitutional amendment was passed by the voters 240,767 to 100,688, and 
floterials were reintroduced to the redistricting process (N.H. Dept. of State 2007, 335).
7
 The 
2006 amendment also required legislatures to give towns their own representatives if their 
population matched the ideal population. Since this amendment was passed by New Hampshire 
                                                          
7
 In New Hampshire, a constitutional amendment must be passed by New Hampshire citizens, so they are placed on 
the general election ballots.  
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citizens in 2006, it was expected that the legislature would abide by this amendment in their 
2012 redistricting plan. However, as will be discussed, the legislature did not follow the 2006 
amendment. 
Even though the House had a veto proof Republican majority, Democratic Governor John 
Lynch vetoed the 2012 House plan. He wrote in his veto message,  
Based on the 2010 census, there are 152 towns and wards in New Hampshire that 
qualify for their own representative. HB 592 denies a total of 62 New Hampshire 
towns and wards their own seats in the House. […] This is completely contrary to 
what the citizens of New Hampshire called for in the state constitutional 
amendment adopted in 2006. Another significant flaw with the House-approved 
redistricting plan is that it unnecessarily breaks-up cities and wards. […] One of 
the unique advantages to living in New Hampshire is the ability of citizens to 
encounter his or her state representative in their daily activities […] HB 592 
undermines that very special quality of life in New Hampshire. (N.H. House 
Record 2012, 43-4) 
 
In his veto message, Governor Lynch made note of the fact that the legislature did not follow the 
2006 amendment, which clearly the citizens of New Hampshire had voted for. However, the 
House and the Senate were both able to provide the two-thirds vote needed to override the 
governor’s veto. Thus, this was the second House redistricting plan to become law without the 
governor’s signature; the other was when the Court created the plan in 2002.  
As the Republican Party felt threatened by the increase in competition by the Democratic 
Party, they pushed the vote on the governor’s veto quickly through the House to assure an 
override. The Republican majority leader and speaker of the House presented the question on the 
governor’s veto prior to the veto message being printed in the House Calendar. The traditional 
practice of the House was to wait to ask the question after the message was printed in the 
calendar, in order to allow time for each of the 400 representatives to read and discuss the 
message with their caucus. However, the speaker of the House, Representative O’Brien, decided 
to push forward with the question and ignore the procedural rules (N.H. House Record 2012, 44-
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45). Several times Democratic House members asked for a recess so that they could hold a 
Democratic caucus, but Representative O’Brien refused the request. The vote on the question of 
“notwithstanding the governor’s veto of HB 592, shall HB 592 become law?”, was 246 voting in 
the affirmative and 112 voting in the negative (N.H. House Record 2012, 45). As a result, the 
governor’s veto was overridden in the House, and later overridden by the Senate. 
After the vote in the House, several representatives filed “protests” to express their 
disapproval of the House vote, and especially the disregard of the House procedural rules (N.H. 
House Record 2012, 48-9). In the roll call, most of the votes in the negative were Democrats, 
however nineteen republicans also voted in the negative (N.H. House Record 2012, 45-8). The 
majority of the Republicans voting in the negative were representatives from Manchester, who 
disapproved of HB 592 because of the floterial district combining two Manchester wards with 
Litchfield. The fact that some Republican members disapproved of their own party’s bill 
provides evidence of how HB 592 was highly Republican leaning. The drafters knew that they 
would still be able to obtain the necessary two-thirds to override a potential governor’s veto, 
even without the nineteen Republican votes.  
 
Constitutionality of HB 592 
Shortly after the governor’s veto was overridden by the General Court, several cities in 
New Hampshire brought suit against the secretary of state about the constitutionality of HB 592, 
in City of Manchester v. Secretary of State (2012). Part of the Court’s decision discussed the 
2006 amendment to the New Hampshire constitution. The 2006 amendment, made floterial 
districts constitutional by stating, “Excess population may be combined with other contiguous 
districts to allow for additional at-large or floterial representatives” (Smarling 2011). In addition, 
the 2006 amendment required the state legislature to give a small town their own representative 
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if their population matched the ideal population. One of the main arguments by the petitioners 
was that HB 592 did not abide by the 2006 constitutional amendment. The Court, however, 
upheld the 2012 redistricting plan. 
The petitioners attempted to prove that the plan was unconstitutional, but the Court was 
unconvinced by the petitioner’s argument. One of the main concerns of the petitioners was a 
floterial district that combined Manchester Wards 8 and 9 with Litchfield. The petitioners argued 
that Manchester does not share a “community of interest with Litchfield” (City of Manchester 
2012, 16). In response, the Court argued that the New Hampshire constitution does not mention 
that “communities of interest” must be taken into consideration when drafting a redistricting plan. 
Another part of the petitioner’s argument was that the plan violates the state constitution because 
there are districts that were drawn that “‘breaks up’ certain cities, towns, and wards” (City of 
Manchester 2012, 15). However, the Court did not find any towns or wards that were broken up 
by the redistricting plan. Therefore, the New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld the 2012 
redistricting plan, because the petitioners were unable to prove that the plan violates the state 
constitution. 
Although the petitioners recognized that the plan does follow the federal requirements, 
they also suggested that the legislature unnecessarily adhered to the ten percent requirement, 
when they could have given more small towns their own representative. The Republicans in the 
House were advised by lawyers to follow the federal requirements first, and then accommodate 
as many of the state requirements as possible. If the representatives had given all of the small 
towns that met the ideal population their own representative, which was required by the 2006 
amendment, then their deviation would have well exceeded the ten percent requirement. The 
Court ruled that the petitioners failed to prove that the legislature “lacked a rational or legitimate 
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basis for adhering to the 10% rule” (City of Manchester 2012, 10). Thus, the final redistricting 
plan had a deviation of 9.9 percent, and 204 legislative districts made up of 91 single-town 
districts, 70 multi-town districts, and 43 floterial districts.  
 
The Implications of HB 592 on the 2012 Election Results 
HB 592 went into effect for the 2012 general election, but it did not have the expected 
effects the Republican Party was hoping for. Looking at Figures 2.4, 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8, it is 
obvious that 2012 was a good year for Democrats in New Hampshire. Most importantly, the 
Democratic Party was able to regain control of the House, despite the hard fought efforts of the 
Republican Party to pass their redistricting plan. Looking at the House election results, 
Republican candidates won both seats in the highly debated floterial district combining 
Manchester Wards 8 and 9 with Litchfield, which suggests that some of the strategies used by 
the Republican Party in the redistricting plan were effective (“State Representative-2012 General 
Election”). Although the Democratic Party won the majority overall, the fact that Republicans 
won the floterial district combining Manchester Wards 8 and 9 with Litchfield provides evidence 
that HB 592 included gerrymandering and had partisan motives. It is possible that HB 592 could 
have helped the Republican Party maintain control of the House if it had not been a wave 
election or a presidential election year.  
The results of the 2012 election allowed the Democrats to gain back a majority in the 
House, win the governor’s office and the two United States Congressional seats. A Washington 
Post article suggests that a major reason why the Republicans lost their majority was because of 
the party’s focus on social issues. During the past two years the Republicans attempted to repeal 
same-sex marriage, tighten abortion restrictions, and exempt certain religious institutions from 
contraceptive insurance coverage requirements (Sullivan 2012). Since New Hampshire has a 
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relatively small population and large 424 member legislature, the majority of constituents know 
what is happening in the legislature. Thus, when voters are unhappy with their representatives 
they react by voting them out of office. In addition, the 2012 election was likely subject to a 
coattails effect because of the highly publicized gubernatorial and presidential races. The 
Democrats winning seats at the top of the ticket likely supported Democrats winning office at the 
bottom of the ticket.  
The Democrats winning at the top of the ticket did not have the same effect on the State 
Senate, as it did in the House, because the Republicans were able to maintain a majority in the 
Senate. Similar to the House, the Senate was redistricted in 2012. It has been suggested that the 
Senate was able to gerrymander more effectively than the House. One of the reasons the Senate 
may have been more effective is that with fewer districts to draw it is easier to keep the statewide 
deviation lower. While fewer districts do not allow for as much gerrymandering, the Senate, 
unlike the House, did not have to worry as much about keeping the deviation under ten percent. 
Even though the Republicans did maintain a majority in the Senate, the majority was narrowed 
after the 2012 election. 
The results of the 2012 election provide evidence that redistricting is not immune to wave 
elections. While redistricting has been an effective strategy for the Republicans to maintain party 
control in the state legislature, it was not effective in 2012. Despite the efforts of the Republicans 
to create a plan that strategically grouped voters, while abiding by the federal requirements and 
most of the state requirements, the Democrats managed to gain a majority. Thus, the 2012 plan 
further explains that redistricting alone as a strategy is not enough to help a political party 
maintain control of a legislative body, especially in the case of two-party competition in a state. 
  
Foster 83 
 
Conclusion  
Over time, redistricting has been shaped by political events at the state and national level 
and by the representatives designing the institution. After the 1962 and 1964 Supreme Court 
rulings, redistricting in New Hampshire shifted to abide by the requirement of equal 
representation. Therefore, districts were implemented to ensure equal representation, but 
consequently would allow for gerrymandering in later years. As the voting behaviors of New 
Hampshire citizens changed, in relation to the changing demographics, the Republican Party was 
no longer guaranteed their majority in the House. As the Democratic Party showed their strength 
as a party in the 1990s, the Republican Party secured their majority in the House by manipulating 
the redistricting process. Consequently, House Democrats attempted to stop the gerrymandering 
efforts of the Republicans by proposing to create redistricting commissions that would take 
redistricting out of the legislature. With the rise of two-party competition in the state, it became 
clear that the Republican Party could no longer strictly depend on strategically grouping voters to 
control the translation of votes into seats, and thus they sought other strategies to help maintain 
their control. 
Starting in 1982, the House maps began to include floterial districts, which is a method 
that has been used by states dating back to before the Baker decision. The next chapter will 
analyze the effects of this redistricting method on the translation of votes into seats in the New 
Hampshire House. The floterial districts used in the 1982, 1992, 2002, and 2012 plans will be 
further discussed to illustrate the way the districts were implemented and what the goals of the 
representatives were when drawing these districts. In relation to the question of floterial districts 
and equal representation, addressed in Baker as well as the New Hampshire Court cases, Boyer v. 
Gardner, Burling v. Chandler, and City of Manchester v. Secretary of State, the discussion of 
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how to properly calculate the statewide deviation when using floterials will be discussed. 
Calculating the deviation is often confusing because in addition to floterial districts, single-
member, multi-member and at-large districts are also used to draw the map. Since at-large 
districts are similar to floterials and are also used in New Hampshire, the history of these districts 
in the state will help explain the use of floterial districts and the connection between the two 
districts. Therefore, the use of floterial districts, in conjunction with single-member, multi-
member, and at-large districts, will explain how the state legislature has the ability to manipulate 
the electoral system to affect the translation of votes into seats, in addition to the strategies used 
by the Republicans outlined in this chapter.  
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Figure 2.1: State Senate Members  
Republican
Democrat
 
Note: This graph shows the partisan composition of the New Hampshire State Senate from the 
1965 legislative session through 2013.  
 
Sources: Dublin 2007, 123; “State Representative-2010 General Election”; “State 
Representative-2012 General Election”  
  
 
Foster 86 
 
 
 
Note: This graph shows the breakdown between the political parties of registered voters in New 
Hampshire.  
 
Sources: N.H. Department of State 1985-2009; “State Representative-2010 General Election”; 
“State Representative-2012 General Election” 
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Note: This graph shows the election results of the presidential elections in New Hampshire from 
1968 through 2012.  
 
Sources: N.H. Department of State 1967-2009; “State Representative-2010 General Election”; 
“State Representative-2012 General Election”  
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Note: This graph shows the election results of the gubernatorial elections in New Hampshire 
from 1966 through 2012.  
 
Sources: N.H. Department of State 1967-2009; “State Representative-2010 General Election”; 
“State Representative-2012 General Election” 
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Note: This graph shows the election results of the U.S. Senate elections in New Hampshire from 
1966 through 2012.  
 
Sources: N.H. Department of State 1967, 1969, 1972, 1975, 1979, 1981, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1993, 
1999, 2003, 2005; “State Representative-2010 General Election”; “State Representative-2012 
General Election”  
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Note: This graph shows the election results of Congressional District 1 in New Hampshire from 
1966 through 2012. 
 
Sources: N.H. Department of State 1967-2008; “State Representative-2010 General Election”; 
“State Representative-2012 General Election”  
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Note: This graph shows the election results of Congressional District 2 in New Hampshire from 
1966 through 2012. 
 
Sources: N.H. Department of State 1967-2009; “State Representative-2010 General Election”; 
“State Representative-2012 General Election” 
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Note: This graph shows the partisan composition of the New Hampshire House of 
Representatives from the 1965 legislative session through 2013. 
 
Sources: Dublin 2007, 123; “State Representative-2010 General Election”; “State 
Representative-2012 General Election”  
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Figure 2.9 
Note: This graph shows the percentage of Republican versus Democratic registered voters by 
county for 1998 and 2008.  
 
Source: Johnson, Scala, and Smith 2008 
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Chapter Three: Floterial Districts 
 
In the previous chapter floterials were introduced as a mechanism for redistricting. This 
chapter will explain in more detail how these districts are a strategy used by politicians to help 
translate votes into seats. A floterial district, as defined by Black’s Law Dictionary and the 
definition used by the New Hampshire state legislature, is  
a legislative district which includes within its boundaries several separate districts 
or political subdivisions which independently would not be entitled to additional 
representation but whose conglomerate population entitles the entire area to 
another seat in the particular legislative body being apportioned. (N.H. House. 
Special Committee on Reapportionment 1981a) 
 
See Figure 3.1 for an example of floterial district in Carroll County from the 1992 redistricting 
map. The purpose of this chapter is to further explain the application of floterial districts, how 
this institution has changed over the years of use in New Hampshire, and the consequences of 
these changes. While this type of district was first introduced in New Hampshire for the 1982 
redistricting plan, they had been previously used in other states. With a rise in two-party 
competition in New Hampshire, floterials became increasingly used to assist in partisan 
gerrymandering. This chapter will look at the goals of the actors in support of using floterial 
districts, but it will also seek to explain how the goals of the actors changed in response to the 
rise of two-party competition. Beyond the actors, this chapter will examine the unanticipated 
consequences of the districts and the changes in the institution as a result of constitutional 
amendments and court rulings. In addition, this chapter will explain the timing of the institutional 
changes to floterials. 
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Before the use of Floterial Districts 
Floterial districts are similar to at-large districts in their grouping of voters and how the 
candidate is elected at-large. New Hampshire still uses at-large districts, in addition to single-
member, multi-member and floterial districts, to redistrict. Prior to the Supreme Court rulings in 
Baker v. Carr and Reynolds v. Sims, the state was separated into only at-large districts. In 1965, 
the New Hampshire state legislature made significant changes to the redistricting process to 
abide by the Supreme Court ruling. For example, the House combined small towns to create 
multi-member districts, when previously these towns had only received part-time representation. 
Leading up to the introduction of floterial districts, the state used a combination of single-
member, multi-member, and at-large districts to come as close as possible to the “one-person, 
one-vote” standard. After floterial districts were introduced in 1981 to the process, the use of this 
district continued to change through the 1990s and into the 2000s.  
In 1965, when the New Hampshire House of Representatives had to redistrict the state in 
response to the Supreme Court ruling in Reynolds v. Sims, the new plan used at-large districts. 
For example, the town of Salem was drawn as an at-large district with six representatives, and 
for the most part has been kept as an at-large district since. Considering that prior to 1965 each 
individual town made up its own district, the maps essentially consisted of only at-large districts. 
Thus, it is not surprising that the New Hampshire representatives continued with this tradition by 
drawing at-large districts wherever possible in the 1965 plan. The House of Representatives had 
to redraw the map in 1965 because their 1960 plan did not observe the Supreme Courts’ “one-
person, one-vote” principle. Since the 1960 plan consisted of all at-large districts and some 
districts had only part-time representation, the new House plan was unable to be drawn in the 
same manner. As a result, the House of Representatives, for the first time, used a combination of 
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single-member, multi-member, and at-large districts. By using at-large districts, the House was 
continuing with their tradition of drawing districts synonymous to town lines. As discussed in the 
first chapter, at-large districts were used in other states to group voters in ways that would make 
it difficult for certain candidates to be elected, because of their race or political party. This 
argument has been made against the use of floterials.  
At-large districts have caused similar concerns to that of floterial districts, in that they 
allow for politicians to strategically group voters. A representative on the House floor stated “a 
town like Salem with 10 at-large representatives it results in domination by one party, and I don’t 
like that whether it’s Democrat or Republican” (N.H. House 1982, 31). In fact, when floterial 
districts were first introduced in the state in 1982 they were referenced as “1 rep (at-large)” in the 
bill (N.H. House. Special Committee on Reapportionment 1982). This is interesting, because at-
large districts have never been differentiated in a redistricting plan. Additionally, it points to how 
the legislature recognized the similarity between floterial and at-large districts. After the 1982 
bill, the plans stopped distinguishing floterial districts as “at-large,” which is most likely because 
these districts began to serve the legislature a different purpose than the typical at-large district. 
During the drawing of the 1992 redistricting plan a representative asked what the difference was 
between an at-large district and a floterial district and another representative responded that an 
“at-large district [… has] two or more towns that elect two or three representative where a 
floterial will have either at-large or single district and it will sit on top of that” (N.H. House. 
Constitutional and Statutory Revision 1992, 16). 
Although at-large districts are similar to floterial districts, a constituent from New 
Ipswich testified at a public hearing on the 1992 redistricting plan about how floterials allow for 
unequal representation. He said, 
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When you have an at-large district electing two or three seats the voting strength 
of everybody in those towns is mathematically equal. However, if you have two 
towns that each elect a rep and together elect a third, and we find that one of these 
towns has twice as many people as the others, you will find that one town is more 
under-represented than the other […] I think the committee has committed a grave 
error in choosing to look at groups of towns served by floterial districts rather 
than groups of towns served by the individual districts within those floterial 
districts. (N.H. House. Constitutional and Statutory Revision 1992, 8-9) 
 
This constituent was skeptical of floterial districts and how the legislators would be able to 
guarantee that voters have equal voting powers when they are in a floterial district compared to 
an at-large district. These concerns were highlighted in the Boyer v. Gardner court case that 
came after the introduction of floterial districts to the state in 1982. While floterial districts share 
similarities to at-large districts, such as the fact that the representatives are elected at-large and 
both types of districts can be used to strategically group voters, they are inherently different in 
their application and how they are used by legislatures. For example, floterial districts were 
originally implemented to help decrease the statewide deviation. Floterials were a significant 
transition in New Hampshire redistricting, where traditionally towns individually made up 
districts to drawing districts that would “float” over several towns. 
 
Introduction of Floterial Districts in 1982 
While the Democratic Party has recently started to argue that floterial districts have 
assisted with gerrymandering, the history of the implementation of floterials in New Hampshire 
suggests that gerrymandering was not their original purpose. The 1982 redistricting plan, HB 2, 
appears to be a partisan bill because the majority and minority parties each brought a different 
version of the bill to the House floor. Additionally, the Democratic representatives were outraged 
with the Democratic governor for signing the bill, and thus did not support his reelection. Part of 
the reason for the partisan divide on the bill could have been because of the use of floterial 
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districts. When the Republican House speaker proposed the use of floterials, the House 
Democratic leader immediately responded by declaring the party’s opposition to them. While 
Speaker John Tucker proposed floterial districts as a “solution to some of the large and 
unpopular districts,” it is difficult to tell if the Republican Party had alternative goals (N.H. 
House. Special Committee on Reapportionment 1981b). However, when reviewing the 
committee minutes it seems that the goal of floterial districts was to help the representatives 
draw smaller districts and simultaneously keep a lower statewide deviation. 
The Reapportionment Committee spent several months in 1981 into 1982 working on 
drawing a map. Several of the debates focused on the issue of maintaining a statewide deviation 
under 16.4 percent, abiding by the “one-person, one-vote” principle, and drawing small districts. 
In a 1971 Supreme Court case, Mahan v. Howell, the Court approved a Virginia plan that had a 
statewide deviation of 16.4 percent. In response to the Mahan ruling, the New Hampshire House 
in 1982 was encouraged by legal counsel to keep the state deviation under this percentage. Prior 
to the introduction of floterial districts the plan had a statewide deviation of 17.5 percent. With a 
deviation this high, there was the possibility that the plan would be challenged in the Courts and 
in this event the state would need to justify the high deviation with a “rational state policy.” The 
chairman recognized that the plan had some “unpopular decisions,” but that he felt that their 
“numbers [were] justifiable” because they took into consideration the 400-members with 
“comparatively small constituencies, plus the fact that the committee did not want to cross 
county lines” (Chase 1982). This plan was not the final bill brought to the House floor, because 
soon thereafter floterial districts were introduced and allowed for a plan to be drawn that 
decreased the deviation. 
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, New Hampshire experienced a significant increase 
in population in the rural areas of the state between 1970 and 1980. Because of the increase in 
population in the rural areas, the representatives from the rural towns advocated for their own 
representation before the Reapportionment Committee. Even though some of their town’s 
populations were slightly under the required population to receive their own representative, the 
representatives argued that their towns were often combined with others that did not share the 
same community interests. For example, a representative argued that Litchfield should be made a 
single-town district because although it had been combined with Merrimack for the past ten 
years, the two towns had significantly different community interests. The representative stated 
that while Litchfield is “the largest farming community in N.H.,” Merrimack is “highly 
industrialized” (N.H. House. Special Committee on Reapportionment 1981c, 3). Prior to the 
introduction of floterial districts, several of the proposed plans created large, multi-member 
districts that combined several towns that individually did not meet the population requirements. 
However, there was little support for these plans because the districts were large and the plan had 
a high deviation. On December 1, 1981, floterial districts were proposed to the committee as a 
technique to allow them to draw a map with smaller districts and a lower deviation.  
Speaker John Tucker proposed the use of floterial districts in 1981 to the committee as a 
solution “to some of the large and unpopular districts.” In his memo he proposed the use of 
floterial districts for only three districts, including Bedford-Litchfield, Hudson-Pelham, and 
Windham-Londonderry, which suggests that the floterials were actually introduced as a means to 
solve the deviation problem (N.H. House. Special Committee on Reapportionment 1981b). Since 
floterial districts were new to the House, a legislative research office staff person, Mrs. Janet 
Monahan, explained to the representatives the proper application of floterials. While floterial 
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districts were new to the New Hampshire House, they had been used by other states and so the 
legislative research office looked to other states for guidance on the proper application and 
methods of calculating deviations of the districts. They gathered information about floterials 
from Virginia’s 1971 and 1981 reapportionment plans. Mrs. Janet Monahan explained that they 
“could be used only when a town or group of towns has a minimum of 2,300 population [the 
ideal population to receive one representative in 1982] plus a surplus” (N.H. House. Special 
Committee on Reapportionment 1981). For example, a floterial district cannot combine a town 
that has a population slightly over 2,300 and its own representative, with a town that has less 
than 2,300 people and no individual representative. In the memorandum sent to the 
Reapportionment Committee analyzing floterial districts, the legislative research office wrote,  
In the case of New Hampshire, floterial districts might help to reduce some of the 
problems created by large multi-member districts. Where New Hampshire has 
traditionally had a citizen legislature and historically (up to [the] 1960’s) every 
town had its own representative, the use of floterial districts may be the answer to 
insure representation from the smaller town(s) in a large multi-member district. 
(N.H. House. Special Committee on Reapportionment 1981a).  
 
After the explanation of the proper application of floterials, they were accepted by the committee 
on a voice vote and from there the representatives saw opportunities to “assure smaller towns 
representation” by using the district to draw the map (N.H. House. Special Committee on 
Reapportionment 1981).  
Floterial districts allowed the legislature to draw as many “regular districts,” such as 
single-member and multi-member districts, as possible, and then fix the deviation by using 
floterials. In 1982 the ideal population per representative was 2,300, and there were many towns 
that had just slightly over this population but not large enough to receive a second representative. 
So, the representatives covered these districts with floterials to provide the towns with more 
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representation. An example of this was the floterial district drawn over Weare and New Boston, 
Francestown, and Bennington. The town of Weare had a population of 3,232 and was given one 
representative. The district of New Boston, Francestown, and Bennington (New Boston) had a 
population of 3,648 and was allotted one representative. The floterial district over these two 
districts helped correct for the “fractional underrepresentation” for the two districts individually, 
because these districts individually were just under the amount needed to receive two 
representatives (Richard E. Boyer 1982, 2).  
The minority and majority party both brought redistricting plans to the House floor. 
Representing the minority plan, Representative Hildreth encouraged the House to vote for this 
plan because it had a lower deviation compared to the majority plan and because it attempted to 
keep the smallest districts possible. Representative Hildreth testified, 
I don’t think it is a partisan plan, […it is] a better plan because the numbers are 
different, are smaller than the majority report, but more importantly, I believe and 
I did most of the work on this plan, that our plan, wherever possible, puts a 
Representative in the smallest unit possible. If a town can have one representative 
and perhaps be part of a floterial district, we have given it that one representative 
because that’s what New Hampshire’s tradition is, and that’s what’s important, 
and the reason that we have a 400-member House. (N.H. House 1982, 3) 
 
The minority plan had a deviation of 13.13 percent, compared to the majority’s plan of 13.74 
percent deviation. Despite the fact that the Democratic Party came out in opposition to floterial 
districts when they were first introduced, they used them in their plan. One of the reasons that the 
Democrats used floterials, despite their opposition to them, could have been because floterial 
districts did in fact allow for a lower statewide deviation. If the minority presented a plan without 
floterial districts their plan would have had a greater deviation and therefore would not have 
been as attractive.  
Foster 102 
 
When the chairman of the committee presented the majority report to the House floor he 
discussed his initial reservations to floterial districts. He discussed how a representative elected 
to this district would have more constituents and would be “farther away from the people you 
represent” (N.H. House 1982, 21). Even so, he explained that it was necessary to use floterials to 
draw this map and to get a lower statewide deviation (N.H. House 1982, 21). Floterials, however, 
were not the only available method for minimizing the statewide deviation. As discussed in the 
second chapter, the legislature was restricted from using other methods because of the federal 
and state redistricting requirements, such as not crossing town boundaries. The chairman warned 
that floterials “should not be used any more than absolutely necessary” (N.H. House 1982, 21), 
and argued that the minority report used floterial districts “far beyond the necessity” (N.H. 
House 1982, 30). The majority plan was adopted, and thus floterial districts were used to elect 
the state representatives for the first time in the 1982 election. 
 
Conclusion 
Floterial districts in the 1982 plan were not used as a strategy to translate votes into seats 
to the extent that they were used in later redistricting plans. In 1982, the representatives had 
difficulty creating a plan that kept the statewide deviation below sixteen percent. Floterials were 
introduced to the legislature as a solution for the high statewide deviation problem, and so their 
initial purpose was to provide a mechanism that would allow the representatives to create a map 
with smaller districts and a lower statewide deviation. In the 1982 plan, far fewer floterial 
districts were used than the amount used in later redistricting plans. The 1982 plan had only 17 
floterials, while in comparison the 1992 plan had 32. Therefore, it is unlikely that floterial 
districts were used as a mechanism to gerrymander in 1982.  
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 As discussed in the previous chapter, the 1982 plan points to the start of a partisan divide 
on redistricting plans in the state. Although there could have been gerrymandering in the plan, 
the secretary of state noted that the increase in Republican House seats after the 1984 election 
could have been attributed to the changes in the population in the state, “national trend with 
President Reagan’s popularity,” or “coattails from the New Hampshire straight-ticket ballot” 
(Gardner 1993, 171). If there was gerrymandering in the 1982 plan, it was not as obvious or 
deliberate as exists in later plans. Additionally, the floterial districts were likely not the source of 
the gerrymander, but rather a mechanism to cover up the deviation caused by the gerrymandered 
districts. In later years, floterials are a clear mechanism used by representatives to gerrymander.  
Even though the Democrats and Republicans both used floterial districts in their 
redistricting plans, there was not a general consensus by the New Hampshire citizens on the use 
of floterial districts. In fact, several concerned citizens brought suit against the state over concern 
that floterial districts created inequality between voters. The representatives had done their 
research on floterial districts, and even looked to other states for guidance for the proper 
application and calculation of deviation of floterials. Despite their efforts to properly use floterial 
districts, keep the statewide deviation within the proper range, and to give smaller towns their 
own representation, a suit was filed questioning the constitutionality of HB 2.  
 
Boyer v. Gardner (1982) and Calculating Floterial Districts 
New Hampshire voters brought suit against the New Hampshire secretary of state in 
Boyer v. Gardner, because they argued that their rights as voters were not equal to the other 
voters in the state as a result of the “discriminatory apportionment of seats in the House of 
Representatives” in HB 2 (Richard E. Boyer 1982, 1). The plaintiffs claimed that the use of 17 
floterial districts in HB 2 resulted in unconstitutional deviations, and that the House had used an 
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incorrect method of calculation. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that HB 2 was 
unconstitutional because the deviations were too high and could not be justified. The District 
Court ruled that the redistricting plan did not “violate any of the rights to vote […] pursuant to 
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States” (Richard E. Boyer 1982, 2). The ruling in 
Boyer is significant because the Court addressed the appropriate use of floterials and the proper 
method of calculation of the deviation, which provided guidance for the legislature for future 
redistricting plans. 
 
Calculating Floterial Districts 
In Boyer, the Court addressed two methods of calculating floterial districts, the aggregate 
method and the component method. The plaintiffs claimed that the aggregate method 
underestimates the deviations of floterial districts. The aggregate method compares the 
population of the floterial district to the ideal population. On the other hand, the component 
method calculates the deviation based on the “‘share’ of the floterial representative” to the 
percentage of the total floterial population (Richard E. Boyer 1982, 3). For HB 2, the aggregate 
method yielded a 13.74 percent deviation, while the component method yielded a 70 percent 
deviation. 
8
 
                                                          
8
 Using the Weare and New Boston floterial district from the 1982 redistricting plan, the following explains how to 
calculate the deviation of the district using the aggregate method compared to the component method. 
  
Aggregate Method: 
1. Calculate the difference between the total population of a floterial district and the ideal 
population multiplied by the number of representatives 
 
      (       )       
 
2. Divide the answer by the ideal population multiplied by the number of representatives 
 
    (       )         
(Richard E. Boyer 1982, 3) 
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Although the component method computes a higher deviation and has been argued to 
provide a truer calculation of the deviation, the Court ruled that the aggregate method is a 
sufficient method for calculation. The Court argued that while the component method calculates 
“‘shares’ of floterial representatives assigned to each regular district […], fractions of a floterial 
representative are never actually given to each component district” (Richard E. Boyer 1982, 3). 
Thus, the Court found the component method was unnecessary. 
 
Ruling of the Court 
The New Hampshire Court found that the component method was unnecessary because 
the aggregate method “sufficiently reveals any defects in apportionment that may exist” (Richard 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The aggregate method calculated that the floterial district had a small deviation of only -.28%. When the component 
method is used, a higher deviation is calculated. 
 
 Component Method:  
1. Calculate the “share” of each individual district in the floterial district. Divide the 
individual district’s population by the floterial district’s population 
 
Weare:                 
New Boston:                  
 
2. Calculate the “adjusted seats” by adding the “share” to the number of representatives of 
each individual district  
 
Weare:             
New Boston:              
 
3. Calculate the component population per representative by dividing each district’s 
population by the adjusted seats 
 
Weare:                  
New Boston:                   
 
4. Calculate the percentage deviation from 2,300 (the ideal population) 
 
Weare: (           )              
New Boston: (           )             
(Richard E. Boyer 1982, 3)  
The component method calculates a greater deviation. The Court ruled in Boyer that the aggregate method 
is a sufficient method for calculating deviation.  
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E. Boyer 1982, 4). The plaintiffs argued that other courts have used the component method 
before, such as the Texas District Court in Kilgarlin v. Martin, which found a Texas 
reapportionment plan unconstitutional. The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed this 
ruling, but avoided answering what method should be used to calculate the deviation (Richard E. 
Boyer 1982, 3). In Mahan v. Howell, the Supreme Court again ignored the question of what type 
of method should be used, and stated that it “decline[d] to enter this imbroglio of mathematical 
manipulation” (Richard E. Boyer 1982, 3). The New Hampshire District Court recognized the 
Supreme Court’s reluctance to address this issue, and made its ruling that the aggregate method 
was sufficient based on the grounds that the Supreme Court had traditionally used the aggregate 
method. Furthermore, the District Court argued that the component method should only be used 
in instances of “invidious or other otherwise impermissible discrimination in the drawing up of 
floterial districts” (Richard E. Boyer 1982, 4). The District Court did not see any instances of 
obvious discrimination, and therefore, the aggregate method was sufficient.  
The other part of the plaintiffs claim was that the overall deviation was unconstitutional, 
but the Court was not convinced by this argument. The court looked to the Reynolds ruling, 
which stated that a district can deviate from the “ideal” deviation as long as it was “based on 
legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy” (Richard E. Boyer 
1982, 4). In this case the Court found that the secretary of state provided several legitimate 
justifications, such as that the state legislature followed the state policies of maintaining county, 
city, and town boundaries. As described in the previous chapter, the state representatives also 
make up the County Convention, pursuant to RSA 24:1, so House districts cannot cross county 
lines. The state constitution requires that towns and wards that make up a district to be 
contiguous and for the legislature to observe existing ward boundaries. The Court found that 
Foster 107 
 
maintaining county lines, as well as the other state policies, limited the possibilities of maps that 
could be drawn. The legislature also “attempted to group towns of like size” when drawing 
districts (Richard E. Boyer 1982, 5). While the Court found these policies to be limiting to the 
legislature, they believed that they were all legitimate policies. Furthermore, since the Court did 
not find any proof that the bill was the “product of bad faith or invidious design,” and that the 
policies were “rational state policies,” they found that the bill was constitutional.  
 
Conclusion 
Boyer v. Gardner was the first test of the constitutionality and appropriate use of floterial 
districts in the state. The ruling of this case did not dismiss floterial districts as unconstitutional, 
and in fact the Court said that “It must be borne in mind that the floterial district is a concept 
devised to equalize representation while preserving political boundaries” (Richard E. Boyer 1982, 
4). Additionally, the Court declared that the aggregate method was a sufficient method for 
calculating the deviation of a floterial district. This case is important because it allowed for the 
continued use of floterial districts in later plans, as seen in the 1992 and 2002 plan. It also 
clarified the proper way for measuring the deviation of floterial districts, which was then 
challenged and overruled in a later case. The continued use of floterial districts in the 1992 and 
2002 redistricting plans led to the Court reviewing the constitutionality of floterials again in a 
2002 case.  
 
Use of Floterial Districts in the 1992 Redistricting Plan 
In the previous chapter, the 1992 redistricting plan was discussed as the first map with a 
clear partisan divide among the parties. Part of this partisan divide would have likely had to do 
with the increase in the use of floterial districts. The 1992 plan increased the number of floterial 
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districts and the statewide deviation from the 1982 plan. The 1982 plan used 17 floterial districts 
and had a statewide deviation of 13.74 percent. In contrast, the 1992 plan had 32 floterial 
districts and a statewide deviation of 14.37 percent (N.H. House. Constitutional and Statutory 
Revision 1992, 2). The 1992 plan also included larger floterial districts. One of the floterial 
districts was “2/3 the size of the Senate seat.” Representative Cowenhoven explained that the 
large floterial districts allowed for lower deviation, and claimed that “without the floterials our 
deviation would have been near 20” (N.H. House. Constitutional and Statutory Revision 1992, 3). 
Thus, similar to the 1982 plan, floterials were partially used as a way to decrease the statewide 
deviation.  
The legislature could have found it difficult to district the smaller rural towns, 
considering that there was still an increase in rural population in the state from 1980 to 1990. In 
1980, the state saw its largest increase in state population in the last 30 years, of 24.8 percent 
(U.S. Census Bureau 1981). The state population still increased a significant amount, 20.5 
percent, from 1980 to 1990.The rural parts of the state saw only a 23.5 percent increase, 
compared to the 36.9 percent increase from 1970 to 1980 (U.S. Census Bureau 1990). This 
increase in rural population over the past 20 years could likely account for the increase in the use 
of floterials in the state. Although there was an increase in rural population, if the legislature 
properly used floterial districts, it would be expected that there would not be an increase in 
deviation. However, the increase in deviation points to potential gerrymandering.  
It is difficult to see the influence floterial districts had on gerrymandering efforts in the 
1992 plan, because the Republican Party lost seats in the House after the 1992 election. The 1992 
election was an important year for Democrats in the state. This election was the start of the 
growing strength of the Democratic Party in the state, especially with President Clinton winning 
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the state. In the off-year election, the Republicans were able to gain all of their seats back plus 
some. While it is difficult to point to the partisan composition of the House as proof that the 
increased use in floterial district assisted the Republican Party in gerrymandering, there is other 
evidence that the use of floterials were partisan efforts. For example, Democrats testified that 
their proposals were not accepted because they were created by a Democratic representative. 
Representative Chambers said, “There were plans proposed for better deviations however they 
were defeated on a partisan vote because the sponsor was a member of the Democratic Party” 
(N.H. House. Constitutional and Statutory Revision 1992, 2). By “better deviations,” 
Representative Chambers meant that the Democratic Party proposed plans that had a lower 
statewide deviation, which meant that the map more closely followed the “one-man, one-vote” 
principle outlined by the Supreme Court in Reynolds. Since the maps were proposed by 
Democrats, they did not include the Republican Party gerrymandering strategies, and thus were 
not adopted. In a New Hampshire Court case in 2002, it becomes even more evident that 
floterials were in fact not being used to help lower the statewide deviation, as they were in 1982. 
Additionally, the Court case points out instances of unconstitutional use of floterial districts in 
the 1992 plan, which will be discussed later.  
 
Use of Floterial Districts in the 2002 Plan 
In the 2002 plan, the House continued to increase the number of floterial districts used to 
draw the map; however, this plan was never implemented. Representative Bragdon, representing 
the majority of the committee, stated that  
Floterials were used when necessary, and while there are more of them, the 
average number of residents within a floterial decreased from the 1992 levels. 
Additionally, these floterials reduced the overall deviation to under what it would 
have been had we not used a floterial. The average deviation, per district is well 
under the goal of 10%. (N.H. General Court 2002, 292)  
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The Democratic Party countered this statement by calling attention to instances of excessive use 
of floterials and the high “range of deviation” across districts. For example, Representative 
Clemons claimed that “more than 75 percent of the members of this House will be elected from 
multi-member or floterial districts” and that “only 15 members will be elected from districts that 
fall within the constitutionally acceptable range of 3,089” (N.H. General Court 2002, 292). 
Similar to the explanation in 1992, the representatives in support of the 2002 redistricting plan 
argued that there was an increase in floterial districts because the population in the rural areas 
increased. Representative Stritch suggested that the population in the “Small towns in rural areas 
grew by 18 to 20%,” and that a floterial district allows for the “additional number of people in 
each district [an] additional representative” (N.H. General Court 2002, 305-306).  
Democratic Governor Shaheen vetoed the 2002 plan, and the House was unable to get the 
two-thirds majority needed to override the veto. In Governor Shaheen’s veto message she 
explained that she felt “HB 420 creates unnecessary floterial districts. In others, House Bill 420 
fails to create floterial districts where they clearly are warranted” (N.H. General Court 2002, 
870). For example, Governor Shaheen points to the fact that a floterial district was not used to fix 
the underrepresentation of Claremont or Laconia, when it does use floterials for a similar 
situation in Hollis and Raymond. The majority explained that if they were to put Claremont or 
Laconia into a floterial they would have “dominate[d] surrounding smaller towns in a floterial 
district,” but Governor Shaheen was unconvinced by this argument. She points out in her veto 
message several instances where the House drew floterial districts that combined large towns 
with “much smaller neighbors” (N.H. General Court 2002, 871). In addition, Governor Shaheen 
points out that the plan includes an overlapping floterial district, despite the fact that there “were 
better alternatives” and that “the Republican leadership of the House Redistricting Committee on 
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more than one occasion questioned the constitutionality of overlapping floterial districts” (N.H. 
General Court 2002, 871). Since the House was unable to override the veto and the state 
constitution requires the House to redraw a new map every ten years before the candidate filing 
period in June, the responsibility of redistricting fell to the Courts. 
 
Representative Burling v. Gene Chandler, Speaker of the House (2002)  
After the governor vetoed the 2002 redistricting plan and the House was unable to 
override the veto, eleven representatives filed for “original jurisdiction” with the Court. The 
petitioners asked the court to “declare the existing representative districts unconstitutional and to 
impose a deadline for the legislature to enact a valid reapportionment plan” (Representative 
Peter Burling 2002, 2). The Court declared that the 1992 redistricting plan was no longer 
constitutional, because of the change in the state’s population and the fact that the plan had an 
unconstitutional statewide deviation when it was implemented. Since the 1992 plan was ruled 
unconstitutional and the legislature failed to create a new plan, the Court decided that they were 
now responsible for drawing the map. While the Court was reluctant to get involved in a 
legislative task, they explained that it is their role as the judiciary to “insure the electorate equal 
protection of the laws” (Representative Peter Burling 2002, 2). 
The Court’s redistricting plan apportioned 400 representatives into 88 districts and, 
according to the Court, “restore[d] as nearly equal weight as possible” to the voters 
(Representative Peter Burling 2002, 2). The map consisted of five single-member districts and 
83 multi-member districts. The Court explained that by using as few multi-member districts as 
possible it was able to keep a lower deviation. The deviation for the court plan was 9.26 percent, 
which is under the ten percent deviation suggested as the maximum acceptable deviation by the 
Supreme Court in the Brown v. Thomson ruling. In fact, the Court argued that “Floterials, as 
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constructed in New Hampshire, have led to unusual results and voting inequities” 
(Representative Peter Burling 2002, 6). After looking at how floterial districts were used in the 
1992 and 2002 plan, and reviewing the question of the proper method to calculate the deviation 
of the districts, the Court rejected “floterials as an unsound redistricting device” (Representative 
Peter Burling 2002, 12). 
In an attempt to still keep the redistricting process in the legislature, the Court had 
representatives from both political parties propose plans. However, the Court did not accept any 
of these plans, with their main reason being that all of the plans included floterial districts. The 
Court argued that the plans relied on the floterials to decrease the statewide deviation and that 
they used the aggregate method, which is not the proper method to calculate the deviation of 
floterials. The Court explained that “the aggregate method is appropriate for multi-member 
districts, but is not appropriate for the floterials […] because it masks substantial deviation from 
the one person/one vote principle” (Representative Peter Burling 2002, 9). Although the Court 
did not approve of using the aggregate method to calculate the deviation of floterials, it did not 
accept the component method either. In fact, the Court explained that even when floterials are 
calculated using the component method their deviations are still unacceptably high. Thus, the 
ruling in Burling prevented the legislature from using floterials in future redistricting plans. 
While the Court could have simply made the map for the House districts, the Court 
decided to give its opinion on the constitutional and statutory restraints on redistricting, the best 
types of districts to use, the maximum allowed range of deviation, and, most importantly, the 
constitutionality of floterials. The Court used the 1992 redistricting plan as an example of what 
the legislature did incorrectly. First, the Court calculated that the 1992 plan had a statewide 
deviation of 49.7 percent, not 13.74. The Court got this number by using the proper method of 
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calculating deviations of different types of districts. In addition, although it was surprisingly not 
mentioned in the committee minutes or House floor debate in 1992, the Court pointed out that 
the map included floterial districts that were not properly drawn. For example, the 1992 plan had 
three floterials in Carroll County that all included towns that were only part of the floterial. In 
District 10 in Carroll County, a floterial district included Moultonborough, Sandwich, Tamworth 
and Tuftonboro, but only the town of Moultonborough had its own district. As a result, the voters 
in Moultonborough had three representatives, while the other towns only received one at-large 
representation from the floterial district. The voters in Moultonborough were given more 
representation than the voters in Sandwich, Tamworth and Tuftonboro. Thus, District 10 did not 
comply with the definition and proper application of a floterial, as described earlier in the chapter. 
A floterial district is supposed to be made up of single-member or multi-member districts, and 
not individual towns that are not part of a non-floterial district. Therefore, the Court explained 
that the 1992 plan was not a good starting place for the Court’s plan, especially because the 
House did not properly use floterial districts in the plan.  
The ruling in Burling is significant because the floterial districts are classified as 
“unsound.” The Court comes to this decision based on the fact that floterials cause high levels of 
deviation, when the proper method for calculating deviation, the component method, is used. 
Interestingly, the Court never mentions that floterials dilute the voting strength of a voter, or 
could be used to gerrymander based on race. These arguments have been used in the past to 
suggest that at-large districts are “unsound” redistricting techniques, and as discussed earlier in 
this chapter, there are similarities between at-large districts and floterials. However, the Court 
does mention that multi-member districts may “tend to dilute the voting strength of racial or 
political elements of the voting population” (Representative Peter Burling 2002, 12). The Court 
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did not discuss how floterials could be used to dilute voting strength or group voters based on 
race because in the 1982 case, Boyer, the Court approved the use of floterials. The main goal of 
the Court in Burling was to justify and legitimize the Court’s redistricting plan, not to answer a 
question of the constitutionality of the use of floterials. So the Court suggested that floterials 
were an “unsound redistricting device” as an explanation for why they did not include them in 
their plan. Although the obvious arguments to make against the use of floterial districts would be 
that they dilute the voting strength of voters and that they can be used to group voters based on 
race, similar to the arguments made in the past against at-large districts, these were never 
discussed in the New Hampshire Court cases.  
 
Conclusion 
The 2002 redistricting plan followed suit of the 1992 plan by increasing the number of 
floterial districts. The Democratic Party became skeptical of the Republican Party’s increased 
use of floterials, as evident from the governor’s veto, the fact that Democrats did not help 
override the governor’s veto and that a Democratic representative was the main petitioner in 
Burling. As was discussed in Burling, the Republicans created a plan in 1992 that used many 
improper forms of floterials, but the Democrats never brought suit against the 1992 plan. By the 
time that the 2002 plan was created, the Democrats had experienced almost a decade of 
increasing party strength. The Republicans clearly did not anticipate that their redistricting plan 
in 2002 was not going to pass; otherwise they might have worked with the Democratic Party 
more to create a bipartisan plan. Furthermore, the Republicans may have predicted that if the 
plan was sent to the Courts that the Court would uphold the bill, especially because in Boyer the 
Court approved the use of floterial districts in the 1982 plan. 
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As discussed in the previous chapter, the House was not satisfied with the 2002 Court 
drawn map, especially because of the large districts, and consequently redrew the districts in 
2004. The 2004 plan did not use any floterial districts, because the Court ruled in Burling that 
floterial districts were an unsound mechanism. Floterials were reintroduced into the redistricting 
process in 2012 after a constitutional amendment in 2006. The Court ruling in Burling lead to the 
Republican Party pushing forward a constitutional amendment in 2006 to allow the use of 
floterials. 
 
2006 Amendment 
In 2006 floterials were reintroduced to the redistricting process through a constitutional 
amendment, CARC 41. In New Hampshire the voters must vote on a constitutional amendment, 
so CARC 41 was put on the 2006 election ballot. The amendment read as: 
Are you in favor of amending the second part of the Constitution by amending article 11 
to read as follows: 
 [Art.] 11-b [Representative Districts; Standards for Apportionment.] When 
the population of any town or ward, according to the last federal census, is within 
a reasonable deviation from the ideal population for one or more representative 
seats the town or wards hall have its own district of one or more representative 
seats. The apportionment shall not deny any other town or ward membership in 
one non-flotarial representative district. When any town, ward, or unincorporated 
place has fewer than the number of inhabitants necessary to entitle it to one 
representative, the legislature shall form those towns, wards, or unincorporated 
places into representative districts which contain a sufficient number of 
inhabitants to entitle each district so formed to one or more representatives for the 
entire district. In forming the district, the boundaries of towns, wards, and 
unincorporated places shall be preserved and contiguous. The excess number of 
inhabitants of a district may be added to the excess number of inhabitants of other 
districts to form at-large or flotarial districts conforming to acceptable deviations. 
The legislature shall form the representative districts at the regular session 
following every decennial federal census. (N.H. Dept. of State 2007, 335)  
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New Hampshire voters voted for the constitutional amendment, with 240,767 voters in favor of 
the amendment and 100,688 in opposition. The amendment requires the House to give small 
towns their own representative if their population matches the ideal population. If a district has 
excess population, but not enough to receive a second representative, the amendment allows the 
House to use floterial districts. Among the legislators debating CARC 41 there was uncertainty if 
the Court in Burling ruled that floterial districts were unconstitutional or unsound. The passing of 
CARC 41 by the voters, however, would allow floterial districts to be used in future redistricting 
plans.  
The Republican Party, along with the secretary of state, was in favor of CARC 41, and 
centered their argument on the fact that this amendment would encourage and require the House 
to district the state so that representatives would be kept close to their constituents. For example, 
Representative Kurk argued that CARC 41 would “restore a several hundred year tradition of 
having one Representative for one town,” referencing how redistricting occurred in the state 
prior to the 1965 plan. He also said, “New Hampshire has an important tradition of keeping their 
representative close to the people” (N.H. Senate. Internal Affairs 2006, 4). Another Republican 
representative made note of the “illegal floterial districts” used in 1992, and argued that CARC 
41 did not “encourage or allow for those illegal floterial districts to exist” (N.H. Senate. Internal 
Affairs 2006). It is interesting that this representative made note of the mistakes the House had 
made in the past when using floterials. In 1992, a representative claimed “it was the opinion of 
the committee that it was better to give individual representation to a community where possible 
and then create a floterial district with the over-population” (N.H. House. Constitutional and 
Statutory Revisions 1992, 3). However, there is evidence that the 1992 plan had several instances 
of improper use of floterials and several towns that had the population to receive their own 
Foster 117 
 
representative were not given one. Thus, the Democrats were concerned that CARC 41 would 
produce the same problems that were found in the 1992 plan. 
In general, the Democrats were opposed to CARC 41, because it would reintroduce the 
use of floterials. Senator Burling, the petitioner in Burling, testified in opposition to CARC 41 
because he opposes the use of floterials. Senator Burling argued that the Court ruled in Burling 
that the “floterial is a de facto violation of the concept of one person/one vote and that it is 
impossible to design a constitutional redistricting plan which uses floterials” (N.H. Senate. 
Internal Affairs 2006, 8). He went on to explain that one of the issues the House faces when 
redistricting is the non-constitutional requirement to remain within county lines, which then 
pressures the House to rely on floterials. Without the statutory requirement for House 
representatives to also serve as the county council members, Senator Burling argued that 
floterials would not need to be used (N.H. Senate. Internal Affairs 2006, 8). 
 
Conclusion 
The 2006 amendment was needed after the Courts declared floterial districts an unsound 
redistricting technique. Although the House had become more reliant on floterials to help lower 
the statewide deviation, they were also becoming a technique to gerrymander. The Republican 
Party strategically put forward this constitutional amendment. If the amendment were to pass, it 
would allow for floterials to be used in the upcoming redistricting. The question was put on the 
ballot for a non-presidential election year. Out of the four past presidential elections, the state 
went blue in three of them. If it were a presidential election year, the Democratic Party may have 
been able to bring more voters out to the polls and could have educated voters to vote “no” on 
the constitutional amendment question. Another possibility would have been for the 
constitutional amendment question to be overshadowed by the presidential election. Lastly, the 
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Republican Party waited four years after the 2002 Court decision, which allowed time for people 
to forget about the 2002 redistricting debacle and court ruling. Thus, the 2006 amendment was a 
product of the Court’s ruling in Burling and the strategic planning of the Republican Party to 
potentially have the opportunity to use floterials in the next redistricting year. 
 
Use of Floterial Districts in 2012 Plan 
After the 2006 amendment passed floterial districts were reintroduced to the redistricting 
process. This was the first time the House was using floterials since the failed House plan in 
2002. With the 2002 plan still in the minds of the legislatures, they sought legal counsel for the 
2012 redistricting map. The lawyers suggested that the House plan’s statewide deviation should 
be under ten percent and that the guiding principle should be “one-person, one-vote,” in order to 
ensure constitutionality. However, it was essentially impossible for the legislature to draw a map 
that would give every small town that had a large enough population to receive a representative 
their own representation, while following the other redistricting requirements, such as the state 
constitution requirements and keeping the statewide deviation below ten percent. The lawyers 
advised the representatives that the federal mandates of “one-person, one-vote” and keeping the 
deviation below ten percent should be met before the state requirements. The final 2012 
redistricting plan had a statewide deviation of 9.9 percent, and used the aggregate method for 
single-member and multi-member districts, while the component method was used for floterials 
(Brief for the Intervenor 2012). Since the House made certain that the deviation would be under 
ten percent, they were not able to comply with the 2006 amendment in every situation, as 
Governor Lynch pointed out in his veto message. Thus, petitioners filed suit against the secretary 
of state on the grounds that the 2012 redistricting plan violates the 2006 constitutional 
amendment.  
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One of the floterial districts that the Democratic Party was especially concerned with was 
the district that combined Manchester Wards 8 and 9 with Litchfield. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, arguments were made that the Manchester wards do not share a “community of 
interest with Litchfield” (City of Manchester 2012, 16). Furthermore, the Democratic Party saw 
this floterial districts as obvious gerrymandering. In the previous plan, Litchfield was in a multi-
member district with Hudson and Pelham and was represented by all Republican representatives. 
In the 2010 election results, Litchfield voters voted in greater numbers for the Republican 
candidates than the Democratic candidates (“State Representative-2010 General Election”). On 
the other hand Manchester Wards 8 and 9 were their own districts with three representatives each. 
Manchester Ward 8 was represented by two Republicans and one Democrat. Manchester Ward 9 
was represented by one Republican and two Democrats (“State Representative-2010 General 
Election”). By making a floterial district with Manchester Wards 8 and 9 and Litchfield, the 
Republicans were attempting to guarantee two Republican seats in the House, because these 
wards and town tended to lean Republican. In the 2012 election, two Republican candidates won 
the floterial district (“State Representative-2012 General Election”). This is evidence that the 
Republicans used floterials in the 2012 plan as a strategy to translate votes into seats. Since cities, 
towns, and the Democrats did not approve of the redistricting plan, for reasons similar to the 
floterial district combining Manchester Wards 8 and 9 with Litchfield, they brought suit against 
the secretary of state prior to the 2012 election. 
 
City of Manchester v. Secretary of State  
In City of Manchester, the Court was asked if the plan violates the 2006 constitutional 
amendment, Article 11, Party II, because it:  
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1) fails to provide approximately sixty-two towns, wards, and places with their 
own representatives 
2) divides certain cities, towns and wards 
3) devises multi-member districts comprised of towns, wards, and places that are 
not contiguous 
(City of Manchester 2012, 4) 
In addition, the Court was asked if the plan violated the “community of interest” of towns 
covered by floterial districts. In the Court’s opinion, they recognize that the legislature had to 
choose between either adhering “to the 10% rule and give fewer towns, wards, and places their 
own districts or exceed the 10% rule” (City of Manchester 2012, 12). While petitioners made 
arguments about how the House incorrectly calculated the floterial district deviations, even 
though the component methods were used, and in fact the deviations were much higher than the 
House admitted, the Court was not convinced. For example, the City of Concord argued that 
Concord Ward 5 should not be in a floterial district with the Town of Hopkinton, because the 
relative deviation was 20 percent. However, the Court claimed that this did not provide enough 
of a reason for them to be convinced that the legislature did not have rational basis for combining 
the ward with the town (City of Manchester 2012, 13). Overall, the Court argued that the 
petitioners failed to meet the burden of proof to prove that the plan was unconstitutional. 
Similar to the previous court cases discussed in this chapter, the Court did not discuss 
floterial districts in relation to vote dilution or racial gerrymandering. In the City of Manchester 
ruling, the Court addressed that both vote dilution and racial gerrymandering are discussed in 
“equal protection claim” cases, and that the petitioners did not “allege an equal protection 
violation” (City of Manchester 2012, 6). Instead, the petitioners claimed that the plan violated 
“other state constitutional mandates,” especially CARC 41 (City of Manchester 2012, 6). As a 
result, the New Hampshire Court has yet to discuss floterial districts as a mechanism that diluted 
voter strength or as a way to strategically group voters based on race.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter, similar to the previous chapter, highlighted a strategy used by the 
Republican Party to translate votes into seats. Additionally, this chapter showed how this 
strategy was increasingly used over the years. Floterial districts were introduced in the state in 
1982, but by 2012 had a different purpose. In response to the increasing strength of the 
Democratic Party in the state, floterial districts became a mechanism used by the Republican 
Party to gerrymander. In 2002, the New Hampshire District Court ruled floterial districts as an 
“unsound redistricting technique.” This Court ruling led to the passing of a constitutional 
amendment four years later, which made floterial districts constitutional. In the most recent plan, 
floterial districts were used to draw the district maps. Although the Republican Party did not 
maintain control of the House after the 2012 election, some of these floterial districts were 
successful in translating votes into seats for the Republican Party, such as the Manchester Wards 
8 and 9 and Litchfield district. Similar to the previous chapter on redistricting, this strategy is not 
immune to wave elections, such as the 2012 election. It will be interesting to see if the floterial 
districts strategically drawn by the Republican Party in 2012 continue to translate votes into 
Republican seats over the next ten years. It is likely that as voters move between districts, and if 
the trend of wave elections continues in the state, that these floterial districts will become less of 
a guaranteed Republican seat.  
As mentioned by the secretary of state in 1982, several other factors could have 
contributed to the 1984 election results, such as “coattails from the New Hampshire straight-
ticket ballot” (Gardner 1993, 171). The next chapter will discuss another strategy used by the 
Republican Party in the state over the years. New Hampshire has changed its ballot design 
several times over the years, and many of these changes were strategies to help translate votes 
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into seats from within the voting booth. This chapter and the previous chapter discussed 
strategies of the Republican Party to strategically group voters to translate votes into seats. The 
next chapter will discuss how simultaneously the Republican Party strategically changed the 
design of the ballot as another strategy to translate votes into seats. The following chapter will 
discuss these changes to the ballot design, such as straight-ticket voting, party column order, and 
the order of candidates’ names, and the effects of these changes. 
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Figure 3.1: Floterial Districts in Carroll County  
Note: This is a map of the 1992 legislative districts in Carroll County. This map shows the three floterial districts in the county. 
 
Source: Representative Peter Burling v. Gene Chandler, Speaker of the House. 2012. No. 2002-0210. The Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire. “Appendix A: Carroll County N.H. Districts 1992.” 
http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/opinions/2002/0207/hse1992_car.pdf (accessed September 13, 2012).
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Chapter 4: Ballot Design 
 
As seen in the previous chapters, politicians will strategically redistrict and use floterials 
districts to translate votes into seats. This chapter will explain how politicians influence 
uninformed voters in the voting booth as another strategy to translate votes into seats. Since 
some constituents view voting as their civic duty, they will still vote in an election even if they 
lack sufficient information. In other instances, some voters may choose to abstain from voting 
for a certain race because they lack information about the candidates (Miller and Krosnick 1998). 
The voters who still turn up to the polls, even if they lack information, will look for voting cues. 
Thus, with this trend in mind, politicians strategically design ballots to assist their party in 
winning votes. The features of the ballot that politicians use as strategies include the straight-
ticket voting option, the office bloc form versus party column form, and the ordering of party 
columns and candidates’ names on the ballot. 
Currently, New Hampshire uses a party column ballot that is designed by the secretary of 
state and distributed to the town clerks. The secretary of state is responsible, pursuant to RSA 
656:5, for creating “generic column rotation plans,” which means that the position of the party 
columns should be rotated so that each party will appear first on the ballot an equal number of 
times. Figure 4.1 and 4.2 are two examples of the rotating party column ballots from the 2012 
election. The Republican Party is listed in the first column for Manchester Ward 7 and the 
Democratic Party is listed in the first column for Manchester Ward 8. The party columns are 
rotated similarly across all wards and districts throughout the state. The law also requires that if 
there are two or more candidates running for the same office, then the names should be 
randomized. The candidates are listed in alphabetical order, and then by using a system of 
random numbers the secretary of state lists the candidates in that order. The statute provides an 
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in-depth explanation of the system the secretary of state should use to order the candidates. The 
statute states, 
    I. Whenever there are 2 or more candidates for the same office whose names 
will appear together within the same column or list on a ballot, the position of 
such names shall be determined according to this section.  
    II. Immediately following the close of the period during which a person may 
accept the nomination of a party committee pursuant to RSA 655:32, the secretary 
of state or designee shall conduct a public random selection of a whole number 
from one to the total number of candidates for each possible list length where a 
group of candidates for the same office may appear in the same list in state or 
local elections during the next 2 years. For example, for a possible list of 3 
candidates, the number one, 2, or 3 shall be randomly selected. The seed number 
for each possible list length shall remain in effect for the 2 years until the next 
random selection of seed numbers.  
III. To determine the order of names on each ballot, the candidates for each 
office in the same list shall be temporarily listed alphabetically by surnames and 
the positions in such list shall be temporarily numbered in ascending order. The 
candidate whose position in the initial temporary list equals the seed number 
selected under paragraph II for the appropriate list length shall appear first on the 
ballot. The order of candidates after the candidate in the first position shall follow 
alphabetically by surname with "a'' following "z.''  
(N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §656:6) 
 
The New Hampshire ballot was not always structured with randomized party columns and 
candidates’ names. In fact, the randomization of the current ballot is a result of a New Hampshire 
Court case, which will be discussed towards the end of this chapter, and was specifically 
designed so that it did not preference any particular political party or candidate. 
The design of the ballot in New Hampshire has taken many different forms over the years. 
In 1891, the state adopted the Australian ballot form with office blocs and since then the state has 
alternated between the office bloc form and the party column form (Ludington 1911, 46). In the 
past, the party column form listed first the political party that received that most amount of votes 
in the previous general election. There have also been changes to how candidates’ names have 
been ordered on the ballot. The Republican Party attempted to control the voter’s choice by 
listing their party first in the party column and office bloc forms. Throughout the changes in the 
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structure of the ballot, the straight-ticket option was consistently on the ballot from 1897 through 
2007. The Democratic Party began to propose bills to eliminate straight-ticket voting as they 
started to see the straight-ticket option as an advantage for the Republican Party. This chapter 
will look at the timing of the changes in the ballot structure, and what the results of these 
changes were. 
The purpose of this chapter is to explain how politicians use ballot design as another 
strategy to translate votes into seats. This chapter will analyze how the changes to the ballot 
structure were a result of the motivations of political parties, and additionally were dependent 
upon court cases, changes other states were making, and the result of the ballot designs on the 
translation of votes into seats. The chapter will first explain the history of the elimination of 
straight-ticket voting in the state, and then a history of the changes to the ballot structure. The 
chapter will end with an explanation of how straight-ticket voting and ballot structure were 
strategies used together to help translate votes into seats for the Republican Party. 
 
Eliminating Straight-Ticket Voting 
The New Hampshire ballot included a straight-ticket voting option for about 110 years, 
until it was repealed by the Democratic majority legislature in 2007. A straight-ticket option 
allows a voter to mark a box to vote for all of the candidates of that political party. On the New 
Hampshire ballot, the straight-ticket option includes party emblems, so that the voter can easily 
recognize the parties. When it was first implemented in New Hampshire, many states also 
included this option on their ballots. The original purpose of the straight-ticket option was to 
assist illiterate voters, because they only needed to recognize the party emblem. In the 1990s 
states began to remove the option from their ballots. When New Hampshire repealed straight-
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ticket voting in 2007 only seventeen other states still used this voting method (Lambert 2008), 
and currently only fifteen states still offer straight-ticket voting (“Straight-Ticket Voting” 2012).  
The proposals to eliminate the straight-ticket option from the ballot in New Hampshire 
began in 1965, but became more frequent by the 1990s (Lambert 2008). Figure 4.3 is a timeline 
of the proposed bills to eliminate straight-ticket voting. A bill to eliminate straight-ticket voting 
was proposed almost every session from 1965, the first year a bill was proposed, until 2007, 
when the voting method was repealed. In 1965, HB 5 “to do away with voting by a straight 
ticket,” had few supporters. While only Democrats in the House supported the bill, several 
Democrats joined the Republicans in opposition to the bill. After minimal floor debate on the bill, 
it was then struck down by a voice vote (N.H. General Court 1965, 103). In the 1990s, there was 
always a request for a roll call for votes on the bills proposed to eliminate straight-ticket voting. 
However, HB 5 was decided by a voice vote, which suggests that there was a clear majority in 
opposition to the bill.
9
 Compared to the 1990s there was not a clear partisan divide on the issue 
at this time.  
After 1965 until 1989 the bills proposed were either to eliminate the voting method or 
change the structure of the ballot. However, beginning in 1989 the same bill, relative to 
“eliminating straight-ticket voting on the ballot,” was proposed each year until its passage. There 
was a break in proposed bills between 1989 and 1993, most likely because the legislature was 
focused on redistricting the state during this time. After the 1992 election, when President 
Clinton won the state, the Democrats started to see their party gain strength and saw this 
                                                          
9
 According to the “New Hampshire General Court Legislative Handbook,” any proposed bill will be sent to the 
appropriate committee. The committee will then give their recommendation of “Ought to Pass,” “Ought to Pass with 
Amendment,” “Re-refer to Committee,” “Retain in Committee,” “Inexpedient to Legislate,” and “Refer to Interim 
Study.” A bill cannot be “killed in committee” in New Hampshire. After the committee gives their recommendation, 
the bill is put into the House or Senate calendar and voted on by the appropriate chamber. If the chamber adopts the 
committee’s recommendation of Inexpedient to Legislate, the bill will then be essentially “killed.” In 1965, HB 5, 
even though it did not have much support, was still presented to the House floor because a bill cannot be “killed in 
committee” in New Hampshire. (“New Hampshire General Court Legislative Handbook”) 
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continue through the 1990s. As a result of the Democrats gaining strength as a party, eliminating 
straight-ticket voting became a main focus for the party, because they began to see this voting 
method as assisting the Republican Party in maintaining control in the legislature. The arguments 
in support of and against eliminating straight-ticket voting in the 1990s, and leading up to the 
2007 law, increasingly had the clear partisan divide that was missing in 1965. This partisan 
divide was the result of the rise of two-party competition in the state, which caused the 
Democrats to see straight-ticket voting as a threat and the Republicans to want to hold onto the 
voting method.  
In addition to bills attempting to eliminate straight-ticket voting, there have been changes 
to the instructions on the ballot about how to vote a straight-ticket. The legislature made changes 
to the instructions on the ballot to simplify the process for voters. As will be discussed shortly, 
those in support of repealing the straight-ticket option argue that the voter is often confused by 
the ballot, especially because in New Hampshire the voter can choose the straight-ticket option 
and also vote a split ticket. In 1942, an amendment required that the ballot instructions guide the 
voter to cross out the name of the candidate on the party selected for the straight-ticket, in order 
to vote for a candidate from the opposite party (Smarling 1997, 1). Then in 1986, an amendment 
changed the instructions to simplify the process and specify how voters should vote for 
candidates in multi-member districts. The 1986 amendment clarified that “if you vote for one 
candidate of a different party for an office where more than one candidate is to be elected, be 
sure to vote individually for all candidates of your choice for that office, because your straight 
ticket vote will not be counted for that office” (Smarling 1997, 3).  
Between the 1942 and 1986 amendment, there were changes to the redistricting process 
in the state, as mentioned in the previous chapters, and thus more multi-member districts were 
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being drawn. As a result, voting for members of the other party and also using the straight-ticket 
option became more confusing for the multi-member district House races. Then in 1994 an 
amendment gave the secretary of state the power to write the directions for straight-ticket voting 
on the ballot (Smarling 1997, 4). These amendments to the instructions for straight-ticket voting 
were implemented in response to the changes in the number of candidates on the ballot for each 
office and how voters would want to vote. These changes were also implemented in an effort to 
eliminate the argument made by the Democratic Party that the voting method confused voters. 
 
Proposals to Eliminate Straight-Ticket Voting 
During the 1990s there were several attempts to repeal straight-ticket voting by the 
Democrats in the House and the Senate. In fact between 1989 and 2007, as few as eighteen bills 
were proposed to repeal the voting method or change the instructions on the ballot. Over the 
years, the arguments for and against the voting method stayed relatively consistent. The main 
arguments by the Democrats, who supported the repeal of straight-ticket voting, were that it 
confused the voter, confused the people counting the ballots, deterred voters from reading the 
full list of candidates and did not encourage voters to vote for the constitutional amendment 
questions that were at the end of the ballot. They also argued that it only benefitted the political 
party that was subject to the coattails effect in big election years, which had traditionally been 
the Republican Party. On the other side of the argument were the Republicans, who argued that 
the straight-ticket option was a tradition, and that by eliminating the voting option they were 
limiting the voter’s right to choose. While the Republicans never admitted so in testimony, it is 
clear that they recognized the straight-ticket voting method as a strategy to maintain party control. 
Most of the arguments for or against straight-ticket voting focused on how the ballot affected the 
voters, however there were underlying partisan motives by both political parties.  
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While there was a consistent divide along party lines in the 1990s on the issue of 
eliminating the straight-ticket option, the arguments for or against the elimination of the voting 
method did not start out as overtly partisan. The main argument in 1989 by those in support of 
eliminating the voting method, which were the Democrats, was that the “system gives more 
weight to less thoughtful vote[s],” and so they felt people were voting for candidates that they 
would not necessarily have voted for if they read the entire list (N.H. House. Constitutional and 
Statutory Revision 1989). In 1994, when both the House and Senate Democrats proposed 
legislation, they repeated their argument about how the straight-ticket option does not encourage 
voters to think about the individual candidates. Since the Democrats sponsored legislation in 
both the House and Senate, it suggests that passing legislation to repeal straight-ticket voting had 
become part of their policy platform. Another argument made in 1994 was that eliminating the 
straight-ticket option would take confusion out of the voting process and out of the ballot 
counting process (N.H. House. Constitutional and Statutory Revision 1994). In cases of multi-
member districts, the Ballot Law Commission and secretary of state have had to use their 
discretion in determining the intent of the voter, especially in instances when a voter chose the 
straight-ticket option and also voted for a candidate of the opposite party. Most of the arguments 
at this time centered on the rights of the voters, ensuring that the voting process was simple and 
how voters should be encouraged to consider each candidate individually. 
In 1995, Democrats continued to argue that straight-ticket voting was confusing for the 
voter, but they also began to make a clearer argument about how the voting method affected 
political parties. The 1995 bill, HB 632, would have also repealed the laws that allowed the 
incumbent party to be listed first on the ballot, and prohibited a candidate from “being the 
nominee of more than one party.” Although the main goal of the bill was to eliminate the 
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straight-ticket voting method, the other two parts of the bill highlighted the fact that the 
Democrats saw the current ballot structure as assisting the Republicans in maintaining party 
control. In testimony before the committee on HB 632, there were several editorials and 
newspaper articles describing how the straight-ticket option should be repealed because it made 
the recounts exceedingly difficult in the 1994 election (N.H. House. Constitutional and Statutory 
Revision 1995). The minority report for the committee stated that the Ballot Law Commission 
supported the repeal of straight-ticket voting, and most likely because of the difficult recount 
repeals from the 1994 election (N.H. House. Constitutional and Statutory Revision 1995a). Even 
with the Ballot Law Commission supporting HB 632, it was not passed. Republicans, who had 
the majority in the House, did not support the bill, especially because the Democrats had 
attempted to eliminate parts of the ballot that assisted the Republican Party in getting votes.  
Another bill was proposed in 1997, and this time the Democrats argued that straight-
ticket voting “causes a disadvantage to political parties, especially where there is a coattail effort” 
(N.H. House. Election Law 1997). This argument, similar to the arguments made about previous 
bills, suggested that the straight-ticket option does not encourage voters to look at all the 
candidates on the ballot. A voter may just check the straight-ticket box because they want the 
candidates at the top of the ticket from that party to be elected, and thus even though the voter 
does not intentionally choose to vote for the candidates at the bottom of the ticket from that party 
they still receive votes. The Democrats consistently argued that the voters would not even think 
about or look at the candidates at the bottom of the ticket, such as the House representatives. On 
the other side of the debate, the Republicans argued that straight-ticket voting is an option that 
should not be taken away from the voters (N.H. House. Election Law 1997). 
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Straight-ticket voting was originally implemented to assist voters who were illiterate, 
because the option allowed voters to recognize their party emblem and make a check next to the 
emblem. In the 1990s, illiterate voters were not as much of a concern in New Hampshire, and 
Democrats argued that this voting method was now unnecessary. The Democrats saw straight-
ticket voting as confusing and benefitting one particular political party over the other. They 
argued that voters should be reading the name of all of the candidates on the ballot, because there 
may be a candidate of the opposite party more qualified for the position. Or in some cases, a 
voter may know someone on the ballot that they would like to elect. With a 400 member House 
of Representatives in a small state it is likely that voters may personally know the candidate. 
Thus, while the Republicans argued that straight-ticket voting has traditionally been on the ballot 
and should not be repealed, the Democrats saw it as an unnecessary and a confusing addition to 
the ballot.  
As the Democrats were gaining strength as a party in the state, they began to see straight-
ticket voting as hindering their party from gaining a majority, and thus their arguments became 
more focused on political parties. In 2001, the minority opinion from the House committee 
explained that the issue of straight-ticket voting had clearly been a divided partisan issue over the 
years, but suggested that the parties should try to move past that fact for the benefit of the state. 
The minority party used the recent elimination of straight-ticket voting in Illinois as an example 
of Republicans eliminating the straight-ticket voting method. The minority opinion stated,  
Votes in this House in the past have broken down almost entirely along party lines, 
Republicans opposing elimination due in large part to the perception that since 
there are more registered republicans statewide, Republicans benefit. Perceptions 
can be wrong. Illinois Republicans pushed to ban straight ticket voting since they 
believed elimination would help them in the Chicago area. When straight ticket 
voting was finally eliminated in the state, however, Republicans were hurt 
because Democrats did better downstate and still help[ed] in Cook County. Let’s 
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put parties aside this year and do what is most likely to produce election of the 
most qualified, most committee candidates. (N.H. House. Election Law 2001) 
 
The minority opinion provides several important points about New Hampshire politics at the 
time and about straight-ticket voting. First, the minority party recognized that Republicans 
wanted to keep this voting method because they believed it benefitted their party. Interestingly, 
at this time the number of Independent registered voters in New Hampshire exceeded the number 
of registered Republican and Democratic voters. Although there were more registered 
Independent voters, it is possible that these voters identified more with the Republican Party and 
thus would check the Republican straight-ticket box. The Democrats over the years argued that 
the straight-ticket box was often misleading, and voters would choose the option because they 
thought the ballot was asking them to identify their political party. So either the majority of 
voters in New Hampshire were truly Republicans and meant to vote a Republican straight-ticket, 
or they were being misled by the ballot. Either way, the Republicans wanted to keep this option 
on the ballot to help them maintain their majority.  
The minority report also addressed how another state recently repealed straight-ticket 
voting and what the consequences were. Republicans in Illinois sponsored legislation to 
eliminate the straight-ticket option from the ballot, and it passed in 1997 (“Straight-Ticket 
Voting” 2012). It is common, as shown in the previous chapters with redistricting, for state 
legislatures to look to other states for guidance. The minority party used Illinois as an example to 
highlight the fact that even though a political party may think that straight-ticket voting may be 
hurting or benefiting them, it might not be the case. It is also significant that the minority 
committee report mentions that it was Republicans in Illinois asking to repeal the voting method, 
which suggests that favoring straight-ticket voting was not a national Republican policy platform. 
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Straight-ticket voting is a strategy used by both political parties, and often the political party that 
has a majority will favor the voting method.  
From the arguments made over the years about repealing straight-ticket voting it is 
evident that it has consistently been a partisan issue. The Democrats began to clearly express 
how the voting method was hurting their party as they gained strength as a party in the 1990s. 
Additionally, the Democrats began to express how straight-ticket voting was a confusing process 
for the voters. Democrats continued to use this argument after a 2003 Court Case, which 
addressed straight-ticket voting, determining the intent of the voter, and the confusing nature of 
the straight-ticket option. 
 
Appeal of Peter McDonough 
In 2003, the New Hampshire court case, Appeal of Peter McDonough, addressed the 
main arguments for and against straight-ticket voting, including how to determine the intent of 
the voter and whether voters truly understand the ballot instructions. The petitioner, Peter 
McDonough, a candidate in the 2002 election for Hillsborough County Attorney, asked the Court 
to address the constitutionality of straight-ticket voting laws in the state. At the time, the state 
used an office bloc form ballot with a straight-ticket option. Candidates would be grouped by 
their political party and then listed alphabetically. The political party that received the largest 
number of votes in the previous general election would be listed first within the office bloc. Thus, 
McDonough, who was the incumbent, was listed second under the County Attorney office 
because he was a Democrat (see Figure 4.4). McDonough lost the election to the Republican 
candidate by only 226 votes. After requesting a recount, the margin between the candidates was 
reduced to 126 votes. McDonough then appealed to the Ballot Law Commission (BLC), and they 
Foster 135 
 
upheld the recount by the secretary of state. McDonough then appealed the BLC’s decision to the 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire (Appeal of Peter McDonough 2003). 
New Hampshire has a BLC that is responsible for ensuring that the state election laws are 
carried out. RSA 665 creates a five member commission. The speaker of the House and the 
Senate president each appoint two members, but must choose one from each major political party. 
The governor makes the last appointment. Although the commission is set up to be nonpartisan, 
since the governor makes the fifth appointment, there will always be a majority for the political 
party of the governor. In addition, since the governor’s appointment lasts four years, while the 
other appointments are only two-year terms, that member has the most power in the commission. 
The secretary of state, who is responsible for designing the ballot, is the clerk of the BLC, but 
does not have any voting power (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §665:1). William Gardner has been New 
Hampshire’s secretary of state since 1976. The secretary of state is appointed by the House and 
Senate, and then reappointed every two years. The position, similar to the BLC, is a nonpartisan 
position. Evidence that this position is in fact nonpartisan is the fact that Secretary Gardner was a 
Democratic House representative when he was appointed to the position by the Republican 
majority House and Senate in 1976. The fact that Secretary Gardner has had his position for 36 
years, and that the Republicans have had the majority in the House for most of his term, suggests 
that he must be acting in a nonpartisan manner. Thus, neither party is really able to control the 
election process through the secretary of state’s office or the BLC. 
One of the most important roles of the BLC is to determine results of recount appeals 
(N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §665:8). McDonough asked the BLC to review challenged ballots where 
voters:  
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1) filled in the appropriate mark to vote a straight ticket Republican ballot 
2) made appropriate marks to vote for individual candidates, either Republican or 
Democrat 
3) did not make any mark for candidates in the county attorney race 
(Appeal of Peter McDonough 2003, 5) 
 
McDonough challenged these three types of ballots to highlight the difference in the intent of the 
voters. He argued that “the challenged ballots with individual votes for some offices, but a 
‘skipped vote’ for the county attorney’s office, rebutted the presumption that the voter intended 
to vote a straight ticket in that race” (Appeal of Peter McDonough 2003, 5). The secretary of 
state, responsible for administering the recount, explained that they attempted to determine the 
intent of the voter. The secretary of state used the rule that if the voter marked the straight-ticket 
option and voted for some of the individual offices, the straight-ticket mark would apply to the 
skipped races. The BLC upheld the secretary of state’s rule for McDonough’s appeal.  
Most of McDonough’s arguments in this case dealt with the confusion of the voter and 
how the BLC was determining the intent of the voter. The petitioner argued that the instructions 
on the ballot, especially with the addition of the clarifying instructions for the voter to vote for all 
the candidates in a multi-member district, often confused the voter. He argued that this confusion 
would result in recounts where the secretary of state or BLC would have to determine the intent 
of the ballot. The petitioner brought forward examples of when a voter would mark a straight-
ticket vote, then individually mark the first five races and leave the rest of the seven races blank. 
He argued that the BLC incorrectly counted the straight-ticket vote for the races that were not 
individually marked. Although the Court upheld the BLC’s ruling, they did caution that if a voter 
“skipped races on the ballot [this] could be considered strong evidence that the voter intended to 
abstain from the skipped races” (Appeal of Peter McDonough 2003, 8). For example, if a voter 
voted a straight-ticket and then marked individual candidates for the straight-ticket party eleven 
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out of the twelve races, the BLC should consider that the voter intentionally meant to abstain 
from that twelfth race. Nevertheless, the Court said that the BLC’s “uniform rule of ballot 
interpretation” is appropriate because “it seeks to give effect to all of the markings on a ballot” 
(Appeal of Peter McDonough 2003, 10).  
Many of the arguments brought forth by McDonough highlighted the same arguments the 
Democrats had been arguing for years, such as how the instructions for straight-ticket voting are 
confusing for the voter and that determining the intent of the voter is complicated. Even though 
the Court was unconvinced by McDonough’s arguments and upheld the BLC’s ruling, 
Democrats continued to argue that voters were easily confused by the straight-ticket option. This 
court ruling led to increased discussion about how voters were not using or understanding 
straight-ticket voting properly. For example, the Democrats pointed to evidence of voters clearly 
thinking the straight-ticket box was asking with which party they aligned or were registered. 
During recounts, Democrats had seen evidence of a voter marking a Republican straight-ticket, 
individually voting for candidates at the top of the ticket, and then skipping the races at the 
bottom of the ballot. In some cases, these voters would even vote a split ticket at the top of the 
ticket. Therefore, the Democrats were frustrated that the straight-ticket vote would still count for 
the bottom races that the voter had skipped over. More often than not, the Republican straight-
ticket box would be marked and the lower offices that were skipped over went to the 
Republicans, and thus helped the party maintain control in the state legislature. In fact, this 
argument was used by the Democrats to pass Senate Bill (SB) 36 in 2007, which repealed the 
straight-ticket voting method. 
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2007 Legislation Eliminating Straight-Ticket Voting 
 
In 2007, the Democratic Party, who had a majority in both chambers and held the 
governor’s office, was finally able to repeal straight-ticket voting. After the 2006 election, when 
the Democrats gained a majority in the House for the first time in 80 years, the Republicans 
questioned the Democrats as to why they would want to repeal the voting method that clearly 
assisted them in gaining a majority. The Democrats responded that they still felt the voting 
method was confusing for the voters, and that with the elimination of the voting method the 
intent of the voter would be much clearer. Since eliminating the voting method was part of their 
policy platform for over a decade, they saw their majority as an opportunity to finally repeal 
straight-ticket voting.  
Even though the bill had been a Democratic effort, several Republicans in the Senate 
testified in favor of the bill. The Senate had ten Republicans and fourteen Democrats; however, 
the final vote in favor of SB 36 to eliminate straight-ticket voting was eighteen to six, with four 
Republicans supporting the bill. Senator Barnes, a Republican, testified that he felt straight-ticket 
voting deterred and confused voters from voting for the individual candidate. He said, “they are 
intelligent enough to read that ballot and pick the candidates of their choice and not voting for 
the party, but voting for the individual. And that’s what voting is all about: it’s not party; it’s the 
individual who’s running for office” (N.H. General Court 2007, 50). This was the first time a 
Republican had openly testified in favor of eliminating straight-ticket voting. While some 
Republicans wanted to keep the voting method because it had helped them keep their majority in 
the past, other Republicans may have wanted to eliminate the voting method that helped the 
Democrats maintain a majority for the first time in 80 years. 
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The Democrats, especially Senator Burling who had also sponsored previous bills to 
repeal straight-ticket voting, continued to argue that the voting method confused the voters. 
Senator Burling said, “We seek now to eliminate one of the major institutions of confusion in the 
ballot, the straight-ticket circle which is then followed by people who vote down the ballot, 
clearly indicating that they don’t understand what the circle’s about” (N.H. General Court 2007, 
48). Senator Foster agreed with Senator Burling that the voter was often confused by the ballot, 
and provided further testimony about how the straight-ticket voting option was the source of this 
confusion. He testified on the Senate floor, 
[T]hey’ll fill out the straight ticket, and I think they do it ‘cause they think they’re 
being asked what their party is. Then they go through and they fill out, let’s say 
90 percent of the ballot. And what happened in my recount, not infrequently—I 
think happened in County Attorney McDonough’s recount, you may recall that 
one—is people skipped over that office entirely and went on to fill the rest of the 
ballot out. But because they filled out the top, the vote went one way or the other. 
And I don’t know what the intent of that voter was. I don’t think anybody can 
know what the intent of the voter is in that instance. But because of the way that 
the straight ticket works, one person got the vote or the other. You don’t think 
that’s evidence of confusion with the system? (N.H. General Court 2007, 54)  
 
While the Democrats arguments may have persuaded some Republicans to repeal straight-ticket 
voting, the Republicans may have also decided to support the bill because they realized that the 
strategy was not assisting their party in maintaining a majority as it had in the past. Either way, 
the Democrats would have been able to pass SB 36 because they had gained a majority in both 
chambers after the 2006 election.  
The effects of SB 36 are yet to be determined. Following the passage of SB 36, there 
have only been wave elections in the state. The 2008 and 2012 elections were both presidential 
election years, and the 2010 election was an important election for Republicans nationwide. The 
first election that followed the elimination of straight-ticket voting from the ballot, the 2008 
general election, was a landslide election for the Democrats. The Democrats won seats up and 
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down the ticket. In fact, this was the first time in the state that the Democrats won the presidency, 
both United States Senate seats, both United States House of Representative seats, the governor’s 
office, and both chambers in the state legislature. While the Democrats maintained a majority in 
both chambers, they did lose some seats in the House. It is unclear whether Democrats would 
have been able to keep their majority if it had not been a presidential election year or a landslide 
election for the Democrats and the straight-ticket option was still on the ballot.  
Since the elimination of the voting method, there have been drastic shifts between the 
party majority in the House, which may be evidence that voters are reading the ballot instead of 
just checking the straight-ticket box. The Democrats had argued that straight-ticket voting had 
more of an effect on the offices at the bottom of the ticket, but since the repeal of the voting 
method there have been only wave elections. Therefore, it is difficult to determine if the 
elimination of the voting method has encouraged voters to read candidates at the bottom of the 
ticket, or if the wave elections are encouraging voters to vote for candidates up and down the 
ticket. The effects of SB 36 will have to wait to be determined until there is not a wave election 
in the state. 
 
Conclusion  
The fact that a bill repealing straight-ticket voting was unable to be passed in New 
Hampshire until Democrats had a majority in both chambers and held the governor’s office is 
evidence that the Republican Party wanted to keep the voting method on the ballot. The 
Republican Party likely wanted to keep straight-ticket voting because it helped their candidates 
win seats at the bottom of the ticket. Despite the fact that the election results after the passing of 
SB 36 cannot be attributed to the repeal of the voting method, especially because there have been 
wave elections, the Republicans have put forth a bill in this 2013 session to bring back the voting 
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method (Smith 2013). Some of the arguments by the Republicans included that if people know 
that they want to vote for all of the candidates of one party they should have that choice, and that 
it would help decrease the lines at the polls and the amount of time that it would take to count the 
ballots. However, Democrats have argued that voters can still choose to elect only candidates 
from one party, and that in fact the time that it took to count ballots was actually increased by the 
confusion of the straight-ticket option. They also argued that the lines at the polls for the 2012 
election could be attributed to the recent voter ID law, and not the elimination of straight-ticket 
voting (Smith 2013).  
While it is difficult to determine the effects of the elimination of straight-ticket voting, 
there is evidence that it was a strategy benefitting the Republican Party. From recount elections it 
was evident that voters were unsure how to properly use the straight-ticket option. When voters 
were not voting for offices at the bottom of the ticket, such as the House of Representatives, the 
straight-ticket vote would count for these races. Considering that more Republicans were 
registered in the state in the past, the straight-ticket option aided the Republican Party in 
receiving more votes, because Republican voters would often fill out the straight-ticket box. 
However, the Democrats, even though straight-ticket voting may have helped them gain their 
majority in 2006, wanted to eliminate the voting method because they felt it was confusing for 
the voters and for those counting the ballots. Even though Republicans held onto this strategy for 
years, there were other parts of the ballot the party strategically designed to help translate votes 
into seats. 
 
Ballot Structure  
In addition to the straight-ticket voting option on the ballot, there have been other 
additions and changes to the ballot design. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, other aspects of 
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the ballot design have included changes between the party column and office bloc form and 
changes to the ordering of the candidates’ names. Figure 4.5 is a timeline of the changes to the 
ballot structure. In 1891, New Hampshire implemented the Australian ballot in the office bloc 
form (see Figure 4.6). Six years later, the state added the straight-ticket option (see Figure 4.7 
and Figure 4.8), which was kept until its elimination in 2007, and simultaneously changed to the 
party column form. In 1994, the ballot structure was changed to the office bloc form (see Figure 
4.4), but then changed back to party columns only ten years later. Over the years, there were also 
changes to how the candidates’ names were listed. These changes were in response to the rise of 
two-party competition in the state and Court rulings. 
 The combination of the straight-ticket option and party column form was kept until 1994, 
when the legislature changed the ballot to the office bloc form. The 1994 law required the 
candidates to be listed within their office by political party, and then listed alphabetically. The 
candidates of the party that received the largest number of votes in the previous general election 
were listed first, which was always the Republican Party. In the Senate Journal, the senators 
discussed that the ballot structure was changed to the office bloc form because the party column 
form often confused voters, and that the party column ballots were large and expensive. In 
addition, it is possible that the Republican Party started to sense the rise of two-party competition 
in the state, and as a senator described the office bloc form as an “incumbent protection act” 
(N.H. General Court 1994, 504). Since the incumbents, who were mostly Republicans, would be 
listed first, there was more of a chance that voters would elect that candidate, because of the 
primacy effect. The primacy effect, which will be discussed in the next section about the Akins v. 
Secretary of State case, is the theory that a voter is more likely to choose the first option listed on 
a ballot. For example, if the voter has the option of voting for ten representatives, and with the 
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office bloc form ten Republican candidates are listed first, an uninformed voter may be inclined 
to vote for the first ten candidates simply because they are listed first.  
In 1994, the state needed to change the format of the ballot because the newly 
implemented voting machines could only read the office bloc form. With the previous party 
column ballots, the Republican Party was always listed in the first column and the party would 
not want to lose this advantage with the adoption of a new ballot structure. For that reason, it is 
likely that the Republican Party designed the ordering of the candidates so that their party would 
be listed first, as a way to ensure that their party still had an advantage in the voting booth.  
In 2004, the ballot structure returned to the party column form. Through the 1990s the 
Democratic Party became competitive with the Republican Party. Even though the Democrats 
had not gained a majority in the House, it is likely that the Republicans were feeling threatened 
by the rise of two-party competition, especially as the Democrats were winning seats at the top 
of the ticket. With a Republican governor in office and a Republican majority in both chambers, 
HB 176 was passed in May 2004, but would not be implemented until January 1, 2005. This bill 
created party columns and had the political party that received the largest number of votes in the 
last general election listed in the first column. Sponsors of the bill argued that since the voting 
machines could now read the party column ballot, the state should return to this type of ballot. In 
addition, they argued that the party column form was easier for voters to read, especially when 
voting a straight-ticket (N.H. Senate. Internal Affairs 2004). However, it is likely that the 
Republicans also had partisan motives for changing back to this type of ballot, such as making 
sure that their party would be consistently listed first on the ballot. Even though the ballot design 
was a Republican effort, the Democrats were able to gain a majority in the House for the first 
time in 80 years when the ballot was implemented for the 2006 election. In a New Hampshire 
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Supreme Court Case, Akins v. Secretary of State, this ballot design was discussed and 
consequently amended in later legislative sessions.  
When the Court was hearing Akins v. Secretary of State, the Democrats in the State 
Senate sponsored SB 204, which would require the party columns on the ballot to be rotated 
(N.H. Senate 2005). For the past ten years, the Democrats were listed after Republican 
candidates in the office bloc ballot, and before that the state used party column ballots with the 
Republican Party consistently listed first. In fact, the secretary of state testified in the Akins case 
that the Republican Party had always been listed first except for the 1966 election ballot, which 
was when the Democrats were listed first because they had received the majority of the votes in 
the 1964 election (Ralph L. Akins 2006, 3). With the Democrats winning seats at the top of the 
ticket since the 1990s, they argued that it was unfair for their party to always be listed second on 
the ballot. They also believed that the design of the ballot was hindering their chances of winning 
seats lower down the ticket. Because uninformed voters are likely to be influenced by the 
primacy effect, the Republican Party predicted that if a voter individually marked the candidates 
they would likely choose the Republican candidate because they were listed in the first column. 
Although SB 204 was not passed, the Court’s ruling in Akins essentially called for a rotating 
columns ballot.  
 
Akins v. Secretary of State  
After the 2004 general election, several candidates, past representatives, and the New 
Hampshire Democratic Party brought suit against the secretary of state concerning the format of 
the state general election ballot. The petitioners argued that they were disadvantaged in the 2004 
general election because of the format of the ballot, which at the time was in the office bloc form 
with candidates grouped by party and then listed alphabetically. Additionally, they argued that 
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the ballot structure advantaged the party listed first. In the meantime the legislature had changed 
RSA 656:5 so that the ballot would be in a party column form. The secretary of state had 
testified that the candidates’ names would be listed in alphabetical order within the party 
columns. The party column ballot and office bloc ballot shared the feature that “the first 
candidate listed for any given office on the ballot is the candidate from the party that received the 
most total votes in the preceding general election,” and so the Court addressed whether the new 
party column form and the alphabetizing of candidates’ names imposed only “reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions” (Ralph L. Akins 2006, 6). In addition, the Court decided that RSA 
656:5 and the “alphabetizing of candidates must comply with strict scrutiny to be constitutional 
(Ralph L. Akins 2006, 7).  
To aid their argument, the petitioner had several experts testify about how there can be a 
primacy effect “when choices are presented visually,” such as on a ballot. In fact, in the 
petitioner’s petition for declaratory judgment, they pointed to a study by Professor Jon Krosnick 
on primacy effect and the order of candidates’ names. The study found that the advantage 
“conferred by primacy effects ranged from 1.41% to 6.32% and averaged 2.88%.” This finding, 
the petitioners argued, was significant because “Numerous races run in New Hampshire are 
decided by lesser margins” (N.H. Senate. Internal Affairs 2005). The secretary of state testified 
that studies have shown that “the primacy effect can confer as much as a six to ten percent 
advantage upon candidates whose names appear on lists as long as twelve candidates,” which the 
state of New Hampshire has especially for the House races (Ralph L. Akins 2006, 3).  
While the state argued that their interest was in “creating a manageable ballot,” the Court 
was not convinced that this was the only way to create the ballot, and thus found it was 
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unconstitutional under Article 11, Part I of the New Hampshire constitution. Article 11, Part I of 
the Constitution states,  
All elections are to be free, and every inhabitant of the state of 18 years of age 
and upwards shall have an equal right to vote in any election. Every person shall 
be considered an inhabitant for the purposes of voting in the town, ward, or 
unincorporated place where he has his domicile […] The right to vote shall not 
be denied to any person because of the non-payment of any tax. Every inhabitant 
of the state, having the proper qualifications, has equal right to be elected into 
office.  
 
The Court ruled that “the State has failed to demonstrate that arranging the ballot as required by 
RSA 656:5 and the practice of alphabetization are necessary to create a manageable ballot” 
(Ralph L. Akins 2006, 7). Additionally, the Court argued that the state in fact already used a 
ballot form that did not violate the Constitution, which was the primary ballot that rotated the 
candidates’ names. Lastly, the Court ruled that the current ballot “denies candidates of minority 
parties an equal opportunity to enjoy the advantages of the primacy effect, and thus, an equal 
right to be elected” (Ralph L. Akins 2006, 6). In other words, the Court was suggesting that there 
was no way to eliminate the primacy effect with the current ballot form.  
In response to the Akins ruling, the state legislature amended the design of the ballot so 
that it did not favor any particular political party. In 2007, the Democratic controlled legislature 
eliminated the requirement that the party “which received the largest number of votes at the last 
preceding state general election would be listed first” in HB 480 (N.H. House 2007). However, 
HB 480 did not set any requirement about how the candidates should be listed. In 2010, the 
Democratic controlled legislature clarified that the secretary of state should rotate the columns so 
that each party should appear approximately an equal number of times “in the first, last, and each 
intermediate column position” in SB 157 (N.H. Senate 2010). The legislature outlined how the 
secretary of state should rotate the columns by using a generic column rotation plan across all 
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representative districts in the state, and provided an example. For example, the bill outlined that 
for the nine wards in Nashua the columns should be arranged as: 
Nashua Ward 1 3 1 2 
Nashua Ward 2 2 1 3 
Nashua Ward 3 1 3 2 
Nashua Ward 4 1 3 2 
Nashua Ward 5 1 3 2 
Nashua Ward 6 3 2 1 
Nashua Ward 7 2 1 3 
Nashua Ward 8 3 2 1 
Nashua Ward 9 1 2 3 
(N.H. Senate 2010) 
The “1,” “2,” and “3” refer to the three major political parties in the state, the Republican Party, 
Democratic Party, and Libertarian Party. The secretary of state is required by the law to 
randomly pick which party will be number 1, 2 or 3. Additionally, SB 157, as mentioned earlier 
in this chapter, set out how the secretary of state should randomly arrange the candidates within 
the randomly arranged party columns. The combination of the 2007 and 2010 bills, which were 
both passed under a Democratic majority in both chambers, created the randomized ballot the 
state still uses today. 
 
Conclusion  
Over the years, the Republican Party designed the ballot as a strategy to maintain control 
in the House, but these strategies were eliminated with a shift in party control in the legislature. 
For about 110 years the Republicans had relied upon the straight-ticket voting option, especially 
in the 1990s with the rise of two-party competition. In addition to the straight-ticket option, the 
Republicans relied on the fact that their candidates would be listed first in the office bloc form, 
or their party would be listed first in the party column form. When voters did not choose the 
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straight-ticket option, or would both mark the straight-ticket option and individually vote for 
candidates, the Republican Party could rely upon the primacy effect to gain more votes. The 
current ballot, however, does not have the straight-ticket option and the secretary of state is 
required to randomize the party columns and the candidates’ names, so that each political party 
and candidate has an equal opportunity to be subject to the primacy effect.  
One strategy that has persisted throughout the changes to the ballot is the chance for a 
candidate to be listed in multiple party columns. If a candidate receives 35 write-in votes on the 
opposing party’s primary ballot, the candidate will be listed in both the Republican Party and 
Democratic Party columns on the general election ballot (N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §659:88). When 
the straight-ticket option was on the ballot, candidates listed in both columns had the chance to 
receive a vote from both straight-ticket votes. The only change to this statute over the years has 
been the increase in the number of required write-in votes a candidate must receive, which most 
likely coincided with the increase in the total number of ballots cast in the state (N.H. Rev. Stat. 
Ann. §659:88). Even though the ballot does not include the straight-ticket option anymore, 
candidates listed in both columns can take advantage of the primacy effect by guaranteeing that 
they are listed in the first column, no matter how the party columns are randomized. This 
strategy has been equally used by the Republican and Democratic candidates over the years.  
After the Republican Party lost their ballot design strategies, the party implemented a 
potentially, new strategy. Beginning in 2011, several states started to implement voter 
identification laws. Prior to the 2012 presidential election, voter identification laws had become a 
national Republican Party effort (“Voter Identification Requirements” 2012). In 2012, New 
Hampshire passed a voter identification law under the Republican majority in the state 
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legislature. A culmination of SB 289 and HB 1354 created a law that required voters to show 
identification at the polls to vote. Governor Lynch, a Democrat, vetoed SB 289, stating that, 
The right to vote is a fundamental right that is guaranteed to all citizens of this 
State under the United States and New Hampshire Constitutions. Our election 
laws must be designed to encourage and facilitate voting by all eligible voters 
in New Hampshire. SB 289 requires a voter to present valid photo identification 
or execute an affidavit in order to vote in person in a municipal, state and federal 
election beginning with the primary election this September […] I was prepared 
to support this form of photo identification because the bill’s provisions would 
ensure that every eligible voter who went to the polls on Election Day was able to 
cast a ballot that would be counted. The legislature, however, adopted a more 
restrictive list of valid photo identifications that can be used in a municipal, state 
or federal election beginning September 1, 2013 […] SB 289 would put into place 
a photo identification system that is far more restrictive than necessary. (N.H. 
House Record 2012a, 19)  
 
In his veto message, Governor Lynch expressed that he did not approve of the fact that prior to 
September 1, 2013 seven types of identification would be accepted, but after that date only four 
types of identification would be accepted. For example, student identification would no longer be 
accepted as a proper form of identification. The governor’s veto, however, was overridden by the 
legislature and the bill became law. If a voter did not have a proper form of identification they 
could sign an affidavit. The governor also mentioned in his veto message for SB 289 that the 
affidavit asked unnecessary questions, which were later removed in HB 1354. However, HB 
1354 still kept the requirement that student identification would not be considered appropriate 
identification after September 1, 2013. Since New Hampshire is a covered jurisdiction under the 
Voting Rights Act, the laws needed to receive preclearance by the United States Department of 
Justice. Both of the laws were pre-cleared prior to the 2012 election (Connor, 2012). 
The purpose of the voter identification law is to prevent voter fraud; however, as a 
Democratic senator mentioned there has been “no evidence of rampant voter fraud in New 
Hampshire” (Landrigan 2012). Two New Hampshire interest groups, The Civil Liberties Union 
of New Hampshire and League of Women Voters, opposed the bills because they felt that the 
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laws created an “unfair burden on the elderly, students and low-income residents, those most 
likely not to have an ID with them at the polls” (Landrigan 2012). The Democratic Party has 
made similar arguments to the interest groups, because the groups of voters that would be most 
affected by the law are typically Democratic voters. Thus, it is quite possible that the voter 
identification law was another Republican strategy to help them maintain party control, by 
discouraging voters without proper identification from going to the polls. The effects of the voter 
identification law have yet to be determined, because in the 2012 election if a voter did not have 
a proper form of identification they had to sign an affidavit and were permitted to vote in that 
election (“Voter ID Law—Laws of 2012, Chapter 289: Explanatory Document”). The Democrats, 
who currently have a majority in the House, have proposed a bill to stop the September 1
st
 
portion of the law, which restricts the types of acceptable identification, from going into effect 
(N.H. House 2013). Since the Republicans have a majority in the Senate, it is unlikely that this 
bill will be passed. 
The Republican Party’s strategy of using ballot design to maintain one-party control is 
not separate from the strategies discussed in the previous chapters. In fact, the strategies of the 
changes to the ballot design, aligned with the changes to redistricting and use of floterial districts, 
allowed the Republican Party to consistently maintain control in the House for about 80 years. 
As discussed in the redistricting chapter, strategically grouping voters becomes less effective 
over the ten years. Thus, in the meantime, the Republicans could count on the ballot design to 
help gain them votes. The combination of straight-ticket voting and the grouping of candidates’ 
names on the ballot helped guarantee more votes for the Republican Party on election day.  
An example of when the combination of these ballot structures is particularly effective is 
in at-large districts. The town of Derry, New Hampshire was an at-large district in 2006, when 
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the state still had straight-ticket voting and the ballot was in the party column form with the 
Republican Party listed first. In 2006, Derry was a decidedly Republican town, as evident by the 
1,490 Republican straight-ticket ballots cast in the election, in contrast to the only 934 
Democratic straight-ticket ballots cast (“State Representative-2006 General Election”). As 
discussed in this chapter, even if a voter skipped a race, their straight-ticket vote would be 
counted for that race. If a voter in Derry chose to skip the House race, their Republican straight-
ticket mark would count for the eleven Republican candidates on the ballot. On the other hand, 
there were only four Democratic candidates on the ballot, so it was not possible for the 
Democrats to win the eleven seats even if there had been more Democratic straight-ticket ballots 
cast. In the 2006 election, nine out of the eleven representatives elected were Republicans. The 
2006 election was a Democratic landslide, and the first year the Democrats gained a majority in 
the House in 80 years, so it is not surprising that a couple Democrats were able to win in a strong 
Republican district. 
The combination of the at-large district and ballot structure helped the Republican Party 
translate votes into seats for their party. The way the ballot was structured in 2006, which had the 
Republican candidates listed in the first column, encouraged voters to choose the eleven 
candidates in the first column, or not vote at all and have their straight-ticket mark count for 
those candidates anyways. In 2004, the Republican controlled legislature allocated Derry eleven 
representatives, because Derry voters had previously only elected Republican representatives. 
Thus, the Republican Party hoped that this district, in combination with the ballot structure, 
would translate votes into eleven Republican seats. Even in a Democratic landslide, the 
Republican Party was able to win seats in the Republican at-large district.  
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The purpose of this chapter was to provide an explanation of another strategy used by the 
Republican Party that allowed them to maintain control, especially as the Democratic Party’s 
growing strength in the 1990s began to threaten the Republicans’ majority in the House. The 
Republicans had multiple strategies for the design of the ballot, including straight-ticket voting, 
and designing the ballot so that their party would be listed first. These strategies were used in 
conjunction with the other strategies discussed in the previous chapters, including redistricting 
and the use of floterial districts. The final chapter of this thesis will provide a better explanation 
of the sequencing of these strategies, which allowed the New Hampshire Republicans to 
maintain a majority in the House while there was a rise of two-party competition in the state.
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Figure 4.1: Sample Ballot for Manchester Ward 7, 2012 General Election  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This is the current structure of the ballot in the state. The Republican Party is listed in the first column on this ballot, but 
for Manchester Ward 8 (see Figure 4.2), the Democratic Party is listed first. 
  
Source: “Sample ACCUVOTE Ballots-2012 General Election.” New Hampshire Secretary of State. 
http://sos.nh.gov/Elections/Election_Information/2012_Elections/General_Election/Sample_ACCUVOTE_Ballots_-
_2012_General_Election.aspx?id=27214 (accessed March 1, 2013).
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Figure 4.2: Sample Ballot for Manchester Ward 8, 2012 General Election  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This is the current structure of the ballot in the state. The Democratic Party is listed in the first column on this ballot, but 
for Manchester Ward 7 (see Figure 4.1), the Republican Party is listed first. 
 
Source: “Sample ACCUVOTE Ballots-2012 General Election.” New Hampshire Secretary of State. 
http://sos.nh.gov/Elections/Election_Information/2012_Elections/General_Election/Sample_ACCUVOTE_Ballots_-
_2012_General_Election.aspx?id=27213 (accessed March 1, 2013). 
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Figure 4.4: Sample Ballot for Manchester Ward 6, 2002 General Election  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This is an example of the office bloc form of the ballot used from 1994 to 2004 in the state.  
 
Source: “Sample Ballot.” Appeal of Peter McDonough (Ballot Law Commission). 2003. 149. N.H. 105. The Supreme Court of 
New Hampshire. http://www.courts.state.nh.us/supreme/opinions/2003/ballot.pdf (accessed March 1, 2013). 
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Figure 4.6: Sample Ballot for Manchester Ward 8, 1892 General Election 
Note: This is an example of the ballot before straight-ticket voting was implemented in the state.  
 
Source: New Hampshire. Department of State. Division of Records Management and Archives. “1892 Ballot, Manchester Ward 8.”  
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Figure 4.7: Sample Ballot for Manchester Ward 8, 1898 General Election  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: This is an example of how the ballot was designed when straight- ticket voting was 
first implemented.  
 
Source: New Hampshire. Department of State. Division of Records Management and Archives. “1898 Ballot, Manchester Ward 
8.” 
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Figure 4.8: Sample Ballot for Manchester Ward 8, 1992 General Election 
Note: This is an example of the ballot in the party column form with the straight-ticket option. Compared to 1898, this ballot includes instructions for the voters on how to vote a 
straight-ticket. Note how President Clinton is listed in the second column, because he is a Democratic candidate, and he won New Hampshire in the 1992 election. 
 
Source: New Hampshire. Department of State. Division of Records Management and Archives. “1992 Ballot, Manchester Ward 8.”
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Conclusion: The Sequencing of the Strategies 
 
The previous chapters have outlined how Republicans in New Hampshire have 
strategically designed institutions to translate votes into seats. The purpose of this thesis was to 
explain how a party in control of a legislative body is able to maintain that control. Chapters two, 
three, and four of the thesis illustrate and analyze three strategies used by New Hampshire 
Republican politicians to maintain control of the New Hampshire House of Representatives. In 
each chapter, I have pointed to how the use of an individual strategy does not guarantee a 
majority for the Republican Party in the House. I make note of the fact that these strategies are 
not immune to wave elections, national trends in politics, or preexisting institutions. Additionally, 
I provide a story of sequencing within each strategy. This final chapter will help clarify how the 
chapters analyzing the individual strategies collectively explain how the Republicans were able 
to maintain one-party control. 
As outlined in the first chapter, this thesis is based on the work of Schickler and Pierson. 
In chapters two, three, and four, I explain the motivation of the actors for strategically designing 
that particular institution, which is how Schickler focuses on institutional design. I also explain 
the sequencing of events and unanticipated consequences affecting the individual strategies, 
which looks beyond the motivations of the actors, as Pierson suggests. The overall goal of this 
thesis is to tell a story of how politicians use multiple strategies to translate votes into seats for 
their party. The sequencing of these strategies allowed the Republican Party to maintain control 
of the House even as Democrats won seats at the top of the ticket in New Hampshire.  
The main argument of my thesis is that as the state shifted from “red” to “purple” the 
Republican Party was able to maintain control of the House by strategic manipulation of 
institutions. Starting in the 1990s the Democratic Party began winning seats at the top of the 
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ticket, but meanwhile the Republicans maintained a majority in the House. As the Republican 
Party began to be threatened by two-party competition, I have shown how the party increased its 
use of strategies to maintain their control in the House. I have also shown how the Democratic 
Party started to attempt to contest these strategies in the 1990s. For example, as the Democratic 
Party began to win seats at the top of the ticket, but not in the House, they saw redistricting as a 
strategy Republicans were using to maintain their majority. Thus, they attempted to take 
redistricting out of the legislature by proposing redistricting commissions. This would have 
stopped the Republican Party from using redistricting and floterial districts as strategies for 
maintaining their majority. Another way the Democrats pushed back was to eliminate the use of 
straight-ticket voting on the ballot. The Republican Party, however, fought to keep this voting 
method on the ballot because they found that it benefitted their party. The Democrats were 
finally able to gain a majority in the House in 2006 and used their majority to eliminate straight-
ticket voting from the ballot.  
This thesis has strictly focused on the New Hampshire House of Representatives. As I 
explained in the first chapter, the New Hampshire House consists of 400 members, and therefore 
allows for more gerrymandering when redistricting the House districts. I have also focused on 
the House over the other offices, because this chamber was more susceptible to the Republican 
Party’s strategic manipulation of districting and ballot design than the other offices. As the 
Republican Party strategically drew the House district maps, implemented floterial districts, and 
designed the ballot to benefit their party, these strategies did not stop the Democrats from 
winning seats at the top of the ticket. Unlike the House races, statewide offices, such as the 
governor’s office, are not elected from districts and thus are not subject to the strategic use of 
redistricting and floterial districts. For example, the governor’s office and president’s office are 
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both elected statewide, and beginning the 1990s the Democratic Party began winning these 
offices. On the other hand the United States House of Representatives is elected by districts, and 
in comparison to the offices elected statewide, the Democrats were not consistently winning this 
office in the 1990s. In fact, neither party has had a stronghold on this office, because the 
legislature can only divide the state into two districts and therefore are not able to as easily 
strategically group voters as they can for the state House districts. Since the New Hampshire 
House of Representatives is elected through districts, and politicians are able to strategically 
group voters through gerrymandering efforts and the use of floterial districts, this office is 
especially responsive to this strategy.  
In addition to strategically redistricting and using floterial districts, the House 
Representatives are especially affected by the design of the ballot. The Republican controlled 
state legislature has strategically designed ballots to benefit its party. Although straight-ticket 
voting was implemented in 1897, the Republican Party fought to keep this voting method on the 
ballot because it helped their party gain seats, especially for the offices at the bottom of the ticket. 
As discussed in the fourth chapter, the secretary of state interprets the law such that if a voter 
checked the Republican straight-ticket box, but did not fill out the races at the bottom of the 
ticket, the straight-ticket vote would be counted for the Republican candidate for the skipped 
races. Since the candidates for the House of Representatives are listed towards the bottom of the 
ballot, this reading of the straight-ticket vote had an effect on this office. Additionally, the 
Republican Party passed legislation that provided that the party which received the largest 
amount of votes in the previous election was listed as the first column or listed first in the office 
blocs. Since New Hampshire was a decidedly Republican state, their party was listed first on the 
ballot. Thus, the Republican Party was subject to the primacy effect, because as studies have 
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shown, uninformed voters are more likely to choose the first option on the ballot. Since voters 
may be more uninformed about the House candidates, especially because some voters have the 
option of electing as many as 11 representatives, they will be more likely to either skip the race 
or vote for the candidates listed first. Designing the ballot so that it included a straight-ticket 
option and listed the Republican candidates first helped ensure that Republicans would receive 
more votes. Therefore, the primacy effect and the straight-ticket voting methods both had more 
of an effect on the House offices than the offices listed at the top of the ticket. 
 
Sequencing of Strategies 
The strategies implemented and used by the Republican Party to help maintain party 
control are not separate tools; they are strategically used together. Drawing the district maps and 
using floterial districts to strategically group voters can be completed only once every ten years, 
as confirmed in the Town of Canaan ruling. Since the Republicans have always had the majority 
in the House when it is time to redraw the maps, they have been able to control this process. For 
example, they were able to introduce floterial districts, and use this as a mechanism to 
gerrymander when they began to feel threatened by the rise of two-party competition in the state. 
As I have discussed, redistricting becomes less effective over the years, because even though 
Republicans may have originally strategically grouped voters, the voters move or the population 
shifts or grows during the ten years. Thus, Republicans use other strategies during this time to 
translate votes into seats, such as ballot design. In addition to straight-ticket voting, the 
Republicans also controlled their party being listed first on the ballot. Similar to how the 
Republicans had the majority for redistricting, they were able to control the design of the ballot. 
Once the Democrats gained a majority in the House, they were able to eliminate the features of 
the ballot that the Republicans were using as strategies to maintain party control.  
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Although the strategies used by the Republicans were not originally used collectively as a 
way to maintain party control, with the rise of two-party competition in the state the Republicans 
increased their use of these strategies. Figure 5.1 shows when the strategies were implemented, 
and how the Republicans began to use the strategies together as a way to secure their majority as 
Democrats began winning seats at the top of the ticket in the 1990s. The major events include the 
introduction of the institutions that are later used as strategies and the eventual elimination of 
these strategies, Court rulings that shape how the strategies can be used and that either benefitted 
the majority or minority party, and the Democratic Party gaining strength as a party in the state 
and gaining a majority in the House.  
As can be seen from Figure 5.1, there is an interplay and sequencing of the strategies 
used by the Republican Party. In 1964, the United States Supreme Court came out with the “one-
person, one-vote” principle in Reynolds v. Sims that changed the New Hampshire redistricting 
process. Originally the House districts were made up of individual towns and the smaller towns 
received only part-time representation. Starting in 1965, the New Hampshire state legislature 
became responsible for drawing district lines, and used a combination of single-member, multi-
member, and at-large districts. Over time, redistricting turned into a strategy for the Republican 
Party to translate votes into seats, and therefore this ruling benefitted the majority party in the 
long run. In 1982, on the cusp of the rise of two-party competition, the Republicans in the House 
introduced floterial districts as a mechanism to assist with lowering statewide deviations. Later, 
this mechanism also became an important strategy for the Republicans. 
As the Democrats began winning seats at the top of the ticket while remaining in the 
minority in the House, the Republicans started increasing their use of existing institutions as 
strategies to assist their party in controlling the legislature. In response, the Democrats attempted 
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to undo these strategies. For example, the Democrats proposed bills to create redistricting 
commissions and to eliminate straight-ticket voting from the ballot. These attempts by the 
Democrats emphasize the importance of the strategies to the Republicans’ ability to maintain 
party control in the House.  
After the House redrew the district map, the Republicans continued to hold a majority in 
the House even as Democratic President Clinton won the state in the 1992 election. Later in the 
1990s, the Democrats won a majority in the State Senate and took hold of the governor’s office, 
but the Republicans still kept their majority in the House. Since the effects of gerrymandering 
become lessened over the years, it is likely that the ballot design was helping the Republican 
Party maintain their majority as well. The 1992 redistricting plan included 32 floterial districts 
and had a high statewide deviation, suggesting that the floterial districts assisted the Republican 
Party in creating a gerrymandered plan. At this time the state still had the straight-ticket voting 
option, which was implemented in 1897, and the ballot was in the office bloc form with the 
Republican candidates listed first. So until the next redistricting plan, the Republicans could 
count on translating votes into seats from the booth, because of the confusion of the straight-
ticket voting method and the primacy effect from their candidates being listed first on the ballot. 
The Republican strategies continued into the 2000s, as the Democrats continued to gain 
strength as a party. In 2002 the Republicans attempted to pass a redistricting plan, but for the 
first time in New Hampshire history a Democratic governor vetoed the bill. The redistricting 
plan was then sent to the state Courts, for again the first time in state history. The Court drew the 
map for the 2002 election, but the Republican legislature and Republican governor replaced this 
plan for the 2004 election. Since the Court had ruled that floterial districts were an “unsound 
redistricting device,” the 2002 Court plan and 2004 House plan did not include floterial districts. 
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Since the Republicans had been using floterial districts as a strategy for redistricting in the past, 
they wanted to be able to use this type of district again. In 2006, a constitutional amendment 
question on the ballot asked if the state legislature should be allowed to use floterial districts to 
redistrict. The voters passed the constitutional amendment in the 2006 election. In addition, in 
2006 voters elected enough Democrats to give the party a majority in the House for the first time 
in 80 years. 
The 2006 election was the first time the Republican strategies had failed, and the start of 
the elimination of some of their strategies. After the 2006 election, the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire in Akins v. Secretary of State, a case about a County Attorney election recount, ruled 
that the legislature was not creating the most manageable ballot as possible. With the Democrats 
having a majority, they were able to change the design of the ballot so that the secretary of state 
had to create a rotated party column ballot. This made it so that the Republican Party was not the 
only party subject to the primacy effect. In the same year, the Democrats, who had been 
consistently proposing legislation to eliminate straight-ticket voting for years, were finally able 
to pass a bill repealing this voting method. After the Democrats kept their majority for a second 
session in 2010, they were able to further outline how the secretary of state should position the 
party columns and candidates on the ballot, so that every candidate and political party would be 
equally subjected to the primacy effect. Even with two of their strategies eliminated, the 
Republican Party was able to take back the House in 2012 and had the chance to redistrict the 
state. The Republicans worked hard to pass their plan, by overriding a governor’s veto and 
defending the plan in Court, but their map did not help them maintain their majority. In the 2012 
election, the Democrats were able to take back the House.  
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After the rise of two-party competition in the state, the Republican Party was able to 
maintain control of the House for more than a decade by using multiple strategies. Throughout 
the 1990s the House Republicans controlled the district map and ballot design, and used these 
strategies to translate votes into seats. In 2006, however, the Democrats were able to gain control 
of the House and eliminate some of the Republican strategies. But since the rise of two-party 
competition there have been wave elections and the House majority has alternated between 
political parties, despite the use of strategies. The Republicans strategically drew the district map 
for the 2012 election, such as drawing a floterial district combining Manchester Wards 8 and 9 
and Litchfield that produced two Republican representatives. However, the Democrats were still 
able to win enough seats to have a majority in the House. As discussed in the previous chapters, 
the Republican strategies are not immune to wave elections, and thus it is difficult to tell what 
the effects of using or eliminating the strategies are when there are wave elections. For example, 
since the elimination of straight-ticket voting every election has been a wave election, and as a 
result it is difficult to tell whether straight-ticket voting on the ballot would have helped the 
Republicans maintain control in the elections after its elimination.  
With consistent wave elections and the House fluctuating between party majorities, both 
parties have been eliminating and adding strategies to maintain their majority. When the 
Democrats had a majority they eliminated some of the strategies they felt the Republicans were 
using to hold onto the House. After the Democrats eliminated some of the Republican’s 
strategies, the Republicans took advantage of their veto proof majority and passed a 2012 
redistricting bill that was strongly opposed to by the Democratic House members and governor. 
In addition, the Republican Party added a new strategy by passing a voter identification law, 
which the Democrats have argued targets their party’s voters. Since the voter identification law 
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does not go into full effect until September 1, 2013, the implications of this law on party control 
of the House are yet to be determined. With the Democrats currently having a majority in the 
House, they have proposed legislation that would prevent the tighter regulations of the voter 
identification law from going into effect on September 1. Even though the Democrats have a 
majority in the House and hold the governor’s office, the Republicans have a majority in the 
Senate and will likely not pass this law. Thus, if the Democrats attempt to eliminate or add any 
other strategies so they can maintain their control, it is likely that their efforts will be stopped by 
the Republican controlled Senate. If the trend of wave elections and voters alternating the 
majority in the House continues, it is possible that strategies may cease to have any effect on 
party control of the House.  
 
Conclusion 
Although this thesis focuses on the use of strategies by Republicans to maintain party 
control of the New Hampshire House, it is merely an illustrative example of how the sequencing 
of multiple strategies allows a political party to maintain control of a state legislature while there 
is two-party competition in the state. As discussed earlier, the strategies analyzed in this thesis 
have a greater effect on the House compared to the other offices, and thus it is unlikely that the 
findings of this thesis can be extrapolated outside the state level. For example, it is unlikely that 
the Republican Party would have been able to use strategies quite as effectively to influence 
elections at the federal level. Additionally, the findings of this thesis apply to a state that has 
rising two-party competition and a state legislature with consistent one-party control. In New 
Hampshire, the Republicans increased their use of multiple strategies to maintain their party 
control. Without the rise of two-party competition in the state, and if the state had stayed “red,” 
the Republicans would not have felt as though their majority was being threatened, and would 
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not have needed to use strategies to maintain their majority. Therefore, the threat of two-party 
competition encourages politicians to seek multiple strategies to maintain one-party control of a 
legislature. 
The threat of two-party competition increased the use of strategies in New Hampshire, 
because the Republican Party was used to having a majority in the House and the ability to 
exercise agenda control. Having one-party control in a state legislature allows that political party 
to control the legislative agenda and electoral rules. As a result, both political parties will want to 
be in the majority. However, when one party has a majority they will work to set up rules that 
can ensure that they maintain control, and as a result make it more difficult for the minority party 
to gain a majority. In 2006, the Democrats were able to gain a majority in the New Hampshire 
House, and as a result were able to eliminate some of the Republican Party’s strategies. The 
Democrats were able to gain control of the House because of the shift in the political makeup of 
the state and court rulings. This thesis has highlighted how politicians rely on the sequencing of 
multiple strategies to keep their majority in a legislature, which then allows for their party to 
control the legislative agenda. Furthermore, this thesis has shown how court rulings and changes 
in population and political alignment in a state can allow for a shift in majority control, which 
can result in changes to the strategies of the previous majority party and changes in the “rules of 
the game.” 
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Note: This is a timeline of the sequencing of the strategies used by the Republican Party to maintain control of the New Hampshire House as there was a rise in two-party 
competition in the state. 
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